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2025年3月26日 星期三

Taiwan's TSMC to invest 15 trillion yen in the US, President Trump announces

 Recently CNN.co.jp reported the following:

台湾TSMC、米国で15兆円投資へ トランプ大統領発表

2025.03.04 Tue posted at 17:47 JST

  ニューヨーク(CNN) 台湾の半導体大手、台湾積体電路製造(TSMC)が、米国での生産事業に少なくとも1000億ドル(約15兆円)を投資するとの見通しが明らかになった。

 

トランプ米大統領が3日、魏哲家・最高経営責任者(CEO)、ラトニック商務長官、人工知能(AI)・暗号資産政策を指揮するサックス氏とともに、ホワイトハウスで発表した。

 

アリゾナ州ですでに稼働しているTSMCの半導体製造工場一つと建設中の二つに加え、新たに先端工場三つを建設するための資金で、数万人の雇用創出が期待される。

 

Translation

Taiwan's TSMC to invest 15 trillion yen in the US, President Trump announces

New York (CNN) Taiwanese semiconductor giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) was set to invest at least $100 billion (approximately 15 trillion yen) in its manufacturing operations in the US.

US President Trump announced this at the White House on the 3rd, along with CEO Wei Zhejia (魏哲家), Secretary of Commerce Lutnick, and Sachs, who oversees artificial intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrency policies.

The funds would be used to build three new cutting-edge factories, in addition to one TSMC semiconductor manufacturing plant already in operation and two under construction in Arizona, tens of thousands of jobs were expected to be created.

       So, TSMC will be investing at least $100 billion in its manufacturing operations in the US. I am wondering what are the reasons that push TSMC to make such a decision. Will US tariffs be a factor? Or the future security of Taiwan?

2023年11月14日 星期二

中國新一輪逮捕使到外國公司緊張,對富士康展開調查(2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

China Rattles Foreign Firms with New Arrests, Foxconn Probe (2/2)

Bloomberg News

Tue, October 24, 2023 at 2:46 a.m. GMT+8

(continue)

Foxconn billionaire founder Terry Gou resigned from the company’s board last month as he campaigns to become president of Taiwan. The campaign referred questions to Foxconn. He previously dismissed claims he would be susceptible to Chinese pressure, were he to win January’s election.

“I will not bow to China’s threats,” Gou said at the August briefing announcing his presidential bid. Name-checking key customers including Apple, Tesla and Amazon.com Inc., he said any halt to production due to political pressure would disrupt supply chains — something China would need to explain to the world.

Xiaomeng Lu, director of Geo-Technology at Eurasia Group, said the probe may be China’s way of seeking influence in the Taiwanese election, where the island’s relationship with the mainland will be a central issue.

“I think Beijing definitely has an incentive to weigh in and have a chat with Terry Gou about this presidential race,” she said on Bloomberg Television.

To Teneo’s Wildau, the “crackdown is surprising because Gou has strong relationships with mainland leaders, and Foxconn has played an important role in establishing China as the world’s largest exporter and manufacturer”. However, “top leaders are probably unhappy that Gou is poised to play spoiler in Taiwan’s presidential campaign. The actions against Foxconn look like they’re intended to send a message to Gou that he should consider the broader political situation rather than indulging his own ambitions,” he added.

Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and presidential election frontrunner, voiced support for Hon Hai at a campaign event Sunday.

“China shouldn’t force Taiwanese companies to declare their position whenever an election is taking place,” he said. “China should acknowledge Taiwanese companies contribute to its economy greatly.”

On Monday, Taiwanese Premier Chen Chien-jen told reporters in Taipei that the government has kept in touch with Hon Hai and will offer assistance depending on the situation.

The Foxconn probe likely contributed to the weakness in the Taiwan stock market and put pressure on the local currency, according to Khoon Goh, head of Asia research at Australia & New Zealand Banking Corp. The Taiwan dollar slid toward a seven-year low against the greenback.

Beijing has been intensifying its scrutiny of Western businesses amid growing geopolitical tensions. In March, authorities raided New York-based due diligence firm Mintz Group’s office in Beijing and detained five of its Chinese employees. In April, Bain & Co. confirmed that Chinese authorities had questioned staff at its Shanghai office.

The following month, Chinese state security officials visited a branch of Capvision, a consulting firm with headquarters in New York and Shanghai.

At a forum last week in Beijing, Takehiko Nakao, chairman of Mizuho Research & Technologies, said that arrests with no public clarity over the reasons have added to a sense of unease among international companies. Seventeen Japanese have been detained in China since May 2015, the country’s foreign ministry said in a September email.

“Japanese companies want to expand but are also somewhat cautious,” said Nakao, who previously ran the Asian Development Bank, adding that the caution was partly due to China’s detention of an executive without public explanation. “If there’s even one person like that, people become very worried.”

The Foxconn case, however, is unique in to Wildau. “The fact that Foxconn’s founder is running for president in Taiwan puts his company more squarely in the political spotlight than the typical multinational operating in China,” he said. “Moreover, the mainland leaders don’t consider Taiwan a foreign country, so they are likely more willing to use leverage over Foxconn to influence Taiwanese politics than they would for an unambiguously foreign company.”

--With assistance from Thomas Seal, Mark Bergen, Gao Yuan, Cindy Wang, Jasmine Ng, Wenjin Lv and Jacob Gu.

(繼續)

富士康億萬富翁創辦人郭台銘上月因競選台灣總統而從公司董事會請辭。 競選活動把問題指向富士康。 他此前否認如果他贏得一月份的選舉,他將容易受到中國壓力的說法。

郭台銘在八月宣布競選總統的記者會上表示: 「我不會屈服於中國的威脅」。 他列舉了蘋果、特斯拉和亞馬遜等主要客戶的名字,表示任何因政治壓力而停產的行為都會擾亂供應鏈 - 中國是需要向世界解釋這一點。

歐亞集團地質技術總監 Xiaomeng Lu 表示,調查富士康可能是中國在台灣選舉中尋求影響力的一種方式,台灣與大陸的關係將成為這次選舉的核心議題。

她在彭博電視台上表示: 「我認為北京肯定有動力參與並與郭台銘相談這次總統競選」。

Teneo’s Wildau說,「這次打擊行動令人驚訝,因為郭台銘與大陸領導人關係密切,富士康在中國成為全球最大出口國和製造商的過程中發揮了重要作用」。 然而,他補充道: 「高層領導人可能對郭台銘準備在台灣總統競選中做搞事者感到不滿。 針對富士康的行動看起來是為了向郭台銘傳遞一個訊息,即他應該考慮更廣泛的政治局勢,而不是沉迷於自己的野心」。

