新收費結構在緩解首都高速道路交通擁堵有一定效果

Yesterday the NHK On-line reported the following:

新料金体系で首都高の渋滞緩和に一定の効果

5月20日 5時48分

首都圏の高速道路で、先月から料金水準を原則統一する新たな料金体系を導入したところ、都心を通過する車の台数が１１％減少するなど、首都高速道路の渋滞の緩和に一定の効果が出ていることが分かりました。

高速道路各社は建設コストの違いなどから、道路ごとに料金水準が異なっていた首都圏の高速道路について、先月１日から原則、１キロ当たり３６．６円に統一する料金体系の変更を行いました。

国土交通省が先月１か月間の利用状況を調査したところ、都心を経由して東名高速道路と東北自動車道を結ぶルートの利用が、料金変更前と比べ半減しました。こうしたことから、首都高速道路で都心を通過する車の台数は１日当たり１１％減少し、渋滞で余計にかかった時間も９％短くなるなど、新たな料金体系の導入で首都高速道路の渋滞の緩和に一定の効果が出ていることが分かりました。

一方、料金体系の変更で、おおむね値下げとなった圏央道の１日当たりの利用台数は５％から８％ほど増えるなど、国土交通省では都心を通過する道路から首都高速道路の外側の環状道路への利用の転換が進んでいると分析しています。

国土交通省では新たな料金体系の効果を引き続き、検証していくことにしています。

(試譯文)

Since a unified standard charging principle was introduced last month on the freeway in metropolitan area, it was found that congestion was relaxed in the Capital freeway and that certain positive result was produced, such as the number of car which went through downtown had decreased by 11 % when the new charging system was in force.

About the freeway in the metropolitan area, each road had different charging standard due to the difference in construction costs; from the 1^st of last month all freeway companies in principle changed into a unified charging system of charging 36.6 yen per kilometer.

In a one-month-survey done by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport last month to investigated the situation on usage; those made use of the route in going through downtown where Tomei Expressway and Tohoku Expressway were connected had reduced by half when compared with before the charge was changed. For that reason, the number of car which went through downtown using the Capital freeway had decreased by 11 % each day; in a traffic jam, the extra time taken was shortened by 9 %. The introduction of a new charging system showed that there was a reduction in congestion in the Capital freeway and some positive results were produced.

On the other hand about price changes in the charging system, the price of Metropolitan inter-city Expressway had become cheaper, the usage number per day increased to about 8 % from 5%. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport was analyzing the development in road usage changes: from passing through downtown for conversion to passing the Capital freeway’s outside ring road for conversion.

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport would continue to examine the effect of the new charging system.

     It seems that drivers could easily adapt to new charging systems by choosing their most convenient routes.

日本制紙有限公司在宮城建設生產線 出產比鐵強五倍原材料

To-day  the NHK on-lne reported the following:

強度鉄の５倍の素材 日本製紙 宮城に製造ライン建設へ

5月18日 5時28分

植物から製造され、鉄の５倍の強度を持つ次世代の素材「セルロースナノファイバー」の国内で最大規模の製造ラインを、製紙会社大手の日本製紙が宮城県石巻市の工場に建設することになりました。

「セルロースナノファイバー」は特殊な技術によって木材や稲わらなどから細かな繊維を取り出した次世代の素材で、鉄の５倍の強度を持つ一方、重さは５分の１程度で、さまざまな機能を持った物質を付着させることも出来ます。

素材の特徴を生かし、自動車部品から紙おむつまで幅広い分野での活用が研究されるなか、製紙会社大手の日本製紙は、この新素材の製造ラインを宮城県石巻市の工場に１６億円かけて建設することになりました。ラインの稼働は来年４月を目指し、新素材の生産能力は年間およそ５００トンで、会社によりますと、国内では最大規模になる見込みだということです。

当面は、素材に消臭機能を持つ物質を付着させることで紙おむつの消臭剤などとして出荷する予定ですが、生産量の拡大によって新素材の利用がどこまで広がるか注目されます。

(試譯文)

Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. as Japan’s mega paper making company is going to construct the biggest production line in a factory in Ishinomaki city of Miyagi prefecture that would manufacture raw material from plantation; it could become the next generation's material which had four times the strength of iron, the "cellulose’s fiber".

"Cellulose’s fiber" would become material of the next generation that has four-time the strength of iron and about 1/5 of its weight. It is small fiber extracted from wood and rice straw by special technology; it can attach to other material that had multiple functional nature.

Flexibly making use the special feature of this new material, studies on its application is conducted in a wide range from auto parts to disposable paper diaper. Nippon Paper Industries as a mega paper producing company will spend 1,600 million yen to construct a production line in a factory in Ishinomaki city of Miyagi. The productive capacity of this new material will be approximately 500 tons a year, aiming at staring production in April next year. According to the company it is said that the scale is probably a record in the country.

At the moment, it is expected to ship out deodorant paper diaper by sticking the material to a substance with the deodorant function. It has caught attention as to where the usage of this new material would spread based on expanded production.

   It seems that this new material has good potential as the material of the next generation.

MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points from chapter four to the end are as follows:

Book title: Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Main points:

Ch.4 - talks about how the economic general staff (economic bureaucrat) behaved before and during the War, in particular to see how they coped with the military.

