為何紅黃藍白都尊重的朱鎔基

Recently Jacky Fung Chi Ching（馮智政）, a current affairs commentator on YouTube, posted the following article on Facebook:

為何紅黃藍白都尊重的朱鎔基

Jacky FUNG 馮智政

16 Aug 2026

 Books｜讀Brahm 的《朱鎔基傳：朱鎔基與現代中國的轉型》

朱鎔基逝世之後，中港都有不少文章去總結他在中國改革開放的功績。有些根據官樣文章，也有從語錄Soundbite去寫其思想，兩者敍事多是藉朱鎔基推動作者的政治主張。對於朱鎔基的經濟功績及其思路，我推薦美國學者龍安志（Laurence J. Brahm）所著的《朱鎔基傳：朱鎔基與現代中國的轉型》。龍安志曾定居中國，長年涉足國際社運、國際危機調停與政治經濟研究的工作。

雖然同樣寫朱鎔基如何處理三角債、通貨膨脹、亞洲金融危機等一連串經濟問題，不過Brahm在書裡試圖為他規劃中國從封閉經濟走向開放轉型的角色，找出理論及歷史的位置。讀畢全書，最大的感受不是人物的生平故事，也不是政策的制定過程，而是一種久違的、對歷史人物複雜性的重新認識。

坊間對朱鎔基的評價，向來存在矛盾。一方面，他是在一九八九年民運期間已經身居上海市委書記要職、其後在總理任內也打壓過民主自由。另一方面，他在國企改革、落實市場經濟規則等關鍵角色，令中國慢慢走向開放。

這種矛盾之所以難以調和，是因為今天social media的政治論述，習慣以一種二元的框架去理解歷史人物：不是民主派，就是專權者；不是改革英雄，就是體制幫兇。這種框架簡單易用，卻往往解釋不到歷史的複雜，也捕捉不到歷史的拐點。

這樣的人物，歷史上並非孤例，近如李登輝、戈爾巴喬夫、辛德勒、拉貝⋯⋯今天的網上世界，習慣了在冷氣房裡看「勇者鬥惡龍」，卻失去了對時空背景Context應有的賞析與判斷。朱鎔基之所以能在前social media時代生活過的人心目中，跨越紅黃藍白被欣賞，或許正正在於此。

❚ ❚ 一個危機四伏的年代

要理解朱鎔基的處境，必須先理解他接手的爛攤子。八九六四之後，鄧小平為了證明自己改革開放的功績，加速推動經濟轉型，並放任金融企業尋租、違規行為。在工業起飛的背後，是規模龐大的債務與過度投資泡沫：國有企業之間互相拖欠、形成「三角債」，通貨膨脹一度飆升至百分之二十一；地方政府為追增長指標，重複投資，令劣質商品堆積如山。這場危機的清理工作，最終落在朱鎔基肩上。

泡沫還泡沫，但有錢賺、有工返，只要不在自己任內爆，大可以領功之後將爛攤子推給下屆。拉丁美洲如是，英國今日政治更是如是。朱鎔基卻選擇了Take hard mode：收水、減產、解散國企、地方稅改。得罪國有企業、得罪地方官員、也令工人下崗再找工作，為的就是將中國經濟推向市場規則。

這種吃力不討好的改革，在中國的政治生態裡格外危險。《朱鎔基傳》記載，一九九二年國企化債陷入困局時，「八大元老」之一、前經濟沙皇薄一波（其子正是後來因貪腐案下台的薄熙來）曾私下發出批評條子，標題是〈問題出在政策還是政策的執行者〉，劍指朱鎔基。無論朱鎔基自己頂，還是交出屬下能幹的經濟師去頂，最終都會令政策不彰、改革不成功，為政敵遞刀子，惹來更大的危機。最終他選擇自己頂，讓石萬鵬、李劍閣、樓繼偉、王岐山這班當時圍繞在他身邊的經濟班子，繼續深化改革。

或許正是這種近乎執拗的市場信仰與改革熱誠，早在一九五八年已經令他在「反右」運動中被打成右派，被下放農村勞動五年之久。歷史往往吊詭：令他吃盡苦頭的性格，正是二十年後令他成就一番事業的性格。

❚ ❚ 信號經濟學

Brahm在《朱鎔基傳》裡以信號經濟學總結朱鎔基的成功。不只於他宣布過甚麼政策，而在於他如何Anticipate民眾理解他的政策及決心，為市場造成什麼Expectation。作者龍安志反覆點出，朱政策宣示前，都意識市場與民間會如何解讀，而這種解讀又將如何反過來影響政策成效。

「我們不再叫它三角債，誰花錢誰還錢！」「誰投資，誰付錢。不然就倒閉！」「誰的孩子誰抱走。」這些短促而近乎命令式的宣言，是精心設計的訊號，目的是向所有相關的市場參與者，國企經理、地方官員、外資銀行，傳遞一個清晰而不容誤讀的預期。98年廣信破產後，他親自在全國人大閉幕記者會上略略提到：北京不會為未經政府擔保的金融企業債務埋單。這不是一句隨口談，而是一次刻意的預期管理，重新校準市場對「政府是否包底」以及「市場規則能否依靠」的預期。

書中亦提到一個微妙的細節：在公開場合，朱鎔基總是恰如其分地提到「以江澤民為核心的」集體領導決策制，又處處談到「共產黨」是政策底氣。看似又八股又擦鞋，但書裡談到匯率、化債及市場管理的決策時，他會多透露，他的「宏觀調控」重點並不在於調控政策，而在於他如何製造市場期待，而這種期待背後有政治力量及過去政績作為擔保，配合市場「短期所要的回報」、「正面對的困難」。

