科學家正在學習改寫生命密碼（2/2）

Recently the New York Times reported the following:

Scientists Are Learning to Rewrite the Code of Life (2/2)

In a giant feat of genetic engineering, scientists have created bacteria that make proteins in a radically different way than all natural species do.

NYT - By Carl Zimmer -Origins- (Carl Zimmer covers news about science for The Times and writes the Origins column.)

July 31, 2025

(continue)

In 2019, the Medical Research Council team unveiled their first successful creation: a version of E. coli with only 61 codons, which they named Syn61. Its ability to survive without three codons encouraged them to whittle its genetic code down even further.

“We were motivated to see how far we could streamline the genetic code,” Dr. Robertson said.

He and his colleagues set out to create Syn57, a version of E. coli with only 57 codons. They entered a race with Dr. Nyerges and his colleagues at Harvard, who were already trying to reach that same goal.

For Syn61, the researchers had altered more than 18,000 codons in E. coli’s genome. To make Syn57, they would have to alter more than 100,000. They tested these changes by making small fragments of DNA and observing how well the microbe could read them.

Some changes caused no trouble, but others caused devastating harm. Bacteria have certain genes that overlap, for instance, and changing a codon in one can accidentally wreck the sequence of the other.

The scientists had to invent a lot of repairs to undo the damage, including separating overlapping pairs of genes to create two distinct stretches of DNA.

“We definitely went through these periods where we were like, ‘Well, will this be a dead end, or can we see this through?’” Dr. Robertson recalled.

Glitch by glitch, the researchers figured out how to fix the altered DNA. On Thursday, the researchers announced that they had succeeded: They had created Syn57.

“It’s kind of crazy that they were able to pull this off,” said Yonatan Chemla, a synthetic biologist at M.I.T. who was not involved in the study. “It’s a technically demanding tour de force.”

Meanwhile, at Harvard, Dr. Nyerges and his colleagues have encountered glitches of their own. “There’s a lot more in genomes than we thought,” he said. “We are still not great at designing biology.”

Last month, his team reported that they had assembled a 57-codon genome into seven pieces of DNA. They are now working on stitching them together into a single molecule. “We will definitely get there,” he said.

Syn57 is unquestionably alive, but just barely. E. coli typically takes an hour to double its population; Syn57 needs four hours. “It’s extremely feeble,” Dr. Chemla said.

Dr. Robertson and his colleagues are now tinkering with Syn57 to see if they can speed up its growth. If they succeed, other scientists might be able to engineer it to carry out useful jobs that ordinary microbes can’t.

Along with the 20 amino acids that our cells use to make proteins, chemists can create hundreds of others. It might be possible to reprogram Syn57 so that its seven missing codons encode unnatural amino acids. That would enable bacteria to make new kinds of drugs or other useful molecules.

Syn57 might also help scientists address the potential risks that could come if engineered microbes were released into the environment. Microbiologists have long investigated how microbes might eat plastic or detect pollutants in the ground. But bacteria trade genes with ease; a gene could escape from an engineered microbe and spread through the environment, potentially causing ecological harm.

Then again, that spread would become a threat only if other bacteria could read the engineered gene and make proteins from it. If the gene came from a microbe like Syn57, which used a different genetic code, it would be gibberish to natural microbes.

“We can then prevent the escape of information from our synthetic organism,” Dr. Robertson said.

Organisms like Syn57 are also allowing scientists to tackle the puzzle of the genetic code. In 1968, the Nobel-prize winning biologist Francis Crick sketched out two opposing hypotheses for why it is both redundant and universal.

One possibility was that the 64-codon genetic code had some hidden advantage over any other arrangement. When it evolved on the early Earth, natural selection favored it until it had outcompeted all others.

But Crick leaned toward a second explanation: The genetic code was largely the result of chance. He speculated that mutations caused certain codons to encode certain amino acids. As early life-forms expanded their genetic code, they could build more complex proteins. But evolution connected codons to amino acids at random.

Once the proteins became big and complex, the genetic code could evolve no further; any mutation that might change it would produce a lot of defective proteins. Crick called this scenario a “frozen accident.”

Dr. Robertson said that the ability of Syn57 to survive without seven codons led him to favor Crick’s frozen-accident theory. “This reveals that there is nothing fundamental about the universal genetic code,” he said.

Translation

科學家正在學習改寫生命密碼（2/2）

在基因工程的一項偉大壯舉中，科學家們創造了一種與所有自然物種截然不同的蛋白質合成方式的細菌

（繼續）

2019年，醫學研究委員會團隊公佈了他們的第一個成功創造：一種只有61個密碼子的大腸桿菌，他們將其命名為Syn61。它能夠在欠缺三個密碼子的情況下存活，這促使團隊進一步精簡其遺傳密碼。

Robertson博士說: 「我們很想知道我們可將遺傳密碼精簡到什麼程度」。

他和他的同事著手創造Syn57，一種只有57個密碼子的大腸桿菌。他們與哈佛大學的 Nyerges博士及其同事展開了一場競賽，後者也已經在努力實現同樣的目標。

為了合成 Syn61，研究人員改變了大腸桿菌基因組中超過 18,000 個密碼子。而為了合成 Syn57，他們則需要改變超過 10 萬個密碼子。他們透過製作小片段 DNA 並觀察微生物讀取這些密碼子的能力來測試這些改變。