台灣副總統、總統選舉領跑者賴清德在周日的競選活動中表達了對鴻海的支持。

:中國不應該在選舉時強迫台灣企業表明立場;「中國應該承認台灣企業對其經濟做出了巨大貢獻 」。

週一,台灣行政院院長陳建仁在台北告訴記者,政府一直與鴻海保持聯繫,並將根據情況提供協助。

澳洲和紐西蘭銀行亞洲研究主管 Khoon Goh 表示,富士康調查可能導致台灣股市疲軟,並對當地貨幣造成壓力。新台幣兌美元匯率跌至七年來的最低點。

在地緣政治緊張局勢日益加劇之際,北京方面一直在加強對西方企業的審查。 今年三月,當局突襲搜查了總部位於紐約的盡職調查公司Mintz Group在北京的辦公室,並拘留了其五名中國員工。 4 月, Bain & Co 證實,中國當局對其上海辦事處的工作人員進行了詢問。

接下來的一個月,中國國家安全官員參觀了總部位於紐約和上海的顧問公司Capvision的一家分公司。

上週在北京舉行的一個論壇上,Mizuho Research & Technologies 董事長 Takehiko Nakao 表示,在沒有公開說明原因的情況下進行逮捕,加劇了國際公司的不安感。 中國外交部在 9 月的一封電子郵件中表示,自 2015 5 月以來,已有 17 名日本人在中國被拘留。

曾任亞洲開發銀行行長的 Nakao表示:「日本企業希望擴張,但也有些謹慎。他補充說,這種謹慎的部分原因是中國在沒有公開解釋的情況下拘留了一名高階主管。 「即使有一單這樣的事,人們也會變得非常擔心」。

然而,對於Wildau說富士康案是獨一無二的。 說:富士康創始人正在台灣競選總統,這一事實使他的公司比在中國經營的典型跨國公司更直接地處於政治焦點下 此外,大陸領導人並不認為台灣是外國,因此他們可能更願意利用富士康的影響力來影響台灣政治,而不是用一家徹徹尾的外國公司。

         So, China often does not publicly explain the actions taken by its regulators, leaving companies operating in the country to guess the ultimate goals of the government. China’s investigation into Foxconn Technology Group is shaking the confidence of foreign companies in the country. It is worth noting that the part of the leadership dealing with the economy and attracting foreign capital is not in the driving seat, and they can only watch and hope to minimize the damage by announcing the opening of certain sectors to appease investors. The fact that Terry Gou is running for president in Taiwan puts his company squarely in the political spotlight.

2023年10月6日 星期五

富士康計劃未來 12 個月將印度職位和投資增加一倍

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

Foxconn aims to double jobs, investment in India over next 12 months

Sun, September 17, 2023 at 7:23 a.m. PDT

(Reuters) - Apple supplier Foxconn aims to double its workforce and investment in India by next year, a company executive said on Sunday.

Taiwan-based Foxconn, the world's largest contract manufacturer of electronics, has rapidly expanded its presence in India by investing in manufacturing facilities in the south of the country as the company seeks to move away from China.

V Lee, Foxconn's representative in India, in a LinkedIn post to mark Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 73rd birthday, said the company was "aiming for another doubling of employment, FDI (foreign direct investment), and business size in India" by this time next year.

He did not give more details.

Foxconn already has an iPhone factory in the state of Tamil Nadu, which employs 40,000 people.

In August, the state of Karnataka said Foxconn will invest $600 million for two projects in the state to make casing components for iPhones and chip-making equipment.

The company's Chairman Liu Young-way said in an earnings briefing last month that he sees a lot of potential in India, adding: "several billion dollars in investment is only a beginning".

(Reporting by Shivani Tanna in Bengaluru; Editing by Susan Fenton)

Translation

(路透社) - 蘋果供應商富士康的一位高層週日表示,該公司計劃到明年將其在印度的勞動力和投資增加一倍。

總部位於台灣的富士康是全球最大的電子產品合約製造商,在尋求撤離中國之際,該公司透過在印度南部投資製造設施,迅速擴大了在印度的業務。

富士康駐印度代表V Lee LinkedIn 上發文紀念印度總理莫迪73 生日表示, 該公司到他明年生日的「目標是讓印度的就業人數、外國直接投資(FDI) 和企業規模再次翻一番」。

他沒有透露更多細節。

富士康已經在泰米爾納德邦擁有一家 iPhone 工廠,擁有 4 萬名員工。

8 月,卡納塔克邦表示,富士康將投資 6 億美元用於該州的兩個項目,生 iPhone 外殼組件和晶片製造設備。

該公司董事長 Liu Young-way 在上個月的財報發布會上表示,他看到了印度的巨大潛力,並補充說:「數十億美元的投資只是一個開始」。

So, Foxconn is expanding its presence in India by investing more in manufacturing facilities as it seeks to move away from China. I am wondering whether this will affect China’s iPhone production.

2023年1月26日 星期四

World's largest semiconductor producer Taiwan TSMC considers building a second factory in Japan

Recently NHK News on-line reported the following:

半導体生産で世界最大手 台湾TSMC 日本に2番目の工場建設検討

2023112 2040

半導体の受託生産で世界最大手の台湾のTSMCは、日本で2番目となる半導体工場の建設を検討していることを明らかにしました。

これは会社が12日、オンラインで開いた決算発表の記者会見で魏哲家CEOが明らかにしました。

CEOは「日本で2番目の工場の建設を検討している」と述べ、条件として「顧客の需要と政府の支援が合理的な水準であること」を挙げました。

TSMCは現在、日本で初めての工場をソニーグループなどと共同で熊本県に建設中で、来年末までに量産を始める予定です。

TSMCは各国から工場建設の誘致を受けていて先月、アメリカのアリゾナ州で最先端の半導体を生産する工場を新たに建設すると発表しています。

一方、TSMCの去年1年間の決算は、売り上げが前の年より42.6%多い22638億台湾元、およそ98000億円、最終的な利益は前の年より70.4%多い1165億台湾元、およそ44000億円で、いずれも過去最高を更新しました。

Translation

Taiwan's TSMC, the world's largest contract manufacturer of semiconductors, revealed that it was considering building a second semiconductor factory in Japan.

This was announced by CEO CC Wei at the company's online financial results announcement press conference on the 12th.

CEO Wei said, ``We are considering building a second factory in Japan,'' and cited ``a reasonable level of customer demand and government support'' as a condition.

TSMC was currently constructing Japan's first factory in Kumamoto Prefecture jointly with the Sony Group and others, and planned to start mass production by the end of next year.

TSMC had received invitations to build factories from various countries, and last month announced that it would build a new factory to produce state-of-the-art semiconductors in Arizona, USA.

On the other hand, TSMC's financial results for last year showed sales of NT$2.2638 trillion, about 9.8 trillion yen, up 42.6% from the previous year, and the final profit was 1.0165 trillion yuan, about 4.4 trillion yen, up 70.4% from the previous year, both of which were new record highs.

              So, Taiwan's TSMC has revealed that it is considering building a second semiconductor factory in Japan. It seems that the company is diversifying its production centre away from Taiwan and I am wondering if this is a response to the tense situation caused by threats from mainland China.

2021年8月27日 星期五

台灣菠蘿 - 隨著新買家的入市, 中國的菠蘿禁令適得其反

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

China’s Ban on Taiwan Pineapples Backfires as New Buyers Step In

Betty Hou

Fri., August 6, 2021, 3:00 a.m.