-the main contribution of the 1930s to the postwar economic ‘miracle’ was to create and install in the government an economic general staff. Such an agency could be effective until the political problems of determining who was to reign were resolved. The economic general staff never relinquished its power or retreated from its mission. Before 1945, the economic general staff could not unleash the developmental forces of the society by breaking the hold of the military. (p.155)

Ch. 5- talks about the establishment of the Munitions Ministry (MM).  Virtually all Japanese regarded the defeat of 1945 as the most important watershed in modern Japanese history since the Meiji restoration. However from the point of view the history of industrial policy, Johnson believes that the 1940s was a continuous era: the period of high tide of state control. The state dominated virtually all economic decisions. (p.195)

-true state control did not last long after 1949. Its primary contribution to the later high-growth system was the irreversible establishment of economic general staff at the heart of all Japanese economic policy-making and administration. In the years after the occupation the economic bureaucracy shared its power with the big business and consulted them on all important issues. (p.196)

Ch. 6- talks about the institutions of high-speed growth. During the period 1949 to 1954 the Japanese forged the institutions of their high-growth-system (p.198). Some of the elements of what became MITI’s high-growth-system derived from the government’s selection of industries for “nurturing”, and perfection of measures to commercialize the products of these chosen industries, and the regulation over the competition.

-the tool in hands of the economic bureaucrats included control over all foreign exchanges and the import of technology. (p.199) The system began to be forged during the Dodge Line era that tried to end the inflation. Yet with the outbreak of the Korean War, US armed forces placed orders with Japanese firms for trucks that worth nearly $13 million, thus reviving the Japanese automotive industry. (p.200). The Japanese industrial system took on one of the most distinctive character. The pattern of dependencies on borrowings that exceeded what the individual company could repay was seen. The bank in turn over-borrowed from the Bank of Japan who acted as the guarantor. As such, it had completed control over the policies and lending decision on private banks. (p.203)

- in its fully elaborated form, in the late 1950 the MITI system in nursing new industries included the following measured. First, to do investigation, second to authorize foreign currency allocation, third, to grant licenses for the import of foreign technology, fourth,  to designate the industry as strategic, fifth, to provide it with land to build its installation, sixth, the industry was given key tax break, and lastly seven, MITI created an administrative guidance cartel to regulate completion and coordinated investment amount among the firms in the industry. (p.236)

- reflecting on the critical attribute of the postwar high-growth economic Alfred Chandler concluded that the Japanese miracles was based on improved institutional arrangement and cheap oil. To Johnson, the Japanese system was resulted from three things: first, a popular consensus favoring economic priorities, second, an organization inheritance from the first 25 years of Showa era. Third, the conscious institutional manipulation starting from the Dodge Line (aimed at cutting government subsidies etc.) and the Korean War. (p.239)

-the most important ‘improved institutional arrangement’ was MITI. It had no precise counterpart in any other advanced industrial democracy: it played the role of “pilot agency” or “economic genera staff”. (p.240)

- just as a nation mobilized for war needs a military general staff, so a nation mobilized for economic development needed an economic general staff. The men of MCI, MM, and MITI had been preparing to play this role since the late 1920s. (p.241)

Ch. 7- talks about the administrative guidance. There was nothing mysterious about administrative guidance. It referred to the authority of the government which was contained in the laws that established the various ministries to include powers to issue directive, request, warnings, suggestion, and encouragement to the enterprises or clients within a particular ministries’ jurisdiction. (p.265)

- the demobilization of the Japanese economy really began during the early 1960s, with trade and exchange liberated. This chapter shows that administrative guidance became a salient feature of the Japanese government-business relationship. The power of administrative guidance greatly enhanced the ability of Japanese economic officials to respond to new situations rapidly and flexibly. (p.273)

-thanks to MITI, more than any other nation in the world, Japan came to possess more knowledge and more practical experience on how to phase out old industries and to phase in new ones. (p.274)

Ch. 8 - talks about internationalization. Despite the turmoil around the MITI ministry during the 1970s, by the end of the decades its leaders had reasons to be satisfied. Japan had more than fulfilled the long-range goal that its bureaucrats had set for the country after the war. It had caught up with the Western Europe and North America. (p.303)

Ch. 9- talks about whether to use Japan as a model in economic development. In Japan one of the most powerful social supports for private corporation managers was that Japanese manager performance was not being judged solely in term of short-term financial performance. In the US, managers’ performance was judged by short term success. (p.313)

- the point was that Japan’s more flexible means of evaluating manner contributes to smoother labor-management relation. These Japanese practices came into being as a result of postwar condition. There was nothing in Japanese history to suggest that smooth labor manage relations came naturally. The postwar leveling of all Japanese’s income made possible a relative equality of rewards.