有些改變沒有造成任何問題，但有些改變卻造成了毀滅性的傷害。例如，細菌中某些基因是重疊的，改變其中一個基因的密碼子可能會意外地破壞另一個基因的序列。

科學家必須發明許多修復方法來修理這些損傷，包括分離重疊的基因對，產生兩條不同的 DNA 片段。

Robertson博士回憶道:「我們確實經歷過這樣的時期 - 例如問『哎,這會是一條死路嗎，我們能堅持下去？』」

研究人員透過一個又一個的嘗試，找到了修理被改變的 DNA 的方法。週四，研究人員宣佈他們成功了：他們合成了 Syn57。

並未參與這項研究的麻省理工學院的合成生物學家 Yonatan Chemla 說道: 「他們能做到這一點真是太不可思議了」;「這真是一項技術要求極高的傑作」。

同時，在哈佛大學，Nyerges 博士和他的同事們也遇到了一些小問題。他說: 「基因組比我們想像的要多得多」; 「我們在設計生物學方面仍然不夠出色」。

上個月，他的團隊報告稱，他們已將一個包含57個密碼子的基因組組裝成七個DNA片段。現在他們正致力於將它們拼接成一個單分子。 他說: 「我們一定會成功」。

Syn57無疑是活着的，但只是勉強存活。大腸桿菌通常需要一個小時才能使其數量翻倍，而Syn57則需要四個小時。 Chemla博士說: 「它是非常脆弱」。

Robertson 博士和他的同事目前正在對Syn57進行改進，看看能否加快其生長速度。如果他們成功了，其他科學家或許能夠改造它，使其執行普通微生物無法做出的有用功能。

連同我們細胞用來製造蛋白質的20種氨基酸，化學家還可以創造數百種其他氨基酸。或許可以對Syn57進行重新編程，使缺少了的七個密碼子編碼出非天然胺基酸。這將使細菌能夠製造新型藥物或其他有用分子。

Syn57 或許也能幫助科學家應對被工程微生物所釋放到環境中而可能帶來的潛在風險。微生物學家長期以來一直在研究微生物如何消化塑膠或檢測地下污染物。但細菌很容易交換基因；基因可以從工程微生物中逸出，並在環境中傳播，可能造成危害生態。

然而，只有當其他細菌能夠讀取工程基因, 並利用其製造蛋白質時，這種傳播才會構成威脅。如果基因來自像Syn57這樣使用不同遺傳密碼的微生物，那麼它對天然微生物來說就如同亂碼一樣。

羅伯森博士說: 「這樣我們就可以防止密碼資訊從我們的合成生物體中洩露」。

像 Syn57 這樣的生物也讓科學家得以破解遺傳密碼之謎。 1968 年，諾貝爾獎得主、生物學家Francis Crick 提出了兩種截然相反的假設，以解釋為何遺傳密碼既冗餘又普遍。

一種可能性是，64 個密碼子的遺傳密碼比其他任何排列方式都具有某種隱藏的優勢。當它在早期地球上進化時，自然選擇青睞它，直到它超越了所有其他排列方式。

但 Crick 傾向於第二種解釋：遺傳密碼很大程度上是偶然的。他推測突變導致某些密碼子編碼出某些胺基酸。隨著早期生命形式擴展其遺傳密碼，它們可以建立更複雜的蛋白質。但生命進化把密碼子與胺基酸隨機地連結。

一旦蛋白質變得龐大而複雜，遺傳密碼就無法進一步進化；任何可能改變它的突變都會產生大量有缺陷的蛋白質。Crick將這種情況稱為「凍結意外」。

Robertson博士表示，Syn57 能夠在沒有 7 個密碼子的情況下存活下來，這讓他更傾向於Crick的「凍結意外」理論。他說: 「這表明通用遺傳密碼並沒有什麼基本性的」。

       So, over the past decade, scientists have built microbes with smaller codes. A new study describes a microbe with the most streamlined genetic code yet that has seven missing codons. Scientists believe that it would enable engineered bacteria to make new kinds of drugs or other useful molecules. Apparently, our ability to rewrite the code of life will eventually change our world.

Note:

1. A "frozen accident" (凍結意外)is a phenomenon where an event or decision that happened by chance becomes permanent and unchangeable due to its deep integration into a complex system, making any future alteration too disruptive or impossible. The term was notably used by Francis Crick to describe the genetic code, suggesting it was an arbitrary, early evolutionary development that became "frozen" because modifying it now would require fundamentally changing the entire cellular machinery.

科學家正在學習改寫生命密碼（1/2）

Recently the New York Times reported the following:

Scientists Are Learning to Rewrite the Code of Life (1/2)

In a giant feat of genetic engineering, scientists have created bacteria that make proteins in a radically different way than all natural species do.

By Carl Zimmer - Origins (Carl Zimmer covers news about science for The Times and writes the Origins column.)

July 31, 2025

At the heart of all life is a code. Our cells use it to turn the information in our DNA into proteins. So do maple trees. So do hammerhead sharks. So do shiitake mushrooms. Except for some minor variations, the genetic code is universal.

It’s also redundant. DNA can code for the same building block of proteins in more than one way. Researchers have long debated what purpose this redundancy serves — or whether it’s just an accident of history.

Thanks to advances in genetic engineering, they can now do more than just argue. Over the past decade, scientists have built microbes with smaller codes that lack some of that redundancy. A new study, published Thursday in the journal Science, describes a microbe with the most streamlined genetic code yet.

Remarkably, the engineered bacteria can run on an abridged code, making it clear that a full genetic code isn’t required for life.

“Life still works,” said Wesley Robertson, a synthetic biologist at the Medical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, England, and an author of the new study.

Our DNA is built from four different molecular building blocks, called bases: adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine. A sequence of hundreds or thousands of these bases — known in brief as A, T, C and G — forms a gene. Our cells translate the sequence of bases in genes to make proteins.

To make the translation work, our cells read the bases three at a time, in units called codons. Each codon matches one of the 20 different amino acids that are available in the cell. It’s these amino acids that a cell strings together to form proteins.

A key feature of the genetic code is that more than one codon can encode the same amino acid. For instance, the triplet of bases TCT leads to the amino acid serine. But so do five other codons — TCC, TCA, TCG, AGT and AGC. All told, 61 different codons give rise to the 20 amino acids. Another three codons tell our cells when they have reached the end of the gene. With 64 codons in total, the genetic code is immensely redundant.