(Bloomberg) -- China’s surprise ban on pineapple imports from Taiwan five months ago was widely viewed as an attempt to undermine President Tsai Ing-wen’s standing with a political constituency. Trade data show the move has produced anything but the desired effect.

First-half numbers collected by Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture show growers of the fruit on the island have fared better since China blocked imports starting March 1, as sympathetic Japanese shoppers stepped in to provide support. Shipments to Japan surged more than eightfold to 16,556 tons in the four months through June from a year ago. A domestic campaign to drum up demand also helped.

The helping hand from Japanese importers has come as a pleasant surprise for Taiwan’s rattled farmers who were bracing for a plunge in prices following the move by China, which termed it as a normal precaution to protect biosecurity. The spiky fruit is among a long list of products from Australian wine to coal and lobster China has targeted for sanctions to help gain leverage in trade disputes.

 The bleeding was stopped before it even began,” said Chen Li-i, an official at the Council of Agriculture in Taipei.

Japan has now replaced China as the major overseas destination for Taiwan’s pineapples. While it’s unclear how long the ban will last -- the shift may well reverse once the restrictions are lifted -- the humble tropical fruit has become an unlikely symbol of defiance in the region’s geopolitical intrigues. Amid all the sabre-rattling by Beijing, Japan and the island democracy have expressed a broad desire to forge closer ties. Leaders in Tokyo see their own security directly linked to that of Taiwan, which China asserts is its territory.

Pineapples are an important source of income for farmers in central and southern Taiwan. Around 11% of the tropical fruit harvested in Taiwan are sold overseas. Until the ban, they were almost entirely shipped to China.

Export orders are looking unexpectedly good,” said Chiao Chun, chief executive officer of Harvest Consultancy Co. in Taipei. “This really was a crisis turned into an opportunity.”

Besides the help from Japan, an increase in domestic demand fueled by a “save the farmers” campaign on social media rallied local shoppers in support of growers. Even President Tsai pitched in a day after China’s ban took effect.

Farmers also received passionate backing from local businesses. Restaurants across the island rushed in to add a pineapple-infused sweet twist to all sorts of dishes ranging from shrimp balls, fried rice and even the classic beef noodle soup. Taiwan Railways Administration introduced special edition lunch boxes with pineapples as one of the side dishes.

As a result, domestic prices of the fruit jumped 28% to an average NT$22.1 (80 cents) per kilogram in the March-June period, a three-year high. The total value of the pineapples sold locally rose 17%, according to data provided by the farm council’s Chen.

Higher prices driven by strong domestic demand led to more profit for the farmers,” Chen said.

One key question is whether the uptick in overseas demand is sustainable. Exporters cite concerns over Japan’s stringent quality requirements and consumer preferences for smaller, less-sweet varieties than the pineapples typically grown in Taiwan.

But the Chinese ban leaves Taiwan with little choice but to review its export markets for the fruit, according to Young Fu-fan, a grower in the southern county of Tainan.

 Farmers can’t expect to make ‘easy money’ from China anymore,” he said.

Translation

(彭博社)- 五個月前,中國出人意料地禁止從台灣進口菠蘿,這被廣泛認為是企圖削弱蔡英文總統在政治選區中的地位。但貿易數據顯示,此舉並未生預期效果。

台灣農業委員會收集的上半年數據顯示,自從中國從 3 1 日開始禁止進口以來,島上的水果種植者表現更好,因為有同情心的日本購物者介入提供支持。在截至 6 月的四個月中,對日本的出貨量比去年同期增長了八倍多,達到 16,556 噸。國發起的提振需求運動也起到了幫助作用。

日本進口商的幫助, 令台灣農民感到一個驚喜,他們在中國採取行動後已準備應對價格暴跌。中國稱這是保護生物安全的正常預防措施。菠蘿這種帶刺的水果, 只是數從澳大利亞葡萄酒到煤炭和龍蝦的一連串品項目之一。中國已將其作為製裁目標,以幫助在貿易爭端中獲得優勢

台北市農業委員會官員陳立儀(Chen Li-i) :“出血還沒開始就止住了”

日本現已取代中國成為台灣菠蘿的主要海外目的地。雖然目前尚不清楚禁令將持續多久 - 一旦取消限制,這種轉變很可能會逆轉 。這種不起眼的熱帶水果已成為該地區地緣政治計謀中一個冷門的反抗象徵。在北京展示武力威脅之下,日本和台灣民主島民都表達了建立更緊密聯繫的廣泛願望。東京領導人認為自己的安全與台灣的安全直接相關,中國聲稱台灣是其領土。

菠蘿是台灣中南部農民的重要收入來源。台灣收穫這熱帶水果約有11%銷往海外。在禁令頒布之前,它們幾乎全部運往中國。

黍離策略顧問股份有限公司(Harvest Consultancy Co.) 台北首席執行官焦鈞 (Chiao Chun) : “出口訂單看起來出乎意料地好”;這真的是一場危機變成了機遇”

除了來自日本的幫助外,社交媒體上的“拯救農民”運動, 推動了本地需求的增長,也吸引了當地購物者支持種植者。在中國禁令生效後的第二天,就連蔡總統也加入幫忙。

農民們也得到了當地企業的熱情支持。島上的餐廳紛紛湧入,在蝦丸、炒飯甚至傳統的牛肉麵湯等各種菜餚中加入了菠蘿的甜蜜味。台灣鐵路局亦推出了以菠蘿為配菜的特別版飯盒。

因此,3 月至 6 月期間,該水果的國價格上漲 28%,至每公斤平均新台幣 22.1 元(80 美分),創三年新高。根據農場委員會的陳立儀提供數據,當地銷售的菠蘿總價增長了 17%

:“強勁的需推動價格上漲,為農民帶來更多利潤”。

一個關鍵問題是海外需求的增長是否可持續。 出口商表示擔心日本嚴格的質量要求, 和消費者更喜歡相比通常台灣所種植的更小、更不甜菠蘿品種。

但台南縣南部的種植者Young Fu-fan表示,中國的禁令讓台灣別無選擇,只能重新評估其水果出口市場。

:“農民不能再指望從中國賺‘輕鬆錢’ 了”

       So, even the sympathetic Japanese shoppers stepped in to provide support to the Taiwan’s pineapple growers in face of China’s coercion. Some information on how Japanese help the pineapple sales in Japan can be found at Liberty Times Net (https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/3629174)

A Japanese politician shows support (Source : LTN)

Pineapples on sale in a supermarket in Japan (source: LTN)


2021年2月9日 星期二

Taiwan - Requested to increase semiconductor production: an appeal for an early solution to the shortage in Japan, the US and Germany etc.