- specialist on modern Japan would differ as to the precise element of the Japanese model. The first element of the model was the existence of small, inexpensive, but elite bureaucracy; the state was run by the best managerial talent in the system. The majority of the bureaucracy were generalists, they were not professional, and as a general rule professionals performed poorly in managing. (p.315)

- the second element of the model was a political system in which the bureaucracy was given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively. (p.315) The third element of the model was the perfection of market-conforming methods of state intervention in the economy. (p.317) The fourth and final element of the model was a pilot organization like MITI. (p.319)

- the development of MITI was a harrowing process. Its special characteristic and the environment in which it worked arose from the special interaction of the Japanese and society. The Japanese built on known strengths: their bureaucratic, their zaibutsu, their banking system, their homogeneous society and the markets made available to them. Such postwar freedoms appeared when the military was eliminated from politics. The rationalization of the zaibatsu, the strengthening of the Diet, and the equalization of social classes were also important factors. (p.323)

MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points in chapters one to three are as follows:

 Book Title: Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Main points:

Ch. 1- by common agreement among the Japanese, the ‘miracle’ first appeared to them during 1962 and scholars began to search for the cause of the miracle. (p. 3) Between 1946 and 1976, the Japanese economy increased 55-fold. (p. 5)

-according to Johnson so far, Western scholars tried to see what the American could learn from Japan, instead of analysis what had caused this. One explanation of the miracle belonged to the socioeconomic school, i.e. anything but politics, for example national characters, the ‘unique-structural-feature’, or ‘the free-ride’ analysis etc. (p. 8)

-the goal of the book was to lay out some of the main Japanese institutions in economic field. (p. 8)

- as John Roberts had put it, Japan’s ‘miraculous’ emergence as a first-rate economic power in the 1960s had been described exhaustively by Japanese and foreign writers and yet little of these literature provided credible explanation of how it was done, or by whom. This study was an attempt to answer these questions. (p.11)

-the school which the author places himself was the school that stressed the role of the developmental state in the economic miracle. (p.17) The question was: to look at how the government intervened and for what purposed. In countries that were late to industrialization, the state led the industrialization drive, which took on developmental function. In terms of government-business relationship, the US was regulatory orientation, whereas Japan was mainly developmental orientated. (p.19)

-another way to distinguish the policy of a state was to see its priority in economic policy. In a plan-rational state, the government concerned the structure of domestic industry. For a market-rational state it would not have an industrial policy, it would stress rules and reciprocal concession. (p.20) Japan was a developmental, plan-rational state whose economic orientation was the key to industrial policy. (p.20) From about 1955, for Japan the goals had been high-speed growth. (p.20)

-within the developmental state, the center that exerted the greatest positive influence was the one that created and executed industrial policy. MITI’s dominance in this area had been characterized as the ‘pilot agency’. But its true power was its control of industrial policy. (p.26)

-a measurement of what MITI had achieved was a shift in ‘industrial structure’. In the first half of 1950s, about 30 percent of the export still consisted of fibers and textiles; only 14 percent was in the category of machines. The composition changed in the first half of the 1960s. Fibers and textile went down to 8 while machinery was 39 percent. (p.31) Johnson argues that this shift was the operative mechanism of the economic miracle. He asserts that Japanese government exercised a much greater degree of both in intervention and protection that other western European countries, and thus made the difference that led to the miracle. (p.31) Thus Johnson had a prima facie case for MITI’s role in the economic miracle.

-Johnson argues the time frame of 1925-75 was need for two reasons for his research. First MITI only realized very late that what they were doing had added up to an implicit theory of developmental stage; they had no theory or model of industrial policy in the 1960s, not until the creation of the Industrial Source Council in 1964. Second, there was a direct continuity between prewar and postwar official in MITI. MITI was the reincarnation of the wartime MCI and the MM. MITI. Modern Japanese industrial policy was linked to the reign of Emperor Hirohito. (p.33)

-Ch. 2- talks about the economic bureaucracy. The author was concerned to explain why the discrepancy between the formal authorities of either the Emperor (prewar) or the Diet (postwar) and the actual powers held by the state bureaucrat, and why this discrepancy contributed to the success of the developmental state. (p.35)

- Japan had long displayed a marked separation in its political system between reigning and ruling. (p.35)

- the origins of separation between power and authority could be found in Japan’s feudal past and in the emergence of the developmental state during the Meiji era. (p.36) Prewar bureaucrats were not “civil servants”, but rather “official of emperor” appointed by him and answerable only to him. (p.38)

- the success of the economic bureaucracy in preserving more or less intact its pre-existing influence was the perquisite to the success of the industrial policies of the 1950s. It did not simply preserve its influence, it expanded: its size increased, and that the political parties were too weak to exercise political power. (pp.44-5)

- quoting Kusayanagi Daizo, the book shows that all human relations in Japanese society were based on four key of ‘factions’: 1. the family and matrimonial cliques, 2. the clansmen or person from the same locality, 3. the same university graduates, and 4.the faction based on money. All these occurred in the bureaucracy, the first two was minor, and the last two was important. (p.55)

- a serious issue in Japan was not the occasional abuse of office by higher officials but a pattern of cooperation between the government and big business that might have unintended consequence. (p. 68)

- the re-employment of retired government bureaucrats (amakudari) on the board of industries designated as economically strategic also created many opportunities for hand-in-glove relationships. (p. 69)

-one reason for private sectors to accept amakudari was the extensive licensing and approving authority of the government. Companies believed that having former bureaucrats (amakudari) among their executives could facilitate obtaining licenses. (p.70)

- MITI had several characteristic that distinguished it from other economic bureaucracy. It was the smallest among the economic ministries in terms of personnel. MITI exercised control over money through its ability to approve credit or authorized expenditures done by the Japan Development Bank, the Electric power Development Company etc. The ministry supervised the spending of some Yen 160.9 billion. (p.79)

- Japanese analysts unusually characterized the basic outlook of MITI officials as ‘nationalistic’. (p.80) After the war MITI had always been hostile to American-style price completion and anti-trust legislation. (p.81)

Ch.3- talks about the history of the accomplishment of MITI. According to Johnson, the first phase of modern Japanese industry policy seemed related to the postwar economic miracle, but it was in fact directly relevant for several reasons: it faced same problems in these two different periods of 1920s and 1950s. That was the need to restore competitive ability in international trade.