同樣是共產黨政權，但他管治市場的手法不同。他不是靠槍桿子逼人就範，落個行政指令叫新東方執笠、地產商爆雷，而是像格林斯潘管理美國經濟一樣，透過清晰的規則、可預期的懲罰、以及不容妥協的底線，令市場自己選擇跟隨。

❚ ❚ 對全球化與債務，專家以外的判斷

一九九七年亞洲金融危機爆發，國際貨幣基金組織與世界銀行開出的藥方，是要求區內貨幣跟隨貶值，以刺激出口。時任世界銀行首席經濟師Joseph E. Stiglitz（他有另一本書叫《全球化的許諾與失落》又值得分享）向朱鎔基提出「擴大人民幣交易波動幅度」的建議，表面溫和，實質是要引導出貶值不可避免的局面。

他的判斷建基於中國經濟結構的具體現實：中國出口有近半原料依賴進口，貶值只會推高進口成本；出口商品中，又有近半由外資企業生產，貶值等同增加外資企業的還款負擔。在香港，港元與人民幣事實上互相盯住，一旦人民幣貶值，剛剛主權移交的香港，側面衝擊聯繫匯率。但說到底，他核心關注的是，如果再靠出口依賴、廉價貨幣，中國最終會成為全球化下的依賴國。

於是，當泰國、印尼、韓國、俄羅斯的貨幣相繼崩潰，中國寧願出口減弱，都要支撐人民幣。二〇〇〇年，朱鎔基在布魯塞爾歐盟總部向歐洲工業領袖總結這場戰役：中國之所以能夠克服危機，全靠「積極的財政擴張政策、穩健的貨幣政策和產業重組政策」。這句話背後，是正式宣佈中國背棄「華盛頓共識」教條、及「宏觀調控」成功解決經濟危機。

❚ ❚ 結語

作為一個自由經濟的信徒，當然對於朱鎔基的經濟政策有不滿的地方。尤其是，對於中國加入世貿，是否欺詐資本主義國家以自肥？從書中，他對「國家經濟復興」的執着，我相信他是有意利用世貿規則漏洞，配合中國重商主義去發展。

不過，整體而言朱鎔基在他任內10年能夠拆彈，制定發展方向，理順市場參與者重新重視規則，再對比今日各國的領袖，他的功績及歷史重要性是不容忽視。經歷過朱鎔基年代的人，無論政治立場紅黃藍白，都不約而同地懷念這位國務院總理。二元的政治框架，或許永遠無法完整地安放這樣一個人物；但歷史本身，往往正正是由這些難以歸類的人所書寫的。

(Source: https://www.patreon.com/jackyfungcc/posts/books-wei-he-lan-166817130)

              So, regarding Zhu Rongji's economic achievements and his approach, Jacky Fung highly recommend the book Zhu Rongji and the Transformation of Modern China written by American scholar Laurence J. Brahm. Although the book also covers how Zhu managed a series of economic issues—such as "triangle debt" (三角債), inflation, and the Asian financial crisis, Brahm attempts to define Zhu's role in planning China's transition from a closed economy to an open market, mapping out his theoretical and historical positioning. Jacky Fung suggests that the strongest takeaway of the book is not the subject's life story, nor the policy-making process, but rather a long-absent, renewed appreciation for the complexity of historical figures. I agree with Jacky Fung’s point of view about the complexity historical figures.

Note:

1. 《朱鎔基傳：朱鎔基與現代中國的轉型》一書的英文原名：Zhu Rongji and the Transformation of Modern China。作者是美國人 Laurence J. Brahm，中文名通常譯作 “龍安志” 。中文由丁力翻譯。香港中和出版有限公司在 2012 年出版中文版，約 360 頁，ISBN 是 9789881588104。後來這本書有第二版（2020），以及 2023 年精裝典藏版。(ChatGPT)

2.  Jacky Fung Chi Ching（馮智政）經常在網上談論香港、中國、國際政治及移民議題, 是一名研究員、政策評論員和節目主持。他生於1985年，是香港中文大學物理系畢業，後來在香港大學取得國際關係碩士。他曾經在 “香港政策研究所（Hong Kong Policy Research Institute）” 工作，主要研究中國、教育及公共政策。香港大學也曾邀請他作為講者，講談中國與世界的關係。他亦曾擔任 “DBC 數碼電台、now TV、商業電台《光明頂》” 等節目主持或評論員。他現在有自己的 Patreon，以 Jacky FUNG 馮智政的名字製作影片評論。(ChatGPT)

Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Nye, Joseph, Jr. 2004. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.

- ch. 3 – the US has enormous soft-power resource. But the US is not alone. Others, both countries and non-state actors also possess soft power that can be used to help or hinder the US’s achievement of its preferred outcomes.(73)(non-state actor – NGO)

- the decade-long economic slowdown of the 1990s tarnished Japan’s reputation for economic prowess, but it did not erase the nation’s soft power resources.(86)But there are also limits to Japan’s soft-power. Japan has never full come to terms with its record of foreign aggression in the 1930s.(87)

- ch. 4 – military power is to threat and fight. Economic power is used similarly. Soft power is more difficult to wield, many resources are outside the control of government, and their effect depends on acceptance by the receiving audience. (99)

- shaping public opinion becomes even more important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new democracies. Even when foreign leaders are friendly, their leeway may be limited if their public and parliaments have a negative image of the US and its policies. (105)

- there are 3 dimensions of public diplomacy. The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications. Government tells the press on how to carry out a decision. The second dimension is strategic communication much like an advertising campaign. For example, the British tourist authority was busily advertising British tradition, ceremony and history. The third dimension of public diplomacy is the development of lasting relationships with key individual over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channel.(107-9)

-it is important to remember that the same words and images that are  most successful to domestic audience may have negative effects on a foreign audience.(112)

- rigid censorship is not always the answer. An aspect of soft power that the Pentagon got right in the second Gulf war has been the embedding of reporters with forward military units. This limited Saddam Hussein’s ability to create international outrage by claiming that American was deliberately killing civilians. (116)