 Recently Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition reported the following:

台湾に半導体増産要請 日米独など、不足の早期解消求め

北米

2021125 0:30 [有料会員限定]

【台北=中村裕】自動車を中心に世界で半導体が足りないなか、独米日など各国政府が台湾当局に半導体増産などの協力を要請していることが、24日わかった。米国による対中制裁や自動車市場の急回復による半導体需給の逼迫ぶりを裏づけた。半導体不足による自動車の減産が長引けば、世界経済の波乱要因にもなりかねない。

台湾当局の関係者は24日、「自動車用の半導体が世界で不足しており、昨年末から各国の外交ルートを通じて(台湾からの半導体供給を増やすように)要請を受けている」と語った。自動車の生産が盛んなドイツ、米国、日本などから協力要請を受けているという。製造業の部材不足を理由に、各国が特定の国や地域に対し、増産などの協力を求めるのは異例だ。

台湾で製造業を所管する経済部(経済省)はすでに半導体の生産に強い企業に増産などを求めたという。半導体受託生産で世界最大手の台湾積体電路製造(TSMC)や、同世界4位の聯華電子(UMC)などに、車用半導体の増産対応を急ぐよう促した。

TSMCの広報責任者は24日、日本経済新聞に「(世界で今最も不足する)車用の半導体の需要に応えることが、当社の最優先事項である。我々は引き続き、自動車関連企業と緊密に協力し、需要に応えられるように支援していく」とコメントした。

半導体不足は昨秋、あらわになった。新型コロナウイルスの影響でテレワークが世界で広がり、パソコンに使う電源管理用の半導体がまず足りなくなった。さらに世界最大の中国の自動車市場の回復を受け、車でも半導体が不足し始めた。

米国が中国最大の半導体受託生産企業、中芯国際集成電路製造(SMIC)に制裁を科したことが問題に拍車をかけた。SMICが生産する半導体は技術水準は高くないものの、車や家電に数多く搭載する。こうした半導体を生産する企業は世界でも少ないため、最先端から汎用品まで幅広く半導体を製造する台湾勢に世界中から多くの生産依頼が舞いこむ。

半導体の生産量をすぐに増やすのは難しい。車用の半導体は利幅が薄いうえ、需給が緩むとすぐに値段が下がる恐れもあり、増産のために急いで投資をすれば無駄になりかねない。半導体各社が車メーカーに対し、半導体の12割の値上げを要請する動きもあるが、半導体不足はすぐに解消されない。

影響は世界の自動車大手に広がる。独フォルクスワーゲン(VW)は中国や北米、欧州での生産調整を発表。米フォード・モーターも北米の一部工場の停止を表明した。三菱UFJモルガン・スタンレー証券は減産規模は16月を中心に世界で150万台前後とみる。日本の経済産業省幹部は「自動車など逼迫している業界からの増産要請は強い。半導体不足は少なくとも数カ月は続きそうだ」と語った。

国内でもホンダは1月、小型車「フィット」など約4000台を減産する見通し。日産自動車は国内で主力の小型車「ノート」の減産に入った。トヨタ自動車も米国などで生産調整を余儀なくされ、スバルは国内唯一の生産拠点である群馬製作所(群馬県太田市)の稼働が止まる日も出てきた。

車向け半導体では2010月に宮崎県にある旭化成のグループ会社の工場で火災が発生し、一部製品の供給が滞っている。火災の影響が長引けば車生産をさらに下押ししかねない。

Translation

[Taipei = Yutaka Nakamura] With the shortage of semiconductors in the world centered on automobiles, it was revealed on the 24th that governments such as Germany, the United States and Japan were requesting the Taiwanese authorities to cooperate in increasing semiconductor production. This confirmed the tight supply and demand of semiconductors due to the US sanctions against China and the rapid recovery of the automobile market. A prolonged reduction in automobile production due to a shortage of semiconductors could be a cause of turmoil in the global economy.

A Taiwanese official said on the 24th that "there is a shortage of semiconductors for automobiles in the world, and since the end of last year, we have received requests (to increase the supply of semiconductors from Taiwan) through diplomatic channels from individual countries."  It was said that request for cooperation had been received from Germany, the United States, Japan, etc., where automobile production was thriving. It was unusual for an individual country to ask a specific country or region for cooperation such as increasing production because of a shortage of materials in the manufacturing industry.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (Jingji Bu), which had jurisdictions over the manufacturing industry in Taiwan, had already asked companies that were strong in semiconductor production to increase production. It urged Taiwan TSMC as the world's largest semiconductor contract manufacturer, and also the United Microelectronics (UMC) as the world's fourth-largest semiconductor manufacturer, to respond urgently by increasing production of semiconductors for automobiles.

A spokeswoman for TSMC told the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on the 24th that "to meet the demand for semiconductors for automobiles (which is currently in extreme shortage globally) is our top priority. We will continue to work closely with automobile-related companies. We will give support to meet the needs. "

The shortage of semiconductors became apparent last fall. Due to the influence of the new coronavirus, telework had spread all over the world, and the semiconductors for power management used in personal computers had become scarce. Furthermore, with the recovery of the world's largest Chinese automobile market, semiconductors in automobiles began to run short.

This issue was spurred by the US imposed sanctions on China's largest semiconductor contract manufacturing company, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). Although the technological level of semiconductors produced by SMIC was not high, many its semiconductors could be installed in cars and home appliances. Since there were few companies in the world that produce such semiconductors, many production requests come from all over the world to Taiwanese who manufacture a wide range of semiconductors from state-of-the art to general-purpose products.

It was difficult to increase semiconductor production immediately. The profit margin of semiconductors for automobiles was thin, and the price could drop as soon as the supply and demand slowed down. If you made a quick investment to increase production, it might be wasted. There were moves by semiconductor companies to request car manufacturers for raising the semiconductor price by 10 to 20% , yet the shortage of semiconductors could not be resolved immediately.

The impact spread to the world's leading automobile companies. Volkswagen (VW) of Germany announced production adjustments in China, North America and Europe. Ford Motor Co. also announced the suspension of some plants in North America. Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities estimated that the scale of production cuts could be around 1.5 million units worldwide from January to June. An executive of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said "There are strong demands from strained industries such as automobiles to increase production. The semiconductor shortage is likely to continue at least for a few months".

In Japan, Honda was expected to reduce production of about 4,000 compact cars such as the "Fit" in January. Nissan Motor had started to reduce production of its mainstay compact car "Note" in Japan. Toyota Motor had also been forced to adjust production in the United States and other countries, and Subaru had come to a day for its Gunma Plant (Ota City, Gunma Prefecture), which was the only production base in Japan, to stop operating.

About the production of semiconductors for automobiles, in October 2020, a fire broke out at a factory of Asahi Kasei's group company in Miyazaki Prefecture, and the supply of some products became stagnant. If the impact of the fire was prolonged, it could further push down car production.

              It is beyond my expectation that Taiwan has such an important role to play in the supply chain for the production of semiconductors for use in automobiles.