-Japan did not experience a radical discontinuity in its civilian bureaucratic and economic elites since the 1920s. Many top leaders in the government were active in the organization and execution of industrial policy before, during, and after the war. (p.114)

-the theme of historical continuity also suggested the fact that industrial policy was rooted in Japan’s political rationality and conscious institutional innovation, not in Japanese culture, vestiges of feudalism, or any other special characteristics of Japanese society. (p.114)

- economic crisis gave birth to industrial policy. The long recession in 1918 led to the creation of MCI and the first attempt at industrial policy. Similarly the deflation panic of 1949 led to the creation of MITI and the renewal of industrial policy. (p.114) The suitably modified production version of the 1950s amazed the world by its performance. From this perspective the early years of industrial policy were a period of gestation and perfection in the Japanese institution and industrial policy. (p.115)

(to be continued)

外長證實在中越南海衝突 與越南合作

Today the NHK News on-line reported the following:

外相 南シナ海の中越対立でベトナムと連携確認

5月6日 4時06分

東南アジアを訪れている岸田外務大臣はベトナムのミン外相と会談し、南シナ海で中国がベトナムなどと激しく対立している問題について、「国際社会共通の懸念だ」と述べ、引き続き、緊密に連携して対応していくことを確認しました。

ベトナムを訪問中の岸田外務大臣は、日本時間の５日夜、ミン外相と会談しました。

この中で岸田大臣は、南シナ海で中国が軍事的な動きを活発化させ島々の領有権を巡ってベトナムなどと激しく対立している問題について、「一方的な現状変更の試みは、国際社会共通の懸念となっている」と述べました。

ベトナムでは、先に新しい国家主席や首相が就任しており、会談で、両外相は、引き続きこの問題に緊密に連携して対応していくことを確認しました。

また岸田大臣は、先月、海上自衛隊の護衛艦がベトナム海軍の最重要拠点で南シナ海に面したカムラン湾に初めて寄港したことを踏まえ、両国の防衛当局間の交流が進むことに期待を示しました。

(試譯文)

Kishida the Minister of Foreign Affairs who was visiting Southeast Asia had discussed with Vietnam’s Min the Minister of Foreign Affairs. About the problem regarding China’s intense confrontation with Vietnam and other countries at the South China Sea, he expressed "the common anxiety of the international society", and confirmed that he would cooperate closely and continuously to deal with the situation.

Kishida the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Vietnam and discussed with Min the Minister of Foreign Affairs at night on the 5^th, Japan time.

About the problem over China’s intense confrontation with Vietnam and others countries over the  possession right of islands due to China’s military maneuvering at the South China Sea, Kishida said that  "it is an one-sided attempt to change the status quo, it causes a common anxiety among the international society".

In Vietnam, earlier on it had a new president and a prime minister taking office; both ministers for Foreign Affairs confirmed their continuous cooperation in responding closely to this problem.

Also, as minister Kishida was following on the fact that last month for the first time an escort ship of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force had stopped at Kamranh Bay which was the most important base of the Vietnamese navy facing South China Sea, an expectation in developing further exchanges between the two countries’ defense authorities was indicated.

      It seems that, regarding the South China Sea sovereignty disputes, the cooperation between Japan and Vietnam is increasing.

Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points from chapter 11 to the end are as follows:

Book title:  John W. Dower. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II. W.W. Norton.

Main points:

Ch. 11. - when the emperor was descending partway from heaven, the machinery for allied war crimes trials of top leaders was being assembled. The first wave of arrest was announced on September 11. (p.319)

- Yonai Mitsumasa solicited MacArthur’s view on abdication. The supreme commander replied that this would not be necessary. A month later General Dyke, the head of CI&E, had suggest that the emperor might be removed from the limelight by leaving Tokyo and establishing his court in Kyoto. (p.323)

- Fellers was recorded as having said that if the Japanese side could prove to the US that the emperor was completely blameless, the forthcoming trial offered the best opportunity to do that. Tojo, in particular, should be made to bear all responsibility at this trial. The class A defendants led by Tojo was asked to die to protect their sovereign. (p.324)

-the endeavors to insulate Hirohito from any taint of war responsibility, which went beyond the emperor’s own expectation, resulted in a lost opportunity to use him to help clarify the historical record. (p.326)

- the successful campaign to absolve the emperor of war responsibility knew no bounds. Hirohito was not merely presented as being innocent; he was turned into an almost saintly figure that did not even bear moral responsibility for the war. (p.327)