- democracy is more than voting. It could lead to “one man, one vote, once” if done hastily. Since the autocratic regimes in the Middle East have destroyed their liberal opposition, racial Islamist often represents the only alternative dissent in many countries. (120)

- ch. 5 – anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years. A widespread and fashionable view is that the US is a classically imperialist power. (127) In the US skeptics about soft power believe that popularity is ephemeral (i.e. people are forgetful) and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any cases. The US can act without the world’s applause. We are so strong that we can do as we wish. (128)

-power depends on context. We see that in the global information age, power is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chess board of political-military issue, US is in the lead; on the economic board, in the middle, the US is not a hegemony or an empire. On the bottom chessboard of transnational relations, power is chaotically dispersed. (136-7)

- many transnational issues such as climate change, international crime and terrorism cannot be resolved by military force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues were inherently multi-lateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particular important in dealing with these issues. (137)

Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Nye, Joseph, Jr. 2004. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.

.

Main points:

- Ch. 2 – the US has many resources that can potentially provide soft power. Not only is the fact that America is the world’s largest economy, but nearly half of the top 500 global companies are American. 62 of the top global brands are American. (33)

- opposition to American policies is not the same as general opposition to the US. The image or attractiveness of a country is composed of foreigner’s attitudes on a variety of levels and types, American policy constitutes only one. (35)

- many intellectuals and critics disdain popular culture because of its crude commercialism. They view pop culture as an anesthetizing and apolitical opiate for the masses. Such disdain is misplaced because popular entertainment often contains subliminal images and messages about individualism, consumer choice and other values that have important political effects. (47) (c/f  pop songs)

- simple items like blue jeans, Coca-Cola, or a cigarette brand acquired an added value that helped younger generations to give expression to an identify of their own. (48)

- Soviet audiences watching films with apolitical themes nonetheless learned that people in the West did not have to stand in long lines to purchase food, did not live in communal apartment, and they owned their own cars. All these invalidated the negative view promulgated by the Soviet media.(49)

- all countries pursue their national interest in foreign policy, but there are choices to be made about how broadly or narrowly we define our national interest. Polices based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definition of national interest are easier to make attractive to others.]60-61)

-the US, like 19^th century Britain, also has an interest in keeping international markets and global commons, such as the oceans, open to all. To a large extent, international order is a public good. (61)

- the image of the US and its attractiveness to others is a composite of many different ideas and attitudes. It depends in part on culture, in part on domestic policies and values, and in part on the substance, tactics, and style of the US foreign policies.(68)

(to be continued)

Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Nye, Joseph, Jr. 2004. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.

Main points:

- Preface – What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. It arise from the attractiveness of a county’s culture, political ideals, and polices.(x) [c/f also one's own good past records]

- the first chapter analysis the changing context of power in international politics, and the reason why soft power is becoming more important than in the past. (xii)

- the second chapter examines the sources of American soft power. American is not the only one with soft power; the third chapter looks at the soft power of other nations and non-state actors. Chapter 4 examines the practical problems of how to wield soft power. The concluding chapter summarizes what it all means for the foreign policy of the US in the aftermath of the Iraq war. (xiii)

- ch. 1 – at the most general level, power means the ability to get the outcome one wants. (1) Power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context. You need to understand what game you are playing and how the value of the cards may be changing (4)

- soft power rests on the ability to shape the preference of others. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction.(5)

-hard and soft power are related because they are two aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose. The distinction is one of degree; there are command power and co-optive power. The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to pure attraction. (7) Soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard-power resource is usually associated with command behavior. (7)

- in international politics, the resource that produce soft power arise in large part form the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in its internal practice and polices, in the way it handles its relation with others. (8)

- the soft power of a county rests primarily on 3 resources: its culture, its political value, and its foreign policies. Let’s start with culture. Culture is the set of values and practice that create meaning for a society. (11)

- when a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interest that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcome. (11)

- in a diverse world, all three sources of power –military, economic, and soft – remains relevant, although in different degrees in different relationships. (30)

- the soft power in the information is in part a social and economic by-product rather than solely a result of official government action, nonprofit institution with soft power of their own can complicate and obstruct government efforts. (32)

(to be continued)

North Koreans in Japan

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Ryang, Sonia. North Koreans in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997

Main points:

- ch. 6 – (Diaspora and beyond) – Mr. Yun, a Chongryun Korean, drew a clear distinction between the South Korean regime and its people, including his relatives. This distinction functions brilliantly as a device to rationalize Mr. Yun’s north Koran identity despite his southern origin and his relatives were in south Korea. In order to do this, Mr. Yun distinguished between the word kohyan, ‘native place’, and choguk, ‘the fatherland’. The kohyan-choguk separation allowed him to maintain his dual attachment to the peninsula. (168)

- second-generation Chongryun Koreans could do the same type of switching as their third-generation counterparts. They used to speak Korean at school and Japanese at home. But their symbolic boundaries of the organization were drawn in different ways for each generation. (174)

- now the antagonism between Chongryun and Japanese society had eased. Previously Chongryun regarded the Japanese state as one of its ‘enemies’. For this reason, the second generation did not undertake the frequent and speedy border crossing between intra-organizational and extra-organizational line until much later – possibly after quitting high school, and even later for those who were related to Chongryun. For those who continue to be working with Chongryun full time, this experience had yet to come. (174)

- all the forty third-generation youth that I met were clear that they would continue to live in Japan even after Korean reunification. North Korea was politically their fatherland, but Japan was where they lived. (176) In this vision, the third generation gave south Korea little room. Now that the new curriculums more or less ignored South Korea, this tendency would continue to grow. (176)

