Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:
South China Sea: why Beijing takes a low-key approach to Vietnam but not the Philippines (2/2)
South China Morning Post - Alyssa Chen
Tue, September 3, 2024 at 2:30 a.m. PDT·8 min read
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According to an associate professor in Guangzhou, who
specialises in the South China Sea and asked to remain anonymous, Manila's
closeness to the US, the "collective effort to intimidate China" and
its willingness to support Washington's stance on Taiwan was
"intolerable" to Beijing.
Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory that must be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary.
Most countries, including the US and Philippines, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to arm the island to help it defend itself.
The academic said Beijing now felt forced to leverage the South China Sea dispute to put pressure on Manila.
"Unlike other nations that engage frequently in joint
military exercises with forces outside the region, Vietnam has been notably
restrained in colluding with extra-regional powers," the associate
professor added.
Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said Beijing may want to discourage other South China Sea claimants from following the Philippine lead.
"[China] feels that pushing back hard against the Marcos government is useful to teach other countries a lesson about aligning too closely with the US," he said.
Harrison Pretat, a maritime affairs expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said: "It is likely that some amount of the pressure Beijing has applied to Manila's maritime activities has been an attempt to test US-Philippine unity and raise doubts in the Philippines about the usefulness of the alliance."
But he also said that it may be worried that taking a tough approach to the Philippines and Vietnam at the same time could "strain its resources and amount to an untenable level of risk".
Pham, from the South China Sea Chronicle Initiative, said: "Missteps in exerting pressure on Vietnam will only drive Vietnam closer to the US and other regional powers, complicating China's strategic calculations in the South China Sea."
Pretat also said Vietnam "prefers to manage maritime tensions with Beijing quietly and is unlikely to follow in Manila's footsteps", adding that the Philippines has tried to "internationalise" the dispute.
In 2016 it took a case to an international tribunal in The Hague, which rejected Beijing's claims over the waterway, and it is now considering another lawsuit alleging that China has caused environmental damage in the waterway.
China refused to take part in the 2016 hearings and has never accepted the findings.
Ding Duo, from the National Institute for South China Sea
Studies in Hainan, said Manila tended to "escalate the issue as much as
possible" but "high-level officials and leaders in Vietnam rarely
talk about the dispute internationally or point their fingers at China".
But Zhu Feng, executive dean of Nanjing University's school of international studies, said the "potential threats posed by Vietnam's island-building have not been completely eliminated".
Zhu added: "Such activities could become a new flashpoint in the bilateral relationship if there is a substantial change or escalation."
According to Ding, Beijing's different approach towards the two countries stemmed from the fact that Vietnam was building "on features it has controlled since the 1970s and 1980s, while Beijing views Manila's efforts as an attempt to take over previously uninhabited features or those under Chinese control, such as Scarborough Shoal".
Ding said Beijing may think Manila's actions were "unacceptable" and not in line with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
This non-binding guideline signed by China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2002 says countries should not establish a presence on uninhabited islands or reefs and should exercise self-restraint.
In 2013 China embarked on a major island-building programme of its own in the Spratly Islands, and also built up both civilian and military infrastructure in the South China Sea, including runways, radar stations and accommodation for troops.
All this construction happened on features that Beijing already controlled and state media has defended its actions as "lawful and justified".
Pham said the key to China's approach was "divide and rule tactics" because it wanted to forestall any collective resistance among claimant states to maintain its dominance in the South China Sea.
However, Cooper warned, tough measures from Beijing could not be ruled out in the future, "if more substantial military forces start being deployed more regularly to those [Vietnamese] features".
Translation
（繼續）
廣州一位專門研究南海問題、要求匿名的副教授表示，馬尼拉與美國的親密關係、「集體恐嚇中國」以及支持華盛頓在台灣問題上立場的意願，對北京來說是「無法容忍的」 。
北京將台灣視為其領土的一部分，必須與大陸重新統一，必要時可以使用武力。
包括美國和菲律賓在內的大多數國家都不承認台灣是一個獨立國家，但華盛頓反對任何以武力奪取台灣島的企圖，並有法律義務武裝台灣島以幫助其自衛。
這位學者表示，北京現在感到被迫利用南海爭端向馬尼拉施加壓力。
這位副教授補充說：“越南與其他經常與域外勢力進行聯合軍事演習的國家不同，越南在與域外大國勾結方面明顯有自我約制。”
美國企業研究所高級研究員Zack Cooper表示，北京可能希望阻止其他南海聲索國效仿菲律賓的做法。
他說：“（中國）認為，強力反擊馬可斯政府有助於給其他國家一個關於與美國過於密切結盟的教訓。”
戰略與國際研究中心海事專家Harrison
Pretat表示：「北京對馬尼拉海事活動施加一定程度的壓力，很可能是為了考驗美菲團結，並引發對菲律賓對該聯盟的有用性的懷疑」。
但他也表示，北京可能擔心同時對菲律賓和越南採取強硬態度可能會「導致其資源緊張並導致難以承受的風險」。
南海紀事倡議組織的Pham表示：“對越南施加壓力如產生失誤只會讓越南與美國和其他地區大國走得更近，使中國在南海的戰略算盤變得更加複雜。”
Pretat還表示，越南 “更願意悄悄地處理與北京的海上緊張局勢，不太可能步馬尼拉的後塵” ，並補充說菲律賓已試圖將爭端 “國際化” 。
2016年，菲律賓向海牙國際法庭提起訴訟，該法庭駁回了北京對這條航道的主張，目前正在考慮提起另一起訴訟，指控中國對該航道造成了環境破壞。
中國拒絕參加2016年的聽證會，也從未接受調查結果。
海南南海研究院的Ding Duo表示，馬尼拉傾向於“盡可能升級問題”，但“越南高層和領導人很少在國際上談論這一爭端，也很少將矛頭指向中國” 。
但南京大學國際關係學院執行院長Zhu Feng表示，「越南造島造成的潛在威脅尚未完全消除」。
Zhu補充說： “如果出現實質性變化或升級，此類活動可能成為雙邊關係新的爆發點。”
Ding表示，北京對兩國的不同態度源於這樣一個事實：越南只在「自1970年代和1980年代以來在其控制的地物上進行建設，而北京則認為馬尼拉的努力是試圖接管以前無人居住或在中國控制下的地物，例如黃岩島」。
Ding表示，北京可能認為馬尼拉的行為 “不可接受” ，不符合《南海各方行為宣言》。
中國和東南亞國家聯盟於2002年簽署的這份不具約束力的準則稱，各國不應在無人島礁上存在，並應實行自我克制。
2013年，中國在南沙群島啟動了自己的大型島嶼建設計劃，還在南海建設了民用和軍事基礎設施，包括跑道、雷達站和部隊住所。
所有這些依地貎建設都發生在北京已經控制的地區，官方媒體辯稱其行為「合法合理」。
Pham表示，中國做法的關鍵是「分而治之」的策略，因為它希望阻止聲索國之間為維持其在南海的主導地位而進行集體抵抗。
然而，Cooper警告說，“如果更多的軍事力量開始更並頻繁地部署到這些（越南）地物上”，未來不排除北京採取強硬措施的可能性。
So, this article looks at the differences in
China's response to its maritime disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam. China's
response to Vietnam's rapid expansion of its land reclamation in the Spratly
Islands has been muted so far - a stark contrast to Beijing's increasingly
assertive response to the Philippines. It is interesting to note that in
2016 the Philippines took this maritime dispute to an international tribunal
which rejected Beijing's claims over the waterway. China refuses to take part
in this hearing and has never accepted
the tribunal’s findings.
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