- although the government announced in September 1946 that the emperor had no intention of stepping down, the possibility of his doing so resurfaced on two occasions. In 1948, as the Tokyo trial approached judgement, this issue of the emperor’s moral responsibility was rekindled. (p.327) When the occupation ended three and a half years later, the emperor faced the moment of which his old confidant Kido had told him to prepare when bidding farewell as he left for prison in December 1945. The honor of the imperial house, Kido emphases, demanded that the emperor take responsibly for losing the war. But the proper moment would only be when the occupation was over. Kido’s conception of the emperor’s responsibility was inner direct. The emperor should assume responsibility for the defeat by apologizing to this subject who had suffered, died in a war waged in his name. But the moment came and went. (p.329)

- in 1983, “Shattered god” written by an ex-serviceman Watanabe Kiyoshi was published. He was a man consumed by rage at having been betrayed by his sovereign. (p.339) As a young man he believed every word of the emperor said about the ‘holy war’. When defeat came he assumed the emperor would commit suicide. When this did not happen, he wondered if the emperor were staying on so as not to make the confusion worse. It was inconceivable that he would not in some way demonstrate responsibly for, and to those who had died following his orders. (p.339)

- Ch. 12. In early 1946, MacArthur replaced the Meiji constitution of 1890 with a new national charter. (p.346) The rationale for this constitutional revision lay in several ambiguous sections of the Potsdam declaration. (p.347)

-  constitution revision begins on October 25. Privately, Shidehara told both Konoe and Kido Koichi that the constitutional revision was neither necessary nor desirable. Matsumoto confided that that Japan could handle the matter as they pleased. (p.351) They thought the Meiji constitution was sacred. (p.352)

- the basic conflict lay between two western systems of legal thinking. Japanese leaders were largely indifferent to American concerns about popular sovereignty and human rights. There was the “Matsumoto’s four principles”. (p.353)

- the Japanese government paid the price for its inflexibility. In a quick succession, MacArthur and his top aides concluded that the government was incapable of proposing revision that would meet the Potsdam requirement; SCAP would have to take the lead. MacArthur entrusted the government section of SCAP with the task of drafting a new constitution for the Japanese people based on three principles. (p.360)

- MacArthur had to draft the constitution before the FEC began operating, one that would meet the Potsdam requirements and yet preserve the throne. (p.363)

Ch. 13. On February 13, general Whitney present the GHQ draft to Matsumoto Joji and Yoshida Shigeru.(p.374) The American withdrew to the garden to leave their counterpart to read the English-language text. Whitney said that should the government rejected, “SCAP was prepared to bring its draft directly to the Japanese people”. (p.375)

- Ashida Hitoshi offered a persuasive argument for the Japanese government to go along. If the cabinet rejected it, the American made the draft public then the media would support the American. The cabinet would have to resign, in the subsequent election the conservative would be unseated by pro-democracy forces. (p.377)

- all told, the Diet made approximately thirty revision to the government’s June draft. Many of the most substantial changes however came from SCAP or the FEC. (p.392) O on the whole at large, the most striking single feature of the draft was its ‘renunciation of war’. The legislators revised the wording of Article 9 in a way that left no one sure what it really meant. Did Article 9 permit or prohibit limited armament of the purpose of self-defense? (p.394)

-Ch. 14.  Censorship was conducted through an elaborate apparatus with GHQ. (p.406) for all their talk of democracy, the conquerors worked hard to engineer consensus and on many critical issues, they made clear that the better part of political wisdom was silence and conformism. (p.440)

- Ch. 15. When Japan surrendered, the major statement of ally policy regarding Japanese war crimes remained what had been set forth in the Potsdam declaration. (p.445) The seven condemned defendant were hanged. Hey died with the solace that they had been a shield to their emperor to the very end, and they left a legacy of lingering controversy. (p.461)

- however intriguing to imagine, leaving high-level war crimes trial to the Japanese themselves as inconceivable to the victors. Lacking any formal role in prosecuting war criminals, the elites undertook informally to influence whom the victor decided to arrest and indict. By early 1945, even before the steady air raid , fingering the culprits responsible for Japan’s impending defeat already had begun .(p.480)

- being the key witness of prosecution was former General Tanaka Ryukichi. He explained that for incriminating some former colleagues was to make the emperor innocent by not having him appear in the trial. More famous than Tanaka was Kido. His impending arrest as Class A suspect was announced on December 6. Initially he wanted to take up the sole responsibility for all imperial decision sanctioning war. However he changed his tactics after prompted by Marxist Tsuru Shigeto. Tsuru explained to him the American way of thinking. If he pleaded guilty the American would take him as an indication that the emperor was guilty as well.  It behooved him to plead innocent himself. Tsuru apparently offered this advice with encouragement from Paul Baran, an American economist. Kido had a diary since 1930. The diary became known as the prosecution’s bible. (p.483)

- Ch. 16. A week before the first occupation forces arrived, the novelist Osaragi Jior addressed the dead intimately in a daily newspaper, the Asahi. He spoke of them as stars fading away with the whitening sky of dawn. He asked them the question: “What can we do to ease your souls”. (p.485) The Japanese did not arrived at war’s end without some knowledge of the atrocities of the imperial forces. (p.487)