- in the 1960s and 1970s, Chongryun schools placed considerable stress on remembering Japanese colonialism. The story of the massacre of thousands of Koreans by the Japanese in the wake of the Kanto earthquake in 1923 had a prominent place in the lessons. Such films had an immense impact on children’s everyday conduct. Second-generation children equated their being overseas nationals of North Korea with being rescued by Kim II Sung. (178)

-terror-based drills thus help young pupils appreciate the existence of their fatherland. Such a mechanism augmented the second generation’s feeling of indebtedness toward North Korea. The combination of fear and gratitude generated by its emotional campaigns once had been used to maintain Chongryun’s organizational boundaries. (178)

- the transition from the second-generation model to that of the third generation might be called a post-diaspora. This was also a transition form collective identity to individual identity. Second-generation experience had been placed well within the state’s boundaries. Second generation‘s identity as Chongryun Koreans stood on the premise that Chongryun was a north Korean organization. Third generation experience was more individual-oriented. Their identity as North Korean living in Japan did not necessarily relied on the relations between North Korea and Japan. (198)

- the third generation distinguish between the north Korean state and Chongryun, and they could view north Korea critically. The third generation’s North Korea identity was gradually leaving the image of North Korea as a solid entity. Their identity did not have to rely on the state form.(198)

- conclusion: in this section the author tries to retrace the process as a historical flow. (201) If the colonial past was a collective past, the utopia of reunification was a collective future. The second generation thus grew up in the dual construction of terror (of repeating the miserable colonial history) and hope (the reunification under the guidance of Kim). (203)

- the reproduction of Chongryun’s organizational identity in individual utterance had a social effect crucial to Chongryun’s ongoing existence. As Paul Willis has shown us, it was true that within the limits of the given language, individuals were able to make life more meaningful; they strategically appropriated their underprivileged situations and turned them into positive factor to create meaning. In this process working-class youth were articulate and capable of expressively reflecting on their life-world. (203)

- however, Paul Willis’s work was important in the insightful analysis that despite their affirmation attitude towards life, working-class youth were structurally positioned in such a way as to maintain the exiting class structure. Far from causing an ‘educational crisis’ in British, the counter-school culture contributes to perpetuating the process that working-class youth would ‘voluntarily’ direct themselves to skilled, semiskilled and unskilled manual work. (203) The same was observed in the world of Chongryun Koreans. When they referred to their North Korean identity, they were articulate, expressive and positive. (203)

- in this historical course, we could see how the same term, overseas national of north Korean, had had different function. In the 1960s and 1970s, the term represented a utopia and was part of a discourse of heroism; it implied that Chongryun Koreans would eventually become North Korean nationals. Now oversees nationals comes closer to reflecting reality: it implies that Chongryun Korean would remain overseas. There was a shift from heroism to realism. (204)

North Koreans in Japan

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Ryang, Sonia. North Koreans in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Main points:

- ch. 4 – (The structure of coexistence) – what had be emphasized that just as the Japanese government lacked the perspective on Koreans as resident aliens, so Chongryun defined Koreans in Japan as overseas nationals of north Korea, not as citizens of Japan. Chongryun’s self-identification as overseas organization of north Korea coincided with its break with the Japanese Communist party. (115)

- by establishing it new identity, Chongryun successfully avoided being drafted into assisting the revolution on a foreign land.  Because of its political opposition to the south Korean regime and its loyalty to the North, it required a specific political identity by labeling its members as overseas nationals of north Korean, even though the majority of its members came form southern Korea.(115)

- “although the Japanese government and Chongryun pursue their policies separately, the effect of these polices often coincide.” (119)

- in 1965 the Japanese government entered into normal diplomatic relations with south Korea. In 1979, the Japanese government ratified the international covenant on human rights. In 1981 it joined the UN convention relating to the statue of refugees. In 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Justice installed a new category of permanent residence called ‘exceptional permanent resident’ for Koreans who had not been eligible to obtain permanent resident under the 1965 treaty.

- in 1991 Japan and south Korean Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed a memorandum putting into effect various reforms to the alien registration law and the immigration control act: fingerprint was abolished. Improvements were made with regard to civil right. In 1992 all Korean permanent resident, including most Chongryun Koreans, were made ‘special permanent residents’. Chongryun Korean thus became eligible to apply for various social benefits. (125)

- when the legal status of Chongryun Korean was extremely uncertain in the 1950s and 1960s, Chongryun’s identify was relatively stable. During the 1970s it could fortify itself as an organization following Kim II Sung’s idea of juche. Today the state-centered identity of Chongryun as an organization of overseas nationals of North Korean clearly remained in it official discourse. (127)

- generational difference within Chongryun were increasingly coming to the surface. Things that the first generation took for granted were not necessarily so for the second generation and definitely not so for the third and fourth generations. (128)

- ch. 5 – (Hesitation and transition) -for Chongryun Koreans, their Korean identity meant primarily a north Korean political identity, but they adjusted and readjusted it depending on the political conditions. Individuals had their own ways of adapting, sometimes re-ordering their memory, as did the first-generation Korean, and sometimes quickly switching between two different modes of existence, as did the third generation schoolchildren. (140)

- on 7 July 1994 Kim II Sung died, Ae-son a female Chongryun Korean could not stop crying. She was sad because she felt she had not always fulfilled her duty to the great leader. She was sad because she could not bring about the reunification while the great leader was alive. (144)

- out of the author’s numerous visits to Chongryun schools, one of the most interesting incident was an open hours where she could observe the interaction between parents and teachers.  There was certain regularity in the languages they chose. On the one hand, if both the husband and wife or one of them worked for Chongryun, their conversion would be in formal Korean. On the other and, if they were not involved with Chongryun on a professional level, their conversation in public would normally be in Japanese. (151)

- as we look at this shift in language, it was not our concern to ask the speaker’s  motivation. The point was, rather, to view the shift as a practice or a series of practices closely related to identity constitution. In the case of Chongryun Koreans at least, the process of the language shift itself was already part of their Chongryun Korean identification; going from Japanese to Korean or vice versa was how they lead the Chongryun lifestyle.(152)

- in other words, in this case identity could not be the essence; it is the process of identification that matters. And what enabled such a process in ordinary day-to-day life was language use – not the languages as it was but the act of using the language. (152)

- habitus alone cannot explain the transitional (changeable) state of social process; it could not answer the question how social individuals coped with reality. The first generation could stick to the old language. The third generation was flexible; their performative skill would enable them to shift. The second generation was somewhere in between, caused by the transitional nature of their identity.