Scientists have puzzled over the bloated code of life ever since it came to light in the 1960s. With few exceptions, every species on Earth relies on the same 64 codons. Because the code is universal, scientists have speculated, there must be something essential about having so many ways to build a protein.

About a decade ago, scientists began testing this idea by building new, compressed genetic codes. Advances in DNA synthesis allowed them to construct genomes from scratch, eliminating some of the redundant codons to see whether cells could survive with a smaller code.

“You can start exploring what life will tolerate,” said Akos Nyerges, a synthetic biologist at Harvard Medical School who has been working on shrinking the genetic code. “We can finally test these alternative genetic codes.”

Dr. Robertson and his colleagues at the Medical Research Council have been working toward the same goal. Both teams have been tinkering with Escherichia coli, a species of bacteria that dwells in the human gut and has been intensively studied for more than a century. They picked out redundant codons to eliminate, hoping they wouldn’t harm the microbe in the process. Dr. Robertson and his colleagues, for instance, set out to reduce the six serine codons to just two.

These plans demand tremendous amounts of engineering. The genome of Escherichia coli is about four million bases long, and each type of codon appears in thousands of different places along its length. To carry out so many changes, the researchers must build entire genomes from scratch.

(to be continued)

Translation

科學家正在學習改寫生命密碼（1/2）

在基因工程的偉大壯舉中，科學家們創造了一種與所有自然物種截然不同的蛋白質合成方式的細菌。

所有生命的核心都是密碼。我們的細胞利用它將DNA中的信息轉化為蛋白質。楓樹也是。鎚頭鯊也是。香菇也是。除了一些細微的差異外，遺傳密碼是通用的。

遺傳密碼也是冗拙的。 DNA可以用多種方式編碼出相同的蛋白質組成部分。長期以來，研究人員一直在爭論這種冗拙的目的 - 或者這是否只是歷史的偶然。

由於基因工程的進步，研究人員現在可以做的不僅僅是爭論。在過去的十年裡，科學家們建構了擁有更小密碼的微生物，這些密碼沒有其中一些冗拙。週四發表在《科學》雜誌上的一項新研究描述了一種擁有迄今為止最精簡遺傳密碼的微生物。

值得注意的是，這種工程細菌能夠以簡化的密碼運行，這清楚地表明生命並不需要完整的遺傳密碼。

英國劍橋大學醫學研究委員會分子生物學實驗室的合成生物學家、亦是這項新研究的作者 Wesley Robertson說: 「細菌生命依然在運作」。

我們的DNA由四種不同的分子結構單元組成，稱為鹼基：腺嘌呤、胸腺嘧啶、鳥嘌呤和胞嘧啶。數百或數千個鹼基（簡稱A、T、C和G）的序列構成一個基因。我們的細胞翻譯出基因中的鹼基序列來製造蛋白質。

為了進行翻譯，我們的細胞每次讀取三個鹼基，這些鹼基以密碼子(codons)為單位。每個密碼子與細胞中20種不同的胺基酸中的一種相符。正是這些胺基酸被細胞串聯起來形成蛋白質。

遺傳密碼的一個關鍵特徵是，同一種胺基酸可以由多個密碼子編碼出來。例如，鹼基三聯體 TCT 編碼的胺基酸是絲胺酸。其他五種密碼子 - TCC、TCA、TCG、AGT 和 AGC - 也編碼出絲胺酸。總共有 61 種不同的密碼子編碼出 20 種胺基酸。另外三種密碼子負責通知細胞何時到達基因的尾端。遺傳密碼總共有 64 個密碼子，冗拙度極高。

自 20 世紀 60 年代生命密碼被揭露以來，科學家們一直對其繁瑣的編碼方式感到困惑。除了少數例外，地球上的所有物種都依賴相同的 64 個密碼子。科學家推測，由於密碼具有通用性，因此存在如此多的蛋白質建構方式必然存在某種必需性。

大約十年前，科學家開始透過建立新的壓縮遺傳密碼來驗證這個想法。 DNA合成技術的進步使他們能夠從零開始建立基因組，消除一些冗餘的密碼子，以觀察細胞是否能夠在更短的密碼下生存。

一直致力於縮短遺傳密碼的長度的哈佛醫學院合成生物學家Akos Nyerges說道: 「你可以開始探索生命能夠承受什麼」; 「我們終於可以測試這些替代的遺傳密碼了」。

Robertson 博士和他在醫學研究委員會的同事們一直朝著同一個目標努力。兩個團隊都在對大腸桿菌進行研究，大腸桿菌是一種寄居在人體腸道中的細菌，一個多世紀以來一直受到人們的深入研究。他們挑選出需要消除大腸桿菌的冗餘密碼子，希望消除這些密碼子不會對這微生物造成傷害。例如，Robertson 博士和他的同事著手將六個絲胺酸密碼子減少到兩個。

這些計劃需要大量的工程改造。大腸桿菌的基因組長度約為400萬個鹼基，每種密碼子都出現在其全長的數千個不同位置。為了進行如此多的改變，研究人員必須從頭開始建構整個基因組。

（待續）

中國資本外流在開放過程中創下新高

 Recently Yahoo News on-line picked up the following:

China’s Capital Outflows Hit Record Amid Liberalization Push

Bloomberg News

August 17, 2025 2 min read

(Bloomberg) -- China’s capital outflows rose to a record in July, driven by mainland investors’ aggressive buying of Hong Kong assets following new market liberalization measures.

Domestic banks wired a net $58.3 billion of funds overseas on behalf of their clients for securities investment last month, according to data released late Friday by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. That’s the highest monthly outflow since records began in 2010.