- Nanbara Shigeru was typical in the complex way he evoked this country’s war dead. He had encouraged his student to support the wartime mission (p.487). He helped show one way in which an unjust war could be condemned while the war dead might still be honored and reassured that they had not died in vain. His formula became a secular prayer for great number of Japanese. (p.489) His conversion rested on the belief that he, like his students who had been misled by Japanese leaders, was a detergent to wash away their personal responsibility. From this perspective, the people as whole, not just their departed hero were war victims. (p.490)

- science soon became almost everyone’s favorite concept for explain both why the war lost and where the future lay. (p.494)

- the concept of ‘repentance’ was placed at the center of public debate on August 28 1945 when American arrived. PM declared that the military, civilian officials and the people as a whole must thoroughly self-reflected and repented. Few individuals really believed that ordinary people bore responsibility for the war equal to that of the military and civilian groups. (p.496)

- the ways of thinking about repentance and atonement that prominent intellectual like Nanbara and Tanabe offered had enduring legacies. An indigenous peace movement began to coalesce in opposition to cold war militarization. (p.501)

- as the Tokyo tribunal came to a close, the media assessed it meaning in languages of peace and democracy, the Mainichi daily warned that punishing war leaders did not mean that the people as a whole had been ‘washed and cleansed’ of responsibility for crime against peace. (p.509)

Ch. 17.  A year and half after occupation, changes was noted not only in the minds of the occupied. Driven by Cold war consideration, the Americans began to jettison many of the original ideal of ‘demilitarization and democratization’ that had been so inspiring to a defeated populace in 1945. (p.525)

- beginning in 1949 solid majority of opinion poll respondents expressed fear that Japan might again become embroiled in war. In June 1950, war erupted in Korea, the US hastened to impose remilitarization on Japan. (p.526)

- in December 1948, Washington announced nine principles of economic stabilization that were to be imposed on Japan, and then two months later dispatching to Tokyo a mission aimed at putting the country back on its feet as a viable market economy. The mission was head by Joseph Dodge. (p.540)

- the most striking American contribution to this new mercantilist state was largely unwitting. It derived from neither the early reformist policies nor the reverse course per se. (p.546)

Epilogue:

Although the old soldier himself might fade away in Japanese consciousness, what he unwittingly brought to the fore would not be dispelled. The entire occupation had been premised on acquiescing in American’s own overwhelming paternalistic authority. The new military was a ‘little American army’ obviously destined to remain under US control; the new economy was inordinately dependent on American support and indulgence. (p.551)

- rearmament under the American ‘nuclear umbrella’ was but one part of the price. The continue maintenance of US military bases and facility was another. Okinawa was excluded form the restoration of sovereignty. (p.552)

- to understand Japan, it was more useful to look not for the longue duree of an unfolding national experienced, but rather at a cycle of recent history that began in the late 1920s and essentially end in 1989. The short cycle of Japan’s modern experience coincided almost perfectly with emperor Hirohito’s reign. (p.558)

- the American reformers did change the political economy of Japan in significant ways. But they did preserve the rest of the bureaucracy. When Cold war consideration took over and the reverse course was launched, it was the American who promoted the administrative rationalization that resulted in an even greater concentration of bureaucratic authority. (p.558)

Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II

Recently I have read the following book. The main points in Chapters 7 to 10 are as follows:

Book title:  John W. Dower. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II. W.W. Norton.

Main points:

- Ch. 7. To many ordinary Japanese, the sudden post surrender appearance of intellectuals, politicians and other public figures spouting paeans (praise) to democracy were reflection of hypocrisy and opportunism. (p.234)

-to most of the progressive men of letters Marxism offered a theoretical framework to explain the recent disaster in terms of feudal remnants and capitalist contradiction. (p.235)

- Ch. 8 – in retrospect, it seemed obvious that the victors contributed unwittingly to the circumstance in which radical activities flourished by promoting political freedom without taking an active role in rehabilitating the economy. In practice, production stagnation and inflation raged under this hands-off policy. (p.255)

- there were signs that the victors had now drawn a clear line between permissible and impermissible ways of bring about their democratic revolutions. The impression of a conservative crackdown was reinforced by a celebrated episode known as the ‘placard incident’. The placard held by Matsushima Shotaro read: ‘why are we starving no matter how much we work? Answer, Emperor Hirohito”. He was arrested for violating the dignity of the sovereign. (p.267)

- when negotiations between labor leaders and the government broken down completely on January 30, the momentum towards a general strike seemed irreversible. Late in the following day, General MacArthur intervened to announce that he would not permit the use so deadly social weapon. Ii the labor leader was summoned by General Marquat and was ordered to sign a statement canceling the strike. (p.269)

- the suppression of the general strike marked the beginning of the end of the possibility that labor might be an equal partner in sharing of ‘democratic’ power.(p.270)

- as the economy continued to founder, the organized labor became more militant, in the summer of 1948 MacArthur reversed occupation labor policy by withdrawing the right to strike from public employees. (p.271) By 1949 ‘Red purge’ had become one of the fashionable new terms of the occupation. (p.272)

- although the ‘reverse course’ helped establish a democratic conservative hegemony of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen that remained dominant to the end of the century, Communists and Socialists continued to be elected to the Diet. They became the critics of the US Cold war policy. (p.273)