(to be continued)

North Koreans in Japan

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Ryang, Sonia. North Koreans in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Main points:

- ch. 2 – (chapter title: From performative to performance) - in 1993 Chongryun launched a three-year program of curricular reform. Under the new curricular, subject such as things about the childhood of father Marshall Kim II Sung were abolished.

- this chapter focuses on various changes related to the circular reform and considers its implication for re-adjusting the identity of children as overseas national of north Korea. (51)

- of greatest interest with regard to the new Korean educational  program was the emphasis on teaching the spoken version of Korean. In the new textbook, fourteen out of 28 lessons were dedicated to informal, spoken ending forms. (57)

- some young teaches told the author that the revision of the textbook came at the insistence of the second generation teachers. (58)

- the emphasis on teaching the spoken version of Korean was structured in such a way as to replace the spoken Japanese children use outside the school, thereby encouraging the use of Korean in the after-school hours. Yet when child spoke to teachers, they used the Korean honorific with formal ending. It was unthinkable for teacher to conduct class in informal Koran. (65)

- yet outside school the children switched to Japanese. Children’s knowledge of informal Korean could not extend beyond the classroom. (65)

-pupil were getting better reading Korean, yet their daily language was increasingly distanced form the school-taught Korean language. Children were no longer capable of identify themselves as ‘loyal children’ of Kim Ii Sung. They no longer took such an identity as a point of departure, as the language used to form that identity was no longer imposed on the children. (66)

- ch. 3 – (chapter title: The rise of legitimate identity) - in 1945, the peninsula was divided into American and Soviet occupation zones. In the eyes of many Korean in Japan, events in Southern Korea appeared to take a far less satisfactory turn. The situation was chaotic. Riot and uprising, protesting against the military government occurred in many areas in the south. October 1945 saw the release from prisons of many Korean communist in Japan. On 15 October the League of Korean was formed in Tokyo. (79)

- following Korea’s political and territorial division the League of Korean opted for political conviction at the expenses of regional attachment. Its opposition to the South Korean regime meant that it would abandon repatriation to the south because the majority of Koreans in Japan originally came from the southern provinces; this option was a costly one to them. (81)

- from the outset two different orientations had coexisted with the League of Korean: Communist internationalism and nationalism. According to Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent”.  In terms applied to the Korean case, those who associate with North Korean regard the latter as the only legitimate state representing the whole Korean nation. (82)

-  in many ways the League could be regarded as the predecessor of Chongryun. (83) The League was dissolved in September 1949. (87) Following the dissolution of the League, in 1951, during the Korean war, the Korean communist and leftist-nationalist in Japan organized the democratic front of Korean – Minjon .  Minjon inherited the factionalism between internationalist and nationalist within the League of Korean. (89)

- among those nationalist who were frustrated by the communist party’s stance was Han Dok-su, chairman of Chongryun. In March 1955 Han denounced the Internationalist. On 25 may, 1955 Minjon was dissolved and Chongryun emerged with Han as the chairman. (90)

- many member of the first-generation support Han because he shifted away from the subjugation to the Japanese Communist party. Elderly Chongryun Koreans believed that Kim II Sung allowed them to live in Japan as North Korean’s ‘overseas nationals’. (92-3)

- the term ‘overseas nationals ’of north Korea, central to Chongryun’s legitimate discourse, occurred frequently in the languages of the first-generation individuals. This identity replaced the identity of colonial subject. (92)

-  what was surprising was that many first –generation Chongryun Koreans’ story regularly jumped from the ‘colonial past’ to the time they became ‘overseas nationals of north Korea’ mediated by the phrase ‘thanks to the love and care and wise guidance of the Great Leader Marshal Kim II Sung. (93)

- Mrs. Kwon, a Korean, usually conducted her life in Japanese. In the earlier part of the conversation with me, she spoke Japanese. As she moved on to talk about the organization and matters related to Chongryun activities and north Korea, she changed to Korean.  Sometime the language was intermingled. But by the time she was telling me about Kim II Sung, her whole sentences were in Korean. It was obvious to me that she was better at Japanese than Korean; indeed she said she learned Korean only after she became a teacher at a Korean high school. I found such regularity in switching language when I talked to other Chongryun related Korean.(97)

- the example could only be explained in terms of institutionalized training whereby the speaker learned to say certain terms and not to say other. In this case, turning the ‘thanks to’ phrases into a norm as an contrast to colonial humiliation. (97)

- such training should also prevent speakers from telling their own stories with their own expression. We can already see a certain type of censorship at work here. Let us turn to the linguist life of adult member, since this control was closely related to the rise of the legitimate identity of Chongryun. (97)

- Juche literally meant ‘subject’ and was often translated as ‘self-reliance’. According to Kim, ‘establishing juche means that the people approach the revolution and construction of their own country as masters’. (97-8)

- “the implementation of Kim II Sung worship strengthened north Korea’s authority over Chongryun. This in turn provided Chongryun with a rationalizing device: by emphasizing that Chongryun activities were in the served of Kim II Sung and the fatherland.” (102)

- “chongryun workers begin their day with a choson shinbo reading session at which they take note of current slogans and aims of the organization’s activity. It is important that they register the set of rhetorical expressions used in the paper.” (103)