2021年2月6日 星期六

Taiwan started to construct submarine fleet - could stop Chinese invasion for decades (2 of 2)

 台湾が建造開始の潜水艦隊、中国の侵攻を数十年阻止できる可能性 (2 of 2)

Recently CNN.co.jp reported the following:

2021.01.16 Sat posted at 18:00 JST

未知の領域 

台湾が大型潜水艦(排水量は2500~3000トンとなる見通し)の建造に乗り出すのは初めて。専門家の間では、台湾の造船産業にその能力があるか現時点では未知数との見方もある。

台湾は海外の供給業者を確保しようとしたものの奏功せず、台湾の造船企業「台湾国際造船(CSBC)」と自前潜水艦の開発契約を結ぶことになった。

「もし台湾がこうした潜水艦の建造に成功すれば、非常に先進的で有効な艦隊になる可能性がある。ただ、台湾に先進的な潜水艦の製造経験が全くないことを踏まえると、これが大きな『もし』であることは確かだ」(米シンクタンク「ランド研究所」の上級国際防衛研究員を務めるティモシー・ヒース氏)

シュスター氏は、台湾はまだ潜水艦建造技術を学習途上だと説明。8隻全てを実戦投入できるのは2030年以降になる可能性もある。

ただ、潜水艦の開発に失敗したり遅れが出たりしても、台湾には中国の軍事行動に対抗する重要な防衛手段が他にもあると専門家は指摘する。

英ロンドンの王立防衛安全保障研究所で海軍力を研究するシドハース・カウシャル氏によれば、台湾は米国製の「ハープーン」を含む各種の対艦ミサイルや機雷、特殊潜航艇を保有しているという。

パワーバランスでは中国が依然有利

専門家によると、長期的に見れば中国はまだ軍事面で優位を保っている。紛争になった場合、中国は潜水艦や水上艦、地上発射ミサイル、空軍の爆撃機および攻撃機を大量投入できる。

たとえば米国防省は中国の潜水艦隊について、近い将来に65~70隻規模になるとの見通しを示す。

その上、中国は猛烈なペースで軍備増強を進めており、すでに世界最大の規模を誇る艦隊に絶えず戦力を追加している。

この点を強調するように、台湾の潜水艦計画が高雄で始動したわずか1週間後、中国は潜水艦への対抗手段を見せつけた。

中国の環球時報は「PLAの対潜戦用航空機が爆雷攻撃演習を実施、台湾分離主義者への抑止力になるとの見方」という見出しで報道。記事の上にはY8対潜哨戒機が演習中に爆雷を投下する写真も掲載した。中国の対潜戦能力について報道が出るのは「異例」という。

Translation

Uncharted territories

This would be the first time Taiwan to embark on the construction of a large submarine (displacement is expected to be 2500-3000 tons). Some experts said it was unknown at this point whether Taiwan's shipbuilding industry had that capability.

Although Taiwan tried to secure overseas suppliers, it did not succeed, and it was decided to conclude a development contract for its own submarine with Taiwanese shipbuilding company the "Taiwan International Shipbuilding (CSBC)".

"If Taiwan succeeds in building such a submarine, it could be a very advanced and effective fleet. However, given that Taiwan has no experience in manufacturing advanced submarines, this is a big" ‘If’ (Timothy Heath, Senior International Defense Researcher at RAND Corporation, a US think tank)

Schuster explained that Taiwan was still learning submarine construction techniques. It was possible that all eight ships could be put into service after 2030.

However, experts pointed out that Taiwan had other important means of defense against China's military operations, even if the development of submarines failed or was delayed.

According to Sidhaas Kaushall (シドハース・カウシャル), a naval power researcher at the Royal Institute of Defense and Security in London, Taiwan had a variety of anti-ship missiles, mines, and midget submarines, including the US-made "Harpoon."

China still had an advantage in power balance

According to the experts China still had a military advantage in the long run. In the event of a conflict, China could launch large numbers of submarines, surface ships, ground-launched missiles, air force bombers and attack aircrafts.

For example, the US Department of Defense predicted that China's submarine fleet could grow to 65-70 in the near future.

What's more, China was accelerating its armament build-up at a intense pace, constantly adding strength to its already world-class fleet.

To emphasize this point, just a week after Taiwan's submarine program started in Kaohsiung, China showed a counter-measure against submarines.

 China's Global Times reported under the heading "PLA's anti-submarine warfare aircraft will carry out depth charge attack exercises and will be a deterrent to Taiwanese separatists." Above the article was also a photo of a Y8 anti-submarine patrol aircraft dropping a depth charge during an exercise. It is "unusual" for China to report on its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

               So, Taiwan is modernizing its submarines in order to hinder any possible attacks from mainland China from sea.

2021年2月5日 星期五

Taiwan started to construct submarine fleet - could stop Chinese invasion for decades (1 of 2)

 Recently CNN.co.jp reported the following:

台湾が建造開始の潜水艦隊、中国の侵攻を数十年阻止できる可能性 ( 1 of 2)

2021.01.16 Sat posted at 18:00 JST

 香港(CNN) 台湾が防衛力の強化を目指し、最新鋭の潜水艦隊の建造に着手した。この動きについて専門家は、中国軍による台湾侵攻や海上封鎖の計画を複雑化させる可能性があると指摘している。

新造艦8隻のうち最初の艦の建造は昨年11月、南部の港湾都市・高雄の施設で開始された。同艦の試験航行は2025年に始まるとみられている。台湾の蔡英文(ツァイインウェン)総統は着工式で、建造計画を「台湾の強い意思を世界に示す歴史的な節目」と呼んだ。

台湾と中国は過去70年以上にわたり別々の政府によって統治されてきたが、中国政府は台湾に対する完全な主権を主張している。

中国の習近平(シーチンピン)国家主席は台湾独立を決して容認しないと言明し、必要なら武力行使も排除しないと主張。一方の蔡氏も屈しない姿勢を示し、台湾はアジアで「権威主義体制による侵略から民主主義を守る」取り組みの先頭にいると述べた。

中国の人民解放軍(PLA)はここ数カ月、台湾に対する軍事的圧力を強めており、台湾の防空識別圏に軍用機を派遣したり、付近の島で軍事演習を強化したりしている。台湾政府に対する威嚇との見方が多い。

ただ、侵攻を試みるPLAの艦隊はいずれも、台湾と中国本土を隔てる狭い台湾海峡を通過する必要がある。

専門家によれば、まさにこの場所において、台湾が建造を計画する潜水艦は大きな違いを生む可能性がある。新造艦は第2次世界大戦にさかのぼる現有4艦の後継となる。

隠密性の高い兵器プラットフォーム

潜水艦は今なお世界屈指の隠密性を誇る兵器プラットフォームで、相手がどのような艦隊であっても大打撃を与えることができる。

台湾の潜水艦にはディーゼル・エレクトリック方式が採用される見通し。水上ではディーゼルエンジンを動力源とする一方、潜航中は寿命の長いリチウムイオン電池で駆動する超静粛な電気モーターを使用するという。

米海軍や中国が配備を進める原子力潜水艦ではなく、ディーゼル・エレクトリック艦を選んだのは、台湾政府にとって簡単な選択だった。ディーゼル・エレクトリック艦は建造がより容易で、コストも低い。潜航時の騒音も電気モーターのほうが原子炉より少ない。

専門家は、こうした静かな潜水艦なら中国軍の対潜戦(ASW)部隊による探知が難しいとの見方を示す。台湾海峡の海底付近にひそみ、そこから浮上して台湾に向かう中国の兵員輸送艦を狙い撃ちにできる可能性もある。

新造艦にどんな技術が搭載されるのか正確なところはまだ不明だが、米政府は昨年、台湾にMk48魚雷の取得を許可した。

「大型の兵員輸送艦に魚雷が命中した場合、特にそれが米国のMk48のような現代型の魚雷であれば、侵攻する軍は1個大隊を失うことになる。従って、潜水艦がいないことを確信できるまでは、いかなる国も台湾海峡に強襲揚陸艦を派遣しないだろう」。元米海軍大佐で、現在はハワイ太平洋大学のアナリストを務めるカール・シュスター氏はそう指摘する。

Translation

Hong Kong (CNN) Taiwan had begun building a state-of-the-art submarine fleet with the aim of strengthening its defense capabilities. Experts pointed out that this move could complicate plans for Chinese troops to invade Taiwan and blockade the sea.