The steeper capital outflow was partially attributable to mainland investors’ hefty buying of Hong Kong stocks this year and the July expansion of the Southbound Bond Connect program that allows more offshore debt investments. Meanwhile, foreign funds continued trimming their holdings of Chinese bonds, likely due to their diminishing relative appeal compared with riskier assets and global alternatives.

China is expected to tolerate some capital outflows this year, leveraging a weak-dollar environment to gradually liberalize its capital account — a step aimed at helping the yuan’s long-term globalization. In June, regulators raised the amount of money that approved investors can allocate into overseas assets for the first time in more than a year.

Onshore investors bought 12.6 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) of overseas debt through the Southbound Bond Connect in July, the highest monthly total this year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The increase followed the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s early July announcement expanding access to the channel for Chinese non-bank financial institutions, including securities firms, fund companies, insurers and wealth managers.

Outbound investment through approved channels will likely continue to grow this year as “domestic investors reconsider their portfolio amid improving risk appetite,” said Lynn Song, chief Greater China economist at ING Bank NV. While the outflows may initially seem to pressure the yuan, actual risks are likely contained due to anticipated US interest rate cuts and a narrower China-US yield gap, he said.

Offshore institutions’ holdings of Chinese bonds in the interbank market dropped about 300 billion yuan in July to the lowest since January 2024, data from the People’s Bank of China show. The decline suggests overseas funds joined a broader selloff of debt, influenced by easing US-China trade tensions and Beijing’s efforts to combat deflation.

The fading appeal of Chinese negotiable certificates of deposits — a once-popular trade that attracted foreign funds — is also contributing to broader bond outflows. Foreign holdings of NCDs fell by about 15% in July — or by 167 billion yuan — a third straight month of accelerated declines.

Translation

中國資本外流在開放過程中創下新高

（彭博）－ 在新的市場開放措施出台後, 受內地投資者大舉購入香港資產的推動，中國7月份資本外流創下新高。

根據國家外匯管理局週五晚間公佈的數據，上月國內銀行代表客戶向海外淨匯出583億美元資金用於證券投資。這是自2010年有記錄以來的最高月度資本外流。

資本外流加劇的部分原因是內地投資者今年大舉購入香港股票，以及7月「南向通」計劃的擴大，允許更多境外債務投資。與此同時，外國基金繼續減持中國債券，這可能是因為相比與風險較高的資產, 和全球另類投資，中國債券的吸引力正在下降。

中國預計今年將容忍一定程度的資本外流，利用弱勢美元環境去逐步開放其資本帳 - 此舉旨在促進人民幣的長期全球化。今年6月，監管機構一年多來首次提高了認可投資者可配置海外資產的資金規模。

根據彭博社彙編的數據，7月份，境內投資人透過「南向債券通」購買了126億元人民幣（約18億美元）的海外債券，創下今年單月最高紀錄。先前，香港金融管理局於7月初宣布，將擴大包括證券公司、基金公司、保險公司和財富管理公司在內的中國非銀行金融機構去使用該渠道。

荷蘭國際集團（ING Bank NV）大中華區首席經濟學家 Lynn Song 表示，由於 “改善了願意承擔風險的程度，國內投資者正在重新考慮其投資組合” ，通過獲批渠道進行的對外投資今年可能將繼續增長。他表示，儘管資金外流最初可能看似對人民幣構成壓力，但由於預期美國降息以及中美殖利率差距收窄，實際風險是可控的。

中國人民銀行的數據顯示，7月份，境外機構在銀行間市場持有的中國債券減少了約 3,000億元人民幣，降至2024年1月以來的最低水準。這一下降表明，受中美貿易緊張局勢緩和以及中國政府對抗通貨緊縮措施的影響，海外資金加入了更廣泛的債券拋售浪潮。

中國可轉讓存款證（曾是吸引外國資金的熱門交易）的吸引力下降，也導致了更廣泛的債券資金外流。 7月份，外國持有的可轉讓存款證減少了約15%，即1670億元人民幣，連續第三個月加速下降。

              So, China’s capital outflows rose to a record in July, driven by mainland investors’ aggressive buying of Hong Kong assets following new market liberalization measures. One factor for this outflow is due to anticipated US interest rate cuts and a narrower China-US yield gap. Probably China is expected to tolerate some capital outflows this year; a step aims at helping the yuan’s long-term globalization.

Note:

1. Negotiable certificates of deposits (NCD) (可轉讓存款證)are financial instruments issued by banks that allow depositors to earn interest over a fixed term while also being transferable to other parties, making them 'negotiable'.

儘管多年戰爭，美國和歐洲仍在與俄羅斯進行着價值數十億美元的貿易往來 (2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line picked up the following:

The US and Europe are still doing billions of dollars’ worth of business with Russia despite years of war (2/2)

Lauren Kent, CNN

Thu, August 14, 2025 at 5:03 a.m. PDT 8 min read

(continue)

European trade with Russia:

• Oil: Russia was the largest supplier of petroleum to the European Union prior to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU has since imposed a ban on maritime Russian oil imports, as well as refined oil products, like diesel. As a result, oil imports to Europe fell to $1.72 billion (1.48 billion euros) for the first quarter of 2025, down from $16.4 billion (14.06 billion euros) in the same quarter of 2021, according to the most recent data from Eurostat.

The top European importers of Russian fossil fuels in July 2025 were Hungary, France, Slovakia, Belgium and Spain, according to an analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, an international research organization. Hungary and Slovakia accounted for the vast majority of crude oil imports, according to the analysis, while the others import mostly liquefied natural gas.

• Natural gas: The value of natural gas imports from Russia actually increased in the last four years as a result of price increases, growing to $5.23 billion (4.49 billion euros) in the first quarter of 2025, Eurostat data shows. However, the EU has slightly reduced Russia’s market share of liquefied natural gas imports since 2021 – from 22% down to 19% in 2025 – while also greatly increasing the US market share.