-Ch. 9.- Hirohito as it turned out, resilient and malleable, blessed by the heaven and by general MacArthur more particularly to survive and prosper while his subject were denounced, purged, charged with war crimes.(p.278)

- in his memoirs, Yoshida Shigeru praised MacArthur as the ‘great benefactor’ of his country, referring not to the gift of democracy, but the preservation of the throne and protection in a time of peril. SCAP’s influence in these matters was decisive. (p.279)

- one of the psychological-warfare specialists in MacArthur’s wartime command was Bonner. F. Fellers. As an analyst of the Japanese psyche, he prepared a research study. The intensity of Japanese loyalty and military discipline fascinated him. (p.280)

- as a basic rule, MacArthur’s propaganda specialists observed a wartime policy of not provoking the enemy by attacking the Emperor. As an internal report by OSS noted in July 1944, ‘the desirability of eliminating the present emperor is questionable, probably that the inclines towards the more moderate faction might prove to be a useful influence later. (p.281)

- MacArthur’s commanders believed that the Emperor held the key not only to surrender but also to postwar changes. The task of Fellers and his men during the war was to drive a wedge between the Japanese leadership and the emperor (and his subject). The wedge was: the military had not only duped the Japanese people but also betrayed their sacred leader. (p.281)

- a respectful appraisal of the emperor’s benign potential and virtually totalitarian American ‘spiritual’ control over the Japanese psyche would become the bedrock of postwar policy of the US. (p.283) Colonel Sidney Mashbir, one of Fellers’ trusted associate said that you could not remove the emperor worship from the Japanese by killing the emperor. (p.284)

- Roger Egeberg, the personal physician of MacArthur, recalled in May 1945 that the General thought that the Emperor was a captive of Tojo and the warlords. And that Hirohito would be instrumental in permanent changes in the structure of the postwar Japanese government. (p.286)

- while the Emperor was portrayed as a peacemaker, his subjects as a whole were to assume responsibility for failing to win the holy war. The Japanese race was now divided into the emperor, and everyone else. Public figures re-interred these terms ceaselessly during the two weeks before MacArthur’s arrival. The notion of collective guilt was given its consummate expression at a press conference in which prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, who succeeded Suzuki as PM, declared that ‘the repentance of the hundred million is an essential first step toward national reconstruction’. (p.287)

- Higashikuni praised the emperor for having paved the way for peace in order to save the people form hardship in 1945. The impression was that Hirohito just ascended to the throne in August 1945, just in time to end a terrible war. (p.287)

-foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, who signed the surrender document, gave devoted service to the emperor in the days that followed the victor’s arrival. (p.288)

- on September 3 1945, Shigemitsu renewed his vow to shield the throne by conveying the thesis of imperial innocence and militarist conspiracy to General MacArthur in a private meeting. The purpose was to persuade the SCAP to abandon plans on a direct military government, suggesting that it was better to enforce the Potsdam stipulations indirectly ‘through the Japanese government instructed by the emperor’. (p.289)

- in another rare private document of the time, the crown prince’s diary, we had an even more amusing indication of how defeat was explained in court circle. Akihito recorded that Japan had lost the war for two reasons: material backwardness, particularly in science, and individual selfishness. (p.291)

- as the matter transpired, part of the bureaucracy was no yet in on the strategy for saving the emperor, notably the Home ministry which was controlling the police and practicing censorship. It was the time when the country was confront with a photograph. The photo depicted MacArthur and the emperor. The former towered over the later. (p.292)

- the idea for the photo was MacArthur’s. The photo established MacArthur’s author for all to see, while simultaneously demonstrating his receptivity to the emperor. (p.293)

- the secrecy of the discussion content between the emperor and the General enabled both sides to leak selected version of what was said. (p.295)- Fellers went so far as to remind a well-connected Japanese general that the problem of emperor’s responsibility for the attack on Pearl harbor was the most important  and critical issue on the American side, urging the Japanese to come up with a good general defense of the emperor that would help MacArthur override public opinion in the US.(p.300)

- Ch. 10. - when ordinary Japanese were asked whether they wished to retain the emperor and the imperial institution, an overwhelming majority answered affirmatively. The emperor’s surrender broadcast punctured emperor worship. When the holy war ended, so did the worship and the “manifest deity”. (p.302)

- field-level American analyst offered appraisals in mid-December 1945 was that regarding opinion of the middle class about the emperor system, the allies were unduly apprehensive of the effect on the Japanese if the emperor was removed. People were more concerned with food and housing problems than with the fate of the emperor. (p.305)

- the fact that three Kumazawa Hiromichi’s relatives each soon claimed that he was the true family head seemed to reveal one more way in which Hirohito’s authority was eroding. (p.306)

- the campaign to dress Emperor Hirohito in new clothes and turn him into a symbol of peace and democracy was conducted on several fronts. (p.308)

Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II

Recently I have read the following book. The main points in the first six chapters are:

Book title:  John W. Dower. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. W.W. Norton.