- the regular criticism session functioned to maintain Chongryun’s linguistic orthodoxy. The systematic use of fixed terms by cadres would influence the members by exhibiting what was supposed to be ‘good speech’. (105)

-“it became the norm to mention their identity as ‘overseas nationals’ of north Korean in connection to the ‘thanks to’ phrase. In such a process, they reordered their past, remodeled their memory, and reformulate their experience in what is regarded as a ‘proper way’ of speaking. Even Mrs. Kwon represented her adolescence in a well-to-do family as slavery under colonialism.” (106) (c/f using a keyword to describe a period)

“In this sense, it is highly indicative that Chongryun’s official publications hardly refer to pre-Chongryun days, official history begins only after Koreans in Japan came to be benefited by the glories benefactor.”(106)

- two factors were involved: obliteration of nonorthodox identities, such as the well off or docile colonial days; the omission what was regarded as irrelevant including domestic violence and disproportionate personal privilege enjoyed by the top ranks. This was of course censorship. The best censorship was not so much to suppress speaking negative or unusable words but not to give the word at all. In study meetings students were given Korean words related to Chongryun only positively; negative words were used only with reference to ‘enemies’. (106)

- a fundamentalist commitment become a manufactured identity helped by strategies as marking and making, obliteration and omission. Language here again played a decisive role in both forgetting and selecting experience and replacing and displacing memory. (106-7)

- nevertheless, this was not to say that their identity was false. This was not a matter to verify in terms of true-false opposition. By internalizing Chongryun’s discourse, the majority of first-generation Chongryun Korean lost alternative language to represent themselves.  In this process they had indeed become ‘overseas nationals’. (107)

(to be continued)

North Koreans in Japan

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Ryang, Sonia. North Koreans in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997

Main points:

- this book pursues a number of closely connected themes. First it looks at how an organization such as Chongryun that was loyal to North Korea could exist in Japan. The key to investigate was to find out how individuals used their socially constituted linguist capacity and linguistically constructed social resource. (12)

- part I (ch. 1 & 2)  of this volume probes into the system of discipline that shaped Chongryun’s students . In chapter 1, the book discusses the acquisition process of the appropriate socio-linguistic competence by Chongryun’s schoolchildren. Chapter two goes on to examine the changing curriculum and its effect on schoolchildren. (13)

- in chapter 3 of part II (ch. 3 & 4)  a view of the first generation of Chongryun recalled the historic background. (14) In chapter 4, the book considers the connection between Chongryun’s strategies that had enabled Chongryun to find a niche within the framework of the Japanese state.

- in part 2 (ch.3-4), the book thus look at the historically determined condition for the ongoing reproduction  of Chongryun’s identity. (14)

- in part 3 (ch.5-6) it focuses on the contemporary debate inside Chongryun by highlighting dilemmas and difficulties that the second generation faced. Ch. 5 concentrates on a teacher in Chongryun School; it provides a glimpse of a typical second generation.  Chapter 6 summarizes the world of three generations in a comparative perspective. This chapter is about migration and diaspora. (15)

- in conclusion the book summarizes the forgoing discussion, returning to the theme of language, ideology, and identity.  (15)

- ch. 1 – (The performative and its effects) as a self-financing kakushu gakko,(hidden school) Chongryun’s schools were exempted from regular inspection and other forms of intervention by Japan’s central and local education authorities. (25)

- children were also subjected to extra-academic pressure, as their parents were generally keen to see them perform well in school. No text was critical of Chongryun, North Korea, or Kim Ii Sung. To teach negative terms, lessons used examples of South Korean regime, Japanese imperialism, and US imperialism (31)

- the linguistic life of students was placed under collective control inside the school; the implementation of the using the Koran language was an important concern of Chongryun schools.(31)

- the Korean language schoolchildren spoken predominately text-dependent: it was the written form that was spoken. (36)

- Korean was the only language used in Chongryun’s public life; Japanese was the language used in private life. (44)

- the linguistic practices of Chongryun had two interrelated effect. First they fostered a positive relationship between its users and Chongryun. Second a clear distinction between the spheres of application for Korean and Japanese keeps the two sociolinguistic domains relatively independent form each other, the division bring about more efficient social control. (44)

- Bourdieu referred to bilingualism as that the same speaker changed his or her expression, moving from one language to another, without even realizing the fact. Thus, for as long as habitus and field were in agreement, the habitus ‘comes at just the right moment’, and without the need for any calculation. (44-5)

- the utterance of Chongryun students carried strong element of the performative statement. Performative statement, according to Austin, was not to be verified in terms of the true-or-false opposition but to be identified primarily as felicitous or infelicitous depending on the situation. (46)

- utterance was neither neutral or innocent; it amounted to a political act, legitimating Chongryun’s existence and recognizing  its authority. In this way, language and identity were linked.(47)

- by examining the institutionalized disciple, we were able to look at the process whereby individual acquired socially approved way of language use; this might not necessary be preceded by ideological conviction. (48)

- once acquired, the organizational language was at the disposal of individual users. In this process individual accrue a distinct, if only partial, identity as Chongryun Koreans. (49)

(to be continued)

North Koreans in Japan

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Ryang, Sonia. North Koreans in Japan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997

Main points:

- Introduction – people lived through not one but many identities’ or we might say that identity was multiple – ethnic, gendered, occupational, class, or otherwise. (1)

- in this book hopes to show the reader how Chongryun formed and maintained the north Korean identity in Japan. It involved the development of a body of knowledge and pedagogical technology that gave rise to legitimate discourse used with the organization. (2)

- this book is a three-part ethnographic journey to consider the language, ideology and identity of three generations of north Korean in Japan organized around Chongryun. (2) Why language? Because it constituted identity. Why ideology? Because it overlapped with identity, it is part of ideology.(2)