• Iron and steel: Russia’s share of iron and steel imports in the EU has dropped sharply. Iron and steel imports amounted to $850 million (730 million euros) in the first quarter of 2025 – about half of what they were in the same quarter in 2021, according to Eurostat.

• Fertilizer: Sanctions and import duties have not hit the fertilizer industry, and as a result, European imports of Russian fertilizer have changed very little since 2021. In the first quarter of 2025, EU countries imported $640 million (550 million euros) of Russian fertilizer, data shows.

• Nickel: The EU has diversified imports to rely more on nickel from the United States, Norway, the United Kingdom and Canada. Still, the bloc imported $300 million (260 million euros) worth of nickel from Russia in the first quarter of 2025. Nickel is primarily used to make stainless steel and other alloy steels, as well as batteries.

 

Hundreds of Western firms still in Russia

Beyond imports and exports of commodities, many Western companies remain entrenched in Russia.

Some notable American-based holdouts continue to operate in Russia, including top 100 companies, according to lists compiled by the Yale School of Management and the Kyiv School of Economics Institute.

Dozens of European businesses, including consumer-facing brands, retailers and software companies, have also remained in Russia.

The amount of tax revenue that Western companies generate for the Kremlin is relatively small, but analysts say the companies that remain have allowed aspects of normal life to continue for the Russian population.

Corporate exits serve to bring the war closer to the Russian people and confront their “complacency,” as well as make it more difficult for Putin to paint a picture of a well-functioning economy, said Yale School of Management’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, whose large team of researchers keeps track of which companies have left.

“It’s an imploding market – it was never an economic superpower to start with – which is just a lot of smoke and mirrors, a lot of bravado on the part of Putin to try to create an aura of something bigger,” Sonnenfeld told CNN.

 

India’s and China’s energy imports

In contrast to the reduction in trade with Moscow seen in the United States and EU, India imported $67 billion worth of goods from Russia in 2024, according to data aggregated by the United Nations. Roughly $53 billion worth of that was petroleum oils and crude oil.

Before the full-scale war, in 2021, India imported $8.7 billion worth of goods from Russia.

India’s imports of Russian oil and gas have skyrocketed since before the war began. Russian oil now makes up 36% of the Indian market, according to Vortexa, an energy data firm, meaning it imports more crude oil from Russia than from anywhere else.

China has also ramped up purchases of Russian crude oil following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Its price fell after Western countries sharply scaled back their imports of Russian fuel. Russia now accounts for 13.5% of China’s crude imports, according to Vortexa.

China imported roughly $130 billion in Russian goods in 2024, including $62.6 billion of petroleum oils and crude, the UN-aggregated data shows.

Translation

儘管多年戰爭，美國和歐洲仍在與俄羅斯進行着價值數十億美元的貿易往來 (2/2)

歐洲與俄羅斯的貿易：

• 石油：在莫斯科全面入侵烏克蘭之前，俄羅斯是歐盟最大的石油供應國。此後，歐盟對俄羅斯海上石油以及柴油等精煉石油產品實施了進口禁令。因此，根據歐盟統計局的最新數據，2025年第一季度，歐洲的石油進口額從2021年同期的164億美元（140.6億歐元）降至17.2億美元（14.8億歐元）。

根據國際研究機構能源與清潔空氣研究中心的分析，2025年7月，歐洲進口俄羅斯化石燃料的主要國家為匈牙利、法國、斯洛伐克、比利時和西班牙。分析又顯示，匈牙利和斯洛伐克佔了原油進口的絕大部分，其他國家則主要進口液化天然氣。

• 天然氣：歐盟統計局的數據顯示，由於價格上漲，過去四年從俄羅斯進口的天然氣價值實際上有所增加，到2025年第一季增長至52.3億美元（44.9億歐元）。然而，自2021年以來，歐盟略微降低了俄羅斯在液化天然氣進口市場的份額，從22%降至2025年的19%，同時大幅增加了美國的進口份額。

•鐵和鋼：俄羅斯在歐盟進口鋼鐵的份額急劇下降。根據歐盟統計局的數據，2025年第一季，鋼鐵進口額為8.5億美元（7.3億歐元），約2021年同季的一半。

• 化肥：制裁和進口關稅並未對化肥產業造成衝擊，因此，自2021年以來，歐洲對俄羅斯化肥的進口量幾乎沒有變化。數據顯示，2025年第一季度，歐盟國家進口了價值6.4億美元（5.5億歐元）的俄羅斯化肥。

• 鎳：歐盟已實現進口多元化，更依賴來自美國、挪威、英國和加拿大的鎳。儘管如此，歐盟在2025年第一季仍從俄羅斯進口了價值3億美元（2.6億歐元）的鎳。鎳主要用於製造不銹鋼和其他合金鋼以及電池。

 

有數百家西方公司仍在俄羅斯

除了進出口大宗商品外，許多西方公司仍紮根於在俄羅斯。

根據耶魯大學管理學院和基輔經濟學院研究所彙編的榜單，一些美國著名的不願意妥協分子仍在俄羅斯運營，其中包括排名前100的公司。

數十家歐洲企業，包括面向消費者的品牌、零售商和軟件公司，也留在了俄羅斯。

西方公司為克里姆林宮創造的稅收收入相對較少，但分析師表示，留下來的公司讓俄羅斯民眾得以繼續維持各個層面的正常生活。

耶魯大學管理學院的 Jeffrey Sonnenfeld 表示，企業撤離有助於讓俄羅斯民眾更深入地了解戰爭，並挑戰他們的“自滿情緒” ，同時也使普京更難描繪出一個運作良好的經濟圖。 Sonnenfeld 的大型研究團隊一直在追蹤哪些公司已經撤離。