Main points:

Introduction: -Japan’s emergence as a modern nation was stunning to behold: swifter, more successful, more crazed, murderous and self-destructive than anyone had imagined possible. (p.19)

-In the book, Dower tries to convey ‘from within’ some sense of the Japanese experience of defeat by focusing on social and cultural development. He tries to capture a sense of what it meant to start over in a ruined world by recovering the voices of people at all levels of society. WWII did not end for the Japanese until 1952. War, defeat and occupation left an indelible mark on those who lived through them. They were the touchstone years for thinking about Japanese national identity and personal values. (p.25)

-The ease with which the great majority of Japanese were able to throw off a decade and a half of the most intense militaristic indoctrination offers lesson in the limits of socialization and the fragility of ideology. (p.29)

- the preoccupation with their own misery that led most Japanese to ignore the suffering they had inflicted on others help illuminate the way in which victim consciousness colored the identities that all groups and people constructed for themselves. (p.29)

-what matters was what the Japanese themselves made of their experience of defeat; most of them had consistently affirm a commitment to ‘peace and democracy’. This is the great mantra (repeated saying) of postwar Japan. (p.30)

-Ch. 1- see shattered lives in japan. There was the unconditional surrender. The ravages of war could never be accurately quantified. There were the coming home of 6.5 million Japanese stranded in Asia, about 3.5 million were soldiers and sailors. Veterans were despised. Ch. 2 it was about demilitarization and democratization of Japan. Reforms were imposed.

- Ch. 3 – in post war Japan, the persistence of widespread exhaustion and despair was rooted in material conditions. American decided to adopt a hands-off policy. Misery was accepted as proper punishment for a defeat adversary. (p.89) There were inflation and economic sabotage. A massive looting of the public treasury underlay the economic chaos and social hardship. Sudden conversion to non-militarize economy would have proved a staggering task. Loss of overseas empire stripped the economy of access to raw material. (p. 118) These circumstances led many Japanese to perceive themselves as the greatest suffers from the war. (p.119)

Ch. 4. It was a testimony to human resilience that the great majority of Japanese transcended exhaustion and despair to refashion their lives in diverse and often imaginative ways. Recalling all this year later, a critic spoke of a new ‘space’ suddenly exiting in society. People behaved differently, it was a moment of flux, freedom and openness. People were conscious of the need to reinvent their own lives. (p.121)

- two incidents gave prostitution a face in occupied Japan as they serviced the conquerors. (p.123) The black-market entrepreneurship flourished. (p.139) Men who only months earlier had been willing to die for their country (‘shattering of the jade’ in Okinawa) were now mercilessly gouging their compatriots. (p.144)

- there was the Kasutori shochu, the drink of choice among artists and writers. Kasutori culture flourished into the 1950s. Like the panpan and the black marketeers, kasutori culture conveyed a strong impress of liberation from authority and dogma. (p.148) An entire genre of “fresh novels” emerged. Dazai Osamu came to epitomize the captivating degeneracy of kasutori culture. (p.158)

-Ch. 5. - Defeated Japan was engulfed in literature works. The kasutori magazines and the literature of degeneracy were but currents in a great river of communication. Familiar words and slogans cushioned the shock of defeat’ (p.168)

- they were mocking defeat. Witty language accompanies many of the quick adjustment to peace. Military uniforms worn by man after the surrender was rechristened ‘defeat suits’, footwear became ‘defeat shoes’. Such cynicism helped to diminish the pain and disgraced of defeat. (p.70)

- the most hackneyed wartime sloganeering such as  ‘cooperate’, ‘give your all’ became staples of post war exhortation to work for reconstruction, peace, democracy, or a new Japan.(p.177) Old words now had new meanings. The list of tasks to be accomplished was endless, but central to all was the creation of a society based on social justice and responsive to the will of the people. Only that kind of society would prevent tyranny a dictatorship from arising ever again in japan. (p.187)

- the top-ten bestsellers form 1946 to 1949 collectively conveyed an impression of cosmopolitan breath and serious purpose never again to be matched. There was the great writer Natusume Soseki, whose boom seemed to have reflected the desire for a renewed engagement with the torments and solace of the individual. He had spoken strongly about the need to maintain a spirit of ‘individualism vis-à-vis the state. (p.189)

-Ozaki Hotsumi was a best-selling posthumous hero. The greatest appeal of the published letters written was the love directed to his wife and daughter – to the real, nuclear family, that was as opposed to the ‘family state’.(p.193) It was yet another indication of how much the war and defeat had prepared the ground for elevating the preciousness of intimated persona relations. Until the surrender, the state and its ideologies had dictated that the primary love a human should feel was patriotism, or love of country. (p.193)

- as time passed and the occupation’s censor permitted greater freedom, the vision hope and realm of peace found provocative new forms of expression. In 1948, two local books emerged as bestsellers that offered varying perspectives on the issue of victimization, respectively written by Dazai Osamu and Nagai Akashi. (p.197)

- edited by progressive intellectual and evocatively titled Kike – Wadatsumi no Koe (Listen –Voices from the Deep) transformed war words into pace words was inspired by the belief that these intimate communications from the very maw of the war itself would be read as an eloquent cry for peace.(p.198)

- ‘Listen’ perpetuated an image of sacrifice that came perilously close to the imagery of the militarism had promoted. These were pure young men. They could not be faulted for having offered no resistance to militarism. It was their death, rather than the deaths of those they might have killed that commanded attention and were truly tragic. They were selected as a figure to mourn because they wrote so well, but also because it was easy to imagine them was the future leaders of Japan. (p.199)