Construction of the first of the eight new ships began last November at a facility in Kaohsiung, a port city in the south. The ship's test voyage was expected to begin in 2025. At the ground breaking ceremony, Taiwan's President Cài yīngwén called the construction plan "a historic milestone that shows Taiwan's strong will to the world."

While Taiwan and China had been governed by separate governments for over 70 years, the Chinese government claimed full sovereignty over Taiwan.

Chairman Xi Jinping of China had stated that he would not tolerate an independent Taiwan, and claimed that he would not eliminate the use of force if needed. Cai, on the other hand, also showed her unyielding posture and said that Taiwan was at the forefront of an effort to "protect democracy from authoritarian aggression" in Asia.

China's PLA had increased military pressure on Taiwan in recent months, sending military aircrafts to Taiwan's air defense identification zone and stepping up military exercises on nearby islands. There were many views that it was a threat to the Taiwanese government.

However, any PLA fleet attempting to invade had to pass through the narrow Taiwan Strait that separated Taiwan from mainland China.

According to experts, exactly in this place, the submarines that Taiwan planned to build could make a huge difference. The new ships could be the successor to the four existing ships dating back to World War II.

Highly covert weapon platform

Submarines were still one of the most covert weapon platforms in the world, and could be devastating to any fleet.

It was expected that Taiwanese would adopt diesel-electric transmission for its submarines. While on the water it would be powered by a diesel engine, it used an ultra-quiet electric motor powered by a long-life lithium-ion battery during the dive.

Choosing a diesel-electric ship over the nuclear-powered submarines deployed by the US Navy and China was an easy choice for the Taiwanese government. Diesel-electric ships were easier and cheaper to build. Electric motors also had less noise during diving than nuclear reactors.

Experts say these quiet submarines were difficult to detect by Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. It might be possible to sneak near the bottom of the Taiwan Strait, and emerged from there to shoot at a Chinese troop transport ships that headed for Taiwan.

While exact details of on the technology that would be used in the new ship installation were still unknown, yet the US government had allowed Taiwan to acquire the Mk48 torpedo last year.

Carl Schuster, a former US Navy colonel and now an analyst at Hawaii Pacific University, pointed out that "if a large troop transport ship is hit by a torpedo, especially if it is a modern torpedo like the US Mk48, the invading army will lose one battalion. Therefore, no country will send an amphibious assault ship to the Taiwan Strait until it is certain that there are no submarines. "

(to be continued)

2020年12月27日 星期日

Taiwan – one confirmed community infection of new corona - since April

A few days ago CNN.co.jp reported the following:

台湾、新型コロナの市中感染を確認 4月以来

2020.12.22 Tue posted at 19:01 JST

香港(CNN) 台湾の保健当局は22日、新型コロナウイルスの新たな感染者が1人確認されたと発表した。台湾の中での感染が確認されるのは4月以来、255日ぶり。

当局の発表によると、感染が確認されたのは30代の女性。陽性反応を示した外国人パイロットと、今月8日から10日までの間に接触していた。

台湾で4月12日以降に確認された感染者は全員、域外からの渡航者だった。台湾に入る渡航者には隔離が義務付けられ、陽性者は隔離病棟で治療を受けることになっている。今月22日には域外から入った3人の感染も確認され、累計の感染者は770人になった。

台湾は迅速な対応で感染を収束させた例として知られてきた。

新型ウイルスが最初に見つかった武漢からの直行便に対しては、昨年12月31日に乗客の検疫を開始。1月21日に台湾初の感染者が確認されたことを受けて武漢からの入境を禁止し、中国本土と香港、マカオからの渡航者も検疫対象とした。

3月からは外交官らを除く全ての外国人の入境を禁止した。こうした措置と並行して接触追跡を徹底し、検査体制を強化した。

台湾で感染対策のルールを破った場合は厳しく処罰される。今月初めには、フィリピンからの出稼ぎ労働者が隔離中のホテルで8秒間だけ自室から出たとして、約36万円の罰金を科された。

Translation

Hong Kong (CNN) - Taiwanese health officials announced on the 22nd that a person was newly infected with the new coronavirus was confirmed. It was the first time in 255 days since April that an infection was confirmed in Taiwan.

Officials said that a woman in her thirties was confirmed to be infected. She had been in contact with a foreign pilot who was tested positive between the 8th and 10th of this month.

All infected persons confirmed after April 12 in Taiwan were travelers from the outside region. Travelers entering Taiwan were required to be quarantined, and those tested positives were to be treated in a quarantine ward. On the 22nd of this month, three people from outside regions were confirmed to be infected, bringing the total number of infected people to 770.

Taiwan had been known as an example of a quick response to control the infection.

Passenger quarantine began on December 31st last year for direct flights from Wuhan where the new virus was first found. Following the confirmation of Taiwan's first infected person on January 21, entry from Wuhan was banned, and also travelers from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau were targeted for quarantine.

From March, all foreigners except diplomats were banned from entering Taiwan. In parallel with these measures, a thorough contact tracking was carried out and its monitoring system was strengthened.

In Taiwan if anyone broke the rules on infection control, severe punished would be handed down. Earlier this month, a migrant worker from the Philippines was fined about 360,000 yen for leaving the room for just eight seconds during quarantine in a hotel.

              So, Taiwan is a good example on how to control the spread of Covid-19. It demonstrates an alternative way to deal with the pandemic without the need for a total city lockdown that is practiced in mainland China.