Sonnenfeld 告訴CNN: 「這是一個正在崩潰的市場 - 它從一開始就不是經濟超級大國 - 這只是一堆障眼法，是普京為了營造更大影響力而耍的虛張聲勢」。

 

印度和中國的能源進口

對比成鮮明的美國和歐盟與莫斯科貿易額減少是，根據聯合國總的數據，2024年印度從俄羅斯進口了價值670億美元的商品。其中約530億美元是石油和原油。

在全面戰爭爆發前的2021年，印度從俄羅斯進口了價值87億美元的商品。

自戰爭爆發以來，印度對俄羅斯石油和天然氣的進口量飆升。根據能源數據公司 Vortexa 的數據，俄羅斯石油目前佔印度市場的36%，這意味著印度從俄羅斯進口的原油比從其他地方進口的都多。

2022年莫斯科全面入侵烏克蘭後，中國也增加了俄羅斯原油的採購。西方國家大幅減少對俄羅斯燃料的進口後，俄羅斯原油價格下跌。根據nVortexan的數據，俄羅斯目前佔中國原油進口量的13.5%。

聯合國總數據顯示，2024年中國進口了約1,300億美元的俄羅斯商品，其中包括626億美元的石油和原油。

So, while President Donald Trump is threatening an additional tariff on India as well as higher tariffs on other countries that buy Russian oil as an attempt to pressure Moscow to end the war in Ukraine, the United States and Europe themselves are still doing billions of dollars in trade with Russia although that’s a fraction of the trade that took place before the war. It is also noted that some large American-based companies continue to operate in Russia. Apparently, trade war is not very effective in stopping Russian from continuing its war in Ukraine.

儘管多年戰爭，美國和歐洲仍在與俄羅斯進行著價值數十億美元的貿易往來 (1/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line picked up the following:

The US and Europe are still doing billions of dollars’ worth of business with Russia despite years of war (1/2)

Lauren Kent, CNN

Thu, August 14, 2025 at 5:03 a.m. PDT 8 min read

US President Donald Trump is threatening an additional 25% tariff on India as well as higher tariffs on other countries that buy Russian oil, in an attempt to pressure Moscow to end the war in Ukraine. But the United States and Europe themselves are still doing billions of dollars in trade with Russia – although that’s a fraction of the trade that took place before the war.

India has argued that it’s being unfairly targeted with the tariff increase, calling it “unjustified” given that other nations also do business with Moscow.

Trade between Russia and the US has fallen by about 90% since the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but last year, the US still imported $3 billion worth of goods from Russia, according to the latest data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Census Bureau.

Meanwhile, the European Union – which has been the Americans’ partner in sanctions against Russia – imported $41.9 billion (36 billion euros) of goods from Russia in 2024, data from the bloc’s statistics agency shows.

“It’s significant, but I think the more significant thing is how quickly the EU adjusted to reduce their dependency on Russia,” said Kimberly Donovan, director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, a DC-based think tank. “They’re making huge strides to further reduce how much they’re getting from (Russia).”

EU imports from Russia dropped by 86% between the first quarters of 2022 and 2025, according to Eurostat data.

“I do think that there is a lot of opportunity for the US and even the EU to increase our trade with countries like Canada and get the products that we need from them,” Donovan added. “That’s where the trade wars and the negotiations over tariffs are really throwing things for a loop and are reducing our ability to be strategic in how we’re approaching the Russia problem.”

These are the areas where economic ties with Russia remain the strongest, for the US and Europe respectively.

 

US trade with Russia:

• Fertilizer: The US imported $927 million worth of fertilizer in the first half of this year, US Census Bureau data shows. Last year, fertilizer imports from Russia totaled more than $1 billion. The US particularly relies on Russia for imports of three types of chemical fertilizers: urea, urea ammonium nitrate (UAN) and potassium chloride muriate of potash, also called potash.

“Unless the US sanctions Russian fertilizer imports, as it does with Belarusian potash, this (level of trade) is likely to continue,” said Allan Pickett, head of fertilizer analysis at S&P Global Commodity Insights. “Russia remains one of the most important global fertilizer suppliers and the influence of it has not diminished since 2022.”

“Urea and potash could be readily sourced from elsewhere, although with potash it would further increase US dependence on Canada, which currently has an interesting trade dynamic,” Pickett added.

The Trump administration recently hiked tariffs on Canada to a minimum of 35% –unless goods are compliant with the terms of the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement – escalating ongoing trade tensions with its northern neighbor.

• Palladium: Although palladium imports from Russia have reduced significantly since 2021, data shows that the US still imported $878 million worth of the metal in 2024 and $594 million worth in 2025, through June. The silvery metal is used in various electronic and industrial products and it’s a key component in the catalytic converters of cars.

• Uranium and plutonium: The US has imported $755 million worth of uranium and plutonium from Russia so far this year, according to Census data through June. It imported $624 million worth of those commodities from Russia in 2024.

(to be continued)

Translation

儘管多年戰爭，美國和歐洲仍在與俄羅斯進行著價值數十億美元的貿易往來 (1/2)

 美國總統特朗普威脅印度加徵25%的關稅，並對購買俄羅斯石油的其他國家提高關稅，試圖向莫斯科施壓，迫使其結束烏克蘭戰爭。然而，美國和歐洲本身仍在與俄羅斯進行數十億美元的貿易往來 - 儘管這僅僅是烏克蘭戰爭前貿易額的一小部分。

印度辯稱，由於其他國家也與莫斯科有貿易往來，提高關稅對其不公平，並稱其「不合理」。

自克里姆林宮全面入侵烏克蘭以來，俄美貿易額下降了約90%，但根據美國經濟分析局（BEA）和人口普查局的最新數據，去年美國仍從俄羅斯進口了價值30億美元的商品。

同時，歐盟統計局的數據顯示，作為美國的合作制裁俄羅斯夥伴，歐盟在2024年從俄羅斯進口了價值419億美元（360億歐元）的商品。

總部位於華盛頓特區的智庫大西洋理事會經濟治國方略倡議主任 Kimberly Donovan 表示: 「這很重要，但我認為更重要的是歐盟有幾迅速地減少對俄羅斯的依賴」; 「他們正在大力減少從（俄羅斯）的進口量」。

