The China White Paper 1949 (XXVII)

Another implication of the occupation of Changchun was that Nationalist government army leaders in Manchuria became over confident of their military capability and falsely believed that they could solve the problem in Manchuria by non-political means. On May 24th Chiang Kai-shek spelt out his conditions for the restoration of peace. He wanted the Communist to demonstration their good faith by allowing the National Government agencies to restore communication networks in North China. On June 3rd, 1946 Chiang issued orders to cease the advancement of his armies or the pursuit of Communists for a period of ten days thus paving the way for negotiations with the Communists. General Chou En-lai (周恩來 ) asked for an extension from 10 day to one month but finally reduced it to 15 days. Chou would fly to Yenan (延安) to discuss with CCP leaders.1 Negotiations proceeded very slowing during the truce period. On June 17, Chiang told General Marshall his expectation from the negotiations: the evacuation of CCP forces from Jehol and Chahar Provinces before 1st September 1946, and the occupation of Chefoo and Weihaiwai in Shantung by the Nationalists. In Manchuria, the Nationalist government wanted to take over from the Communists locations that included Harbin, Antung, Tunghwa, Mutankiang, and Paicheng. Immediately General Chou regarded these requests were too much.2 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 158.
2. Ibid., page 160.