2017年2月10日 星期五

Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Leo Ching. 2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Main points:
introduction – on February 24, 1979 some Taiwanese aborigines representing the Takasago people  visit Yasuguni jinja. They demanded compensation from Japan, and to have the spirits of Takasago people who had died as Japanese soldiers and being offered in the jinja be returned to them. (1-2) “This episode describes a telling encounter between the (ex)colonizer and the (ex)colonized in the so-called postcolonial conditions. It is a condition marred by the former imperial nation’s refusals to come to terms with its colonial passes.”(4)
- “becoming ‘Japanese’ conceals the inequality between the ‘natural’ Japanese, whose political and economic privilege as citizen are guaranteed, and those ‘naturalized’ Japanese whose cultural identities as Japanese are required, but whose political and economic rights as citizen are continuously denied.” (6)
-“the triangulation between colonial Taiwan, imperial Japan, and nationalist China formed the terrain where contradictory, conflicting and complicitous desire and identities were projected, negotiated, and vanquished.” (8)
-“colonialism, however, is never only about the external process and pressure of economic development or political annexation. It is also about the ways in which the colonized internally colluded with or resisted the objectification of the self that was produced by the colonizer, as Frantz Fanon has remarkably documented in Black Skin, White Masks.”(10)
-“to insist on the predicament of Japanese colonialism, this book puts forward a series of arguments on Japanese colonialism in Taiwan coalescing around the problematic identity formations and the positions and politics of such analysis in the so-called postcolonial conditions. Its premise rests on the assumption that cultural and political identify, be they metropolitan or colonial, do not exist prior to the process of colonialism.”(11)
“I argue that Japanese or Japanese-ness, Taiwanese or Taiwanese-ness, aborigines or aboriginality, and Chinese or Chinese-ness – as embodied in compartmentalized national, racial, or cultural categories – do not exist outside the temporality and spatiality of colonial modernity, but are instead enabled by it.”(11) (i.e. they were generated by the colonial modernity)
-“chapter 1 argues that decolonization, as opposed to post colonialism … offers a better understanding of Japan’s continuous disavowal of it war crimes and coloniality”.(12)
(c/f decolonization was an abrupt and sudden process happened in 1945)
-“ch. 2 analyzes the formation of a debate over Taiwanese conscious and Chinese consciousness, their respective political movements since the 1920s”.(12)(c/f the debate centered around of ‘Taiwan factions’ and ‘China factions’)

- ch. 3 attempts a theoretical analysis of the Japanese colonial discourse of doka and kominka. Ch. 4 extends the analysis of kominka to the Taiwanese aborigines in relation to the Musha rebellion of 1930. Ch. 5 returns to the triangulation between colonial Taiwan, imperialist Japan, and nationalist Chinese. Through a reading of The Orphan of Asia, the book argued that the work was an allegory of Taiwan’s gradual ‘coming into being’ with the intensification of colonial rule and it disillusion with Chinese nationalism. The Pacific war precluded any voluntary or reformist corrective to Japanese colonialism and Chinese nationalism no longer provided a clear and viable alternative to Taiwan’s emancipation. (12-13)

(to be continued)

2016年3月3日 星期四

Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities

Recently I have read the following book, its main points are:

Book Title: Melissa Brown. 2004. Is Taiwan Chinese?  The Impact of Culture, Power, and                     Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of                California Press.

Main Points:
Chapter 1.- since 1999 Taiwan had started to assert its claim over sovereignty in terms of the social basis of its identity. The complex ways in which identity underlay the political debate over Taiwan’s future relationship with China was the subject of the book (p.2).
- the examination the border of identities. The question on How borders were drawn and how people cross them – could help answer the question on how could we get to the reality underneath the political rhetoric. How did we know what identities ordinary individual in Taiwan and China had? (p.3)
- a similar identity changes happened before and after 1949  in China’s Hubei showed that changes in Taiwan in ethnic identity were not unique to Taiwan (p.3).
- narratives of unfolding” were not history, nor were they simply a biased interpretation of past events; they are ideologies – a conscious falsification, a conscious selection of some of the available evidence to serve a political purpose (p.6).
- identities must be negotiated; they were not simply a matter of choice, because identity formation in individuals and groups derived from their interaction with the social and cultural context in which they lived in (p.13).
- if we were to use Confucian criteria related to ancestor worship to classify people as Han, Taiwanese would turn out to be more Han than Chinese in post-cultural revolution 1967. Tu Wei-ming argued that the periphery such as Taiwan, Hongkong were more Confucian than the PRC (p.29).
- chapter 2- the goal was to provide a historical overview of Taiwan that included plains Aborigines from the early 17th century to end of the 20th century (p.36).
- the villages Toushe, Jibeishua and Longtian in Taiwan were descendants of plains aborigines that maintained an aborigine identities in spite of some intermarriage with Hoklo through the Qing period until after the Japanese colonial government mandated a ban on foot-binding. The aborigines took on a Hoklo identity in the 1930s and the author called this recent identify change “the long route to Han” (p.66).
chapter 3. the author reconstructs when and how the changes in identity in these 3 villages had occurred (p.67).
- except for the gendered  practices of foot-binding and chewing betel among women, Toushe, Jibeishua, and Longtain appeared culturally very like poor Hoklo villages. But they were still regarded as savages by non-aborigines; they were not conferred with the Hoklo identity. It indicated that cultural practise were not enough to confer ethnic identity (p.92).
- why older identities was preferred? The whole point of constructing narratives of unfolding was the presumption that antiquity conferred authenticity (p.132). Yet actual historical development of recent identities could be traced and they showed all too clear that identities were closely tied to socio-political circumstances.
- chapter 4. the book explains that mixed population used ancestry, not culture to claim Han identity, probably through the use of Han surname as “the short route to Han”. They changed identity before they culturally changed towards the Han model (p.134).
- the late 17th century identity changes were important to consider a new narrative of Taiwan’s unfolding for 2 reasons. First, people in Taiwan today accept this older identity changes more readily because people view antiquity as conferring authenticity. The second reason why short-route identity changes (by marriage) was important for the consideration of a new narrative of Taiwan’s unfolding was its cultural impact on Hoklo Taiwanese culture (p.135).
- in the present day, in order for the Taiwanese not to be considered as simply another regional variety of Han, Taiwan’s narrative  must show the distinguished new Taiwanese identity as uniquely different, it was actually the long-route pattern which appeared to be unique to Taiwan and could provide a basis  for claiming a difference (p.165).
- chapter 5, the book introduces the identities changes in the Tujia (natives) in Enshi of Hubei. It was used to compare with the situation in Taiwan because it had similarities to the new narrative constructed about Taiwan’s past. It showed that identity changes were not unique to Taiwan (p.167).
- with the founding of PRC, identity change in Hubei took a different turn, undoing short-route identity changes. Many ‘locals’ in Hubei was classified as Tujia in the 1950s. Most notably, officials in Hubei concluded that intermarriage between Han patrilineal ancestor and non-Han matrilineal ancestors led to de-sinicization. Yet the PRC denied such de-sinicization occurred in Taiwan (p.168).
- chapter 5 the book reconstructs identity and cultural changes among Tujia and their ancestor in Hubei.
- in Hubei on the concept of local and outsiders, there were two important conclusions. First, the border between locals and outsider shifted with each new wave of immigrants, people already there became ‘locals’ to the new immigrants. The second important conclusion was that knowledge of these historical shifts in identity was preserved in genealogies and oral histories (p.185).
- in many practices and beliefs relating the parental authority, locals in Enshi differed significantly from Confucian-derived element of Han culture. Thus in spite of local’s sense of themselves as Han; the government felt strongly that they were not Han (p.205).
- what happened in Enshi provided some insight into the PRC’s reaction to Taiwan’s new narrative. The PRC did not deny that de-sinicization was possible; it denied that cultural changes had gone far enough to warrant a change to non-Han identity (p.210).
- the author investigates how culture, power and migration each impacted identity differently. Ideologies in the form of ‘narratives of unfolding’ talked about identity in terms of culture, demographic condition that would affect social experience (p.210).
- chapter 6 talks about why culture, social power, and demographic condition had different influence on people (p.210).
- The ‘Taiwan problem’ – the question of whether Taiwan should be a part of Chinese nation was a political issue. Moreover, it was fundamentally an issue of identity. Identity was political as proved by this book (p.211).
- in the concluding chapter, the book would first examined the ideological terms of debate as well as actual experience which influenced the choices, and action of people and government. The chapter examines them in a theoretical level and then used a theory to discuss the real-world political implication of the new Taiwanese identity (p.211).
- the author combines cognitive, evolutionary, interpretive, and postmodern insights to suggest that choices were influenced differently by culture meaning, social power, the cognitive structure and operation of the brain, and demographic trend (p.228).

- analysis of the underlying identity issue in the ‘Taiwan problem’ showed how difficult it would be to work out the political impasse over Taiwan’s future. Identity was the negotiated product of the interaction between what people claimed for themselves and what others allowed them to claim. (p.245).

2016年3月1日 星期二

Taiwan: a political history

Recently I have read the following book, its main points are:

Book title: Denny Roy. 2003. Taiwan: a political history. Ithaca and London: Cornell University                       Press.

Main points:
- this book seeks to tell Taiwan’s story in a way that would illumine the origin of Taiwan’s present domestic and international political situation (p.2).
- chapter 1 talks about Taiwan’s early history. The people who became known as the Taiwanese came to Taiwan to get away from conditions in China. This was the beginning of Taiwan’s divergence from the mainland in social, economic, and political development. From here foreign influence would play an important role as well – first the Dutch and then the japans (p.31). While growing within China’s shadow, Taiwan remained distinct from China.
- chapter 2 talks about the Japanese occupation.
- chapter 3 talks about the return of Taiwan to mainland rule in 1945. Mainlanders had regarded the Taiwanese as semi feudal Chinese. Five decades of Japanese influence created suspicion about the depth of Chinese patriotism on Taiwan (p.56).
- Taiwanese had a different interpretation of the significance of the Japanese colonial period. While they resented the discrimination and restrictions on their political power, many Taiwanese also believed Japanese rule had helped Taiwan’s advance economically, politically, and socially. Taiwanese had their own sense of superiority. As some Taiwanese had reminded the mainlanders, it was the Chinese government that had given Taiwan to Japan in the first place (p.57).
- chapter 4 talks about the martial law and Kuomintang domination. The KMT’s fixation on recovering China had contradictory consequence for Taiwan. On the one hand, the ROC government required Taiwan people’s dedication and sacrifice; on the other hand, the KMT believed that successfully implementation the ‘Three principles of the people’ in Taiwan could serve as a model of KMT rule and weaken support for the CCP on the mainland.  Thus doing well in Taiwan would help KMT win back China (p.79).
- Despite the harsh treatment of some political offenders, the combination of modest political reforms began to gain the KMT some legitimacy in the eyes of many Taiwanese (p.104).
- chapters 5 talks about Taiwan in the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 convinced key US policymakers that the contest with the Sino-Soviet bloc had entered a new, more intense phase. In Truman’s word ‘the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubts that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nation’ (p.112).
- Truman saw the Korean War as a temporary setback to US-China relations and expected to return to their prewar policy of accommodating China (p.124).
-  Tokyo remained torn between the need to get along with the PRC, and the affinity of many Japanese for Taiwan based on ties of history and ideology (p.129).
- during the PRC’s Cultural Revolution (1967-77), Taipei answered  with a movement called the Cultural Renaissance, which reaffirmed Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Three principles of the people’ as the basis of Chinese society (p.144).
- the events of the Cold War and the Chinese civil war melded together partially but not completely. There was considerable tension between KMT and the US in the context of American Cold War strategy (p.150).
- it was hard to dispute that American discouragement of KMT’s planned ‘return to the mainland’ was in Taiwan’s best interest at least in the short term. The US continued to provide weaponry to Taiwan (p.151).
- Chapter 6 talks about the struggle of the Taiwanese for political reform and freedom. The ruling KMT conservatives worried that liberalization would make Taiwan more vulnerable to separatism or communist subversion (p.154).
- the opposition party DPP members made their public speeches in the Taiwanese dialect rather than in mandarin. DPP adopted a program with the basic goal that included self-determination of Taiwan’s political status trough plebiscite and rejoining the UN (p.173).
- chapter 7 talks about Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui. KMT’s evolution through the 1980s saw the beginning of a deep division; the most important fault lines involved the perennial struggle between Taiwanese and mainlanders (p.184).
- strategically, international connections and recognition could enhance Taiwan’s security. By strengthening its membership in the international community through economic, culture etc., Taiwan became more eligible to the protection offered by international norm (p.212).
- by and large Taiwanese preferred to wait rather than commit to either unification with China or independence. President Lee said ‘Most Taiwan resident have a fluid and ambivalent national identity’ (p.213).
- disagreement over the one-China principle was an obstacle to cross-strait talks between CCP and KMT. In 1992, negotiators for Taiwan and China agreed to shelve this tough political issue. Subsequently, a controversy developed over whether the two sides had reached a ‘consensus’ that they could hold differing interpretations of the one-China principle (p.219).
- chapter 8 talks about how the DPP captured the presidency. The trends of Taiwanese empowerment and weakening of the KMT culminated in the election of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian as the president in March 2000 (p.227). The DPP’s successes when Taiwan entered a new century underscored the two main themes of Taiwan’s recent political history: democratization and the persistence of tensions with China (p.239).
- Chapter 9 concludes that this survey of Taiwan’s political history sought to aid comprehension of the island’s unusual present-day political circumstance. One peculiarity was that two distinct ‘Chinese’ government claim over the ownership of Taiwan (p.241). At issue was not only the question of which Chinese government had rightful claim to Taiwan, but also the possibility that Taiwan might reject both and opted instead for political separation from China. Taiwan had not made up its own mind. The identity of Taiwan’s people as a whole remained unsettled (p.242). While recognizing their cultural and genealogical roots in China, Taiwanese were particularly reticent toward the notion of to be ruled by mainland Chinese. Chinese in Taiwan took Taiwan’s handover to Japan in 1895 as a sell out by the central government. The US and China faced the prospect of a war over Taiwan that neither side wanted. China was committed to attack Taiwan under certain circumstances while the US was committed to defend Taiwan under certain circumstances (p.243).


Book’s idea in one paragraph: this book tells Taiwan’s story in a way that would illumine the origin of Taiwan’s present domestic and international political situation (p.2). By and large Taiwanese preferred to wait rather than commit to either unification with China or independence. Most Taiwan residents have a fluid and ambivalent national identity (p.213) and the identity of Taiwan’s people as a whole remained unsettled (p.242). While recognizing their cultural and genealogical roots in China, Taiwanese were particularly reticent toward the notion of being ruled by mainland Chinese.