根據歐盟統計局的數據，2022年第一季至2025年第一季度，歐盟從俄羅斯的進口量下降了86%。

Donovan 補充道: 「我確實認為，美國乃至歐盟都有很多機會增加與加拿大等國家的貿易，並從他們那裡獲得我們所需的產品」; 「就是這點貿易戰和關稅談判確實令人感到意外，削弱了我們在處理俄羅斯問題上的戰略能力」。

在這些領域美國和歐洲分別與俄羅斯有緊密的經濟聯繫。

 

美國與俄羅斯的貿易：

• 化肥：美國人口普查局的數據顯示，今年上半年美國進口了價值 9.27 億美元的化肥。去年，美國從俄羅斯進口的化肥總額超過10億美元。美國尤其依賴俄羅斯進口三種化學肥料：尿素、硝酸銨尿素 (UAN) 和氯化鉀,也稱為鉀肥。

標普全球大宗商品洞察公司化肥分析主管 Allan Pickett 表示： “除非美國像制裁白俄羅斯鉀肥那樣制裁俄羅斯化肥進口，否則這種（貿易水平）可能會持續下去”“俄羅斯仍然是全球最重要的化肥供應國之一，其影響力自2022年以來從未減弱。”

Pickett補充道： “尿素和鉀肥很容易從其他地方採購，但美國進一步向加拿大採購鉀肥將增加其依賴，而它與加拿大目前的貿易正處於交互變化的動態。”

特朗普政府最近將對加拿大的關稅提高到最低35% - 除非商品符合美墨加自由貿易協定的條款 - 這加劇了美國與北方鄰國之間持續的貿易緊張局勢。

• 鈀：儘管自2021年以來，美國從俄羅斯進口的鈀已大幅減少，但數據顯示，截至今年6月，美國在2024年仍進口了價值8.78億美元的鈀，在2025年進口了價值 5.94 億美元的鈀。這種銀色金屬用於各種電子和工業產品，也是汽車催化轉換器的關鍵零件。

• 鈾和鈈：根據截至6月的人口普查數據，美國今年迄今已從俄羅斯進口了價值7.55億美元的鈾和鈈。 2024年，美國從俄羅斯進口了價值 6.24 億美元此類的商品。

（待續）

中國已做好迎接貿易戰的準備，美國仍有許多值得學習的地方（2/2）

Recently Yahoo News on-line picked up the following:

China Came Ready for This Trade Fight, and the US Has a Lot to Learn (2/2)

Bloomberg - Tom Orlik, Eric Zhu and Jennifer Welch

Wed, August 13, 2025 at 3:00 a.m. PDT 8 min read

(continue)

Such thinking was behind successive waves of development plans. In 1983, Deng Xiaoping introduced the State High-Tech Development Plan, aiming to close the gap with the US in information technology, automation and other areas. In 1994, Ren Zhengfei, founder of telecommunications equipment champion Huawei Technologies Co., told then-President Jiang Zemin “a nation that does not have its own switching equipment is like one that lacks its own military.” Ren’s lesson on the link between industrial self-sufficiency and national security is one the US is only now beginning to relearn.

Under Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao, the priorities were “indigenous innovation” to bring foreign technologies in and a “Great Fire Wall” to keep Western influence out. More than a decade before the US debate about TikTok’s influence went viral, Google, Facebook and Twitter found themselves on the wrong side of the wall and effectively frozen out of the China market. Blocking the US giants opened space for China’s own tech companies—Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba and others—to flourish.

In the top job since 2013, Xi unveiled his “Made in China 2025” plan to extend Beijing’s technology ambitions from self-­sufficiency to global leadership in industries including IT, robotics, high-speed rail and electric vehicles. His “Belt and Road” initiative aimed to diversify export markets, reducing dependence on the US consumer and extending China’s global influence through investments in ports, rail networks and roads. While neither plan has been an unequivocal success, there have been tangible wins, including surging EV and solar panel exports and stronger ties with other emerging markets. Trump eyes the expanding BRICS coalition—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as several more ­countries—as an anti-American club.

In the US, meanwhile, policy was shaped by post-Cold War hubris. The collapse of the Soviet Union convinced leaders that democracy and capitalism had won and the days of authoritarianism and state control were numbered. President Bill Clinton called support for China’s membership in the World Trade Organization “the most significant opportunity we have had to create positive social change in China since the 1970s.” His successors George W. Bush and Barack Obama did little to change the orientation.

Focused on the next quarterly earnings report, US multinationals shifted their supply chains to China’s low-cost factories. An implicit bargain was struck: access to the world’s most populous consumer and labor market in exchange for blueprints for vital technologies that power modern industry. Automakers including Ford Motor Co. and Volkswagen AG were welcome so long as they signed on to joint ventures with homegrown Chinese companies. Starbucks Corp. and KFC opened thousands of outlets. But access to strategic upstream industries such as power and steel remained strictly walled off.

In a first-best world of free trade and market competition, the dynamism of the US approach should win every time. In the second-best world of protectionism and economic statecraft in which we now find ourselves, China’s planned approach still carries significant costs, but the benefits are also easier to discern.

The theory of the second best, expounded by economists Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster in 1956, holds that if one of the conditions for perfect markets is missing, sticking with the others—rather than finding a second-best accommodation—only makes things worse. China’s state planners have spent decades developing tools for a second-best world. Their counterparts in the US haven’t.