- up to 97 percent  of Korean in Japan were born in Japan. Out of those who originally came from Korea, more that 97 percent were from southern provinces of the peninsula. North Korean identity was not geo-culturally pre-given, it was Chongryun’s  political projection.(3) Founded in 1955, Chongryun consisted of a complex of numerous associations. (3) It had one university, 12 high schools, 56 middle schools, 81 primary schools. (3) The school taught about North Korea and saw themselves as overseas nationals of north Korea. (3)

- it was true that there were two distinct organizations in Japan, respectively looked to north and south Korean for affiliation: Chongryun and Mindan. (5) Throughout the text, the book calls the individual who were by and large positively and closely associated with Chongryun the Chongryun Koreas. (5)

- the northern regime was attractive in the eyes of Korean leftist nationalist because it looked more like an indigenous regime. (6)

- in the late 1940s the league of Koreans in Japan, sympathetic to north Korea, suffered intense suppression from the Allied power and Japanese authority. In 1955 Chongryun emerged, adopting a strict policy of noninvolvement in Japanese’s internal affairs.  Its members identified themselves as ‘overseas nationals’ of north Korea. (7)

- anthropological studies of Japan in English ever since Ruth Benedict had been plagued by two problems. The first was the lack of history perspective. (8) For example, in ‘Night Work’ Anne Allison presented data from the early 1980s as if the information were supra historical intrinsic to Japanese culture. This ahistorical perspective continues to be held by Japanese anthropologists. The second problem was the tendency to subsume the whole society under a particular keyword. (8)

(to be continued)

Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation

Recently I have read the following book Its main points are:

Book title: Leo Ching. 2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Main points:

-ch. 5 – “here I am interested in reconstituting two crucial issues of colonial/postcolonial studies: identity and historicity. In this chapter, through a contextualized reading of the orphan of Asia, I argue that the reconstitution of consciousness offers a more historical and thus critical alternative in conceptualizing colonial violence than the politics of identity.”(176)

- the book argues that “the novel opens up a larger historical canvas that depicts the irreducible colonial-national-local triangulation between Japan, China, and Taiwan throughout the Japanese colonial period.  The orphan of Asia presents an allegory of Taiwan’s gradual ‘coming into being’ with the intensification of colonial rule and its disillusion with Chinese nationalism.”(176)

-“the difference between Chen and Sung is stark. For Chen, the ‘orphan mentality’ is an impediment to the channeling of a Taiwanese identity into a grander Chinese identity. For Sung, on the contrary, the orphan signifies the very essence of Taiwanese-ness, the signifier that severs itself from both national (China) and colonial (Japan) representations through the sentiment of rejection and abandonment.”(184)

Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Leo Ching.2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Main points:

- ch. 3 – the historical significance of kominka was that for the first time in Taiwanese colonial history, the struggle over identity emerged as the dominant discourse for the colonized.  (96)

- the politics of identity in kominka represented the way which  the onus of becoming Japanese had shifted from state to the colonial subject. In doka, the making of colonized  subject into Japanese was predominantly a project of the colonial government.(97)

- “I have argued that doka, with its emphasis on cultural integration, conceals the fundament social and political inequality between the colonizer and the colonized.”(107)

- “it is precisely this ambivalent sameness, rather that racial difference, that Oguma Eiji characterized as the particularity of doka in Japanese colonial discourse. In the conclusion of his comprehensive study of the genealogy of the Japanese, Oguma argued that most sociological analyses of ethnicity and group identification are unable to account or the theory of Japanese doka for one simple reason.” (107)

-these analyses based on the assumption that the relationship between different groups was organized by recognized others as different. But the support for the doka ideology situated the colonized others in ‘blood relationship’ rather then in radical different. Oguma argued that the ‘adopted blood’ system was crucial in rationalized the emperor system in incorporating the colonies into the imperial family. (107-8)

- this incorporation, of courses begged the question as to why Japanese colonialism adopted the discourse of doka when most colonial policy had abandoned it. Oguma offered an explanation of the ambivalent in the Japanese version of doka. He observed that one distinctive character of Japanese imperialism was its near relationship to its colonized:  Korean and Taiwan were racially closer to the Japanese. As a result there was no clear exclusion; there was also no complete equality. (109)

- kominka was a condition of an ‘ambivalent identity’, when the self’s interior was invaded by a sense of ‘otherness’ at the moment of ‘becoming Japanese’ (124) “For if kominka, as I would like to argue, is predominately a cultural rather than a political or economic mode of colonial power, then cultural production themselves do not simply reflect the underlying colonial rule but constitute a kind of colonial policy.”(125) “In this regard, the struggle over identities is not merely a reflection of, or even a response to, the process of imperialization; rather, it is an integral part of the very logic of kominka itself.”(125) (c/f see double use of concept. Kominka generated struggle over identities, and that the colonial modernity generated Japanese or Japanese-ness, Taiwanese or Taiwanese-ness, aborigines or aboriginality, and Chinese or Chinese-ness, as mentioned at the introduction on page11).

- “the postcolonial reading of komin texts … fail to grasp the logic and affectivity of kominka. In short, contrary to the postcolonial critic’s assertion, the identity struggle is not the effect, but the very cause of kominka. Prior to the demise of the Taiwan political movements in the 1930s, and during the so-called rule by doka, ‘culture’ was an important form of political expression and social commentary”. (125)

-“only at this particular historical juncture does struggle over colonial identity emerge as the dominant discourse in colonial Taiwan, where the feeling that one ‘cannot be Japanese’ become an overwhelming existential anxiety and a political desire”.(132)

- ch. 4 – a colonial subject that was recognizably the same, but never quite the same. Is this not the textualization, or the discursive process, of what Homi Bhabhi had called the ‘ambivalence of mimicry?’ For Bhabhi, the ‘mimic man’, by virtue of his or her partial and never complete representation for the colonizer, ‘returned as the displacing gaze of the disciplined.’(134)

[to see foot-note on mimicry: Homi Bhabha, the location of culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 85-92. Bhabha defines mimicry as “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.”]