Of course, the US isn’t entirely bereft of sticks and devoid of carrots. Control of the intellectual property behind advanced semiconductors, and the biggest consumer market in the world, might not enable Washington to deliver a hammer blow against China, but it can certainly land some painful punches. Investment pledges running into the hundreds of billions of dollars from the likes of Apple Inc. and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. suggest Trump’s attempts to bring manufacturing home are gaining at least some traction. As a free-market democracy, the US has a capacity for course correction that is missing from China’s state-controlled, single-party system.

Conversely, China’s slow-motion real estate collapse, burgeoning industrial overcapacity and sky-high debt mean the blow from Trump’s tariffs is hardly coming at an auspicious moment. The European Union following suit with its own protectionist measures threatens to compound the problem. Brussels has imposed tariffs on China’s EVs, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remarks on China “flooding global markets with cheap, subsidized goods, to wipe out competitors” echo Trump on substance, even as the tone hews closer to diplomatic protocol.

“I don’t blame China,” Trump said shortly after his April 2 tariff extravaganza. “I blame the people that were sitting at that desk in that beautiful Oval Office for allowing it to happen.” His solutions might misfire. Tariffs and export controls could end up causing more problems for Silicon Valley than they do for Shenzhen. On diagnosis of the cause of the problem, though, Trump has a point. The US thought free trade would change China’s leaders; in fact, it empowered them. Now it’s the US that faces a wrenching transition.

Translation

中國已做好迎接貿易戰的準備，美國仍有許多值得學習的地方（2/2）

（繼續）

這種思維模式是一波又一波發展計劃背後的驅動力。 1983年，鄧小平提出了國家高科技發展計劃，旨在縮小與美國在資訊科技、自動化等領域的差距。 1994年，電信設備巨頭華為技術有限公司的創始人任正非對時任國家主席江澤民說：「一個國家沒有自己的電信交換設備，就如同一個國家沒有自己的軍隊。」任正非關於工業自給自足與國家安全之間聯繫的教訓，美國現在才開始重新領悟。

在江澤民的繼任者胡錦濤的領導下，中國優先考慮的是「自主創新」以引進外國技術，以及建立「防火牆」以阻止西方影響。早在美國關於nTikTok  影響力的爭論引發熱議的十多年前，Google、Facebook和Twitter就發現自己站到了在錯誤的一邊，實際上被排除在中國市場之外。中國阻擋這些美國巨頭為本土科技公司 - 百度、騰訊、阿里巴巴等 - 的蓬勃發展開闢了空間。

自2013年上任以來，習近平公佈了「中國製造2025」計劃，旨在將北京的科技雄心從自給自足擴展到在 IT、機器人、高鐵和電動車等行業佔據全球領導地位。他的「一帶一路」倡議旨在實現出口市場多元化，減少對美國消費者的依賴，並透過對港口、鐵路網和公路的投資擴大中國的全球影響力。雖然這兩項計劃都未取得絕對的成功，但也取得了一些實質的成果，包括電動車和太陽能板出口激增，以及與其他新興市場關係的加強。特朗普將不斷壯大的金磚國家聯盟（巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國、南非以及其他幾個國家）視為反美俱樂部。

同時，美國的政策則受到後冷戰時期傲慢主義的影響。蘇聯解體使領導人確信民主和資本主義已經勝利，威權主義和國家控制的日子屈指可數。克林頓總統稱支持中國加入世界貿易組織是「自1970年代以來我們在中國創造積極社會變革的最重要機會」。他的繼任者喬治·W·布殊和奥巴馬幾乎沒有改變這個方向。

美國跨國公司專注於下一季的獲利報告，將供應鏈轉移到中國的低成本工廠。雙方達成了一項隱含的協議：進入全球人口最多的消費市場和勞動市場，換取驅動現代工業的關鍵技術藍圖。包括福特汽車公司和大眾汽車在內的汽車製造商只要與中國本土企業簽約成立合資企業，就受到歡迎。星巴克公司和肯德基開設了數千家門市。但電力和鋼鐵等戰略性上游產業的准入仍受到嚴格限制。

處於一個用自由貿易和市場競爭營業的「第一最佳」世界裡，美國模式的活力應該每次都能勝出。而在我們如今所處的以保護主義和經濟治國手段的「第二最佳」世界裡，中國的計劃經濟模式仍然代價高昂，但其益處也更容易被察覺。

經濟學家 Richard Lipsey 和 Kelvin Lancaster 於1956年闡述的「第二最佳理論」認為，如果完美市場的其中一個條件缺失，那麼堅持其他條件 - 而不是尋找次優方案 - 只會讓情況變得更糟。中國的國家規劃部門幾十年來一直在為打造一個「二最佳世界」而努力，而美國方面卻沒有。

當然，美國並非完全沒有「大棒」和「胡蘿蔔」。掌握著先進半導體背後的智慧財產權以及全球最大的消費市場，或許仍不足以讓華盛頓對中國施加重擊，但肯定能造成一些疼痛。蘋果和台積電等公司承諾的數千億美元投資表明，特朗普將製造業帶回美國的努力至少正在獲得一些支持。作為一個自由市場民主國家，美國擁有中國由國家控制的一黨制所缺乏的調整能力。

相反，中國緩慢的房地產崩盤、迅速增長的工業產能過剩以及高昂的債務, 意味著着特朗普關稅的打擊來得於一個不合適的時刻。歐盟效仿並採取貿易保護主義措施，可能會加劇中國的問題。布魯塞爾已對中國電動車徵收關稅，歐盟委員會主席馮德萊恩最近關於中國「向全球市場投放廉價補貼商品，以消滅競爭對手」的言論的實質內容與特朗普的如出一轍，即使語氣更接近外交禮儀。

特朗普在4月2日的關稅狂潮發表後不久說道: 「我不怪中國」。 「我怪的是那些坐在那間漂亮的