-“as long as the Musha incident is interpreted and debated within the arena of colonial administration and policy making, any attempt at interrogating the fundamental contradiction between the colonizer and the colonized, the Japanese and the aborigines, is necessary disavowed and foreclosed, we must turn to literature in order to catch a glimpse of an attempt to reconcile and reveal the constitute relationship between civility and savagery.”(148)

-“as Kawamura Minato correctly points out, in the earlier historical moment, at the dawn of Japanese imperialism, the ‘discovery’ of ‘savages’ in the exterior substantiated Japan’s ‘identification’ with ‘civilization’ as a modern nation-state.”(148)

-“in the wake of the Musha incident, Japanese colonial attitudes toward the aborigines underwent a conspicuous shift whereby the ideology of imperialization, rather than military subjugation or economic servitude, emerged as the dominant form of colonial control.”(152)

- “I now consider two popular representation of aborigines form the 1910s, and the 1930s, ‘the story of Goho’ and ‘the Bell of Sayon’ that best delineated the shift of  aboriginal representation from ‘natural savages’ to ‘national subjects’”.(153)

- “Goho is the Japanese adaption of a Chinese folktale that tells of the benevolence and self-sacrifice of Goho, a Ching official who supposed convince the aborigines to give up their head hunting practices”.(153-4)

-“in a valiant effort to reveal the Japanese colonial hypocrisy of ‘universal brotherhood’, Kato Kunihiko devoted a chapter in his book to the plight of the aborigines who became ‘volunteers’.” “Kato is especially intrigued by his encounter with Aui and aborigines who despite having lost his father at the hands of the Japanese police during an uprising, enlisted for the Sixth Takasago Volunteer Army.”(168)

- “similar reservation and incredulity at the contradictory position of the aboriginal volunteers is expressed by Hayashi Eidai.” “Hayashi rightly points to ‘imperialization through education’ as responsible for the transformation of aborigines to volunteer.”(170)

-“Kato and Hayashji’s incredulity and frustration can perhaps be interpreted as their inability to escape the working of the ‘regime of nationality’. For them, the identity of the aborigines, hence their difference, is incommensurable with loyalty to the emperor.” (171)

-“what is being played out here is a politics of identity in which the aborigines are perceived perpetually and solely in their ‘difference’ by the Japanese, despite the fact that they ‘were’ Japanese and imperial subjects during the colonial period.”(171)

-“the claim of patriotism and loyalty to the Japanese nation is a present-day strategy of protest against the ‘betrayal’ of the former colonizer…. Positioned at the bottom of the colonial hierarchy and deprived of any political and economic possibility, becoming ‘Japanese soldiers’ was perhaps the only avenue to perceived equality and agency for most of these ‘volunteers’.”(172)

(to be continued)

Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Leo Ching.2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Main points:

- ch. 1 – in this chapter, the book argues first of all, against the particularization of Japanese imperialism and colonialism as somehow different and unique. (19) Second, it argues that the lack of the decolonization process in the breakup of Japanese empire had prevented both Japan and Taiwan from addressing and confronting their particular colonial relation and legacy. The abrupt dissolution enabled Japan to circumvent and disavow its colonial question. (20)

- in Japan, a new postwar national identity based on singularity and exclusivity was construed by the effacement of memoirs of war and empire, instead of a vast imperial landscape , Japan is now enclosed and delimited within the border of an ‘island country’.(33)

- ch. 2 – there were two primary yet divergent tendencies of anticolonial struggle in Taiwan form the early 1920s to the late 1930s. It was a period marked by coalescing and conflicting political ideas that entailed the ‘official’ inauguration of doka, or assimilation policy. It also led to the emergence of what could be called ‘neo-nationalist’, or a ‘proto-nationlist’ thought.(51)

-it was important to note here that these political movements were short-lived. With the exception of the more moderate journals and newspaper, the political movement left only scant documentation of their activities. (53) “Liberalism and Marxism were the two dominant tendencies that intersected with Taiwanese anticolonial movement of this period.”(53)

- “the historian Wang Hsiao-po has argued that although, historically, Taiwan consists of several ‘secondary communities’, the ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ of the various immigrants from the mainland took on the ‘consciousness of the Han people’.”(62)

- “as an example of the Taiwan faction’s repress China-consciousness under the colonial rule, Wang describes in great length the life work and attitude of … Lin Hsien-tang. Wang cites Lin’s political pragmatism, his refusal to speak Japanese or wear Japanese clothes.”(63)

-“the debate over whether the so-called ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ should be regarded either as an appendage to a larger Han Chinese ethnonational consciousness or as an autonomous historical product of Japanese colonialism is a distinctively postwar and postcolonial attempt at negotiating the cumbersome problem of Taiwanese/Chinese identity that has its roots in the colonial period.”(76)

- “through this contradicting between class interest and colonial oppression, we can see that the notions of ‘Taiwan factions’ and ‘China factions’ in political and cultural discourse were not opposing forms of ethno-national or cultural identification. Rather, they represent the diverging tenets of political imagination and practical feasibly within a class.”(88)

-“similarly, the formal split of Taiwanese neo-nationalist movement into the reform-oriented liberal faction and the radical-mined Marxist faction in the late 1920s should not be regarded as simply the manifestation of ‘foreign’ political influence.”(88)

-“various discourse and policies under the rubric of doka, or assimilation, and later kominka, or imperialization, were implemented and constructed as the dominant Japanese colonial ideology in countering the growing demands of the Taiwanese neo-nationalist movements.”(88)

(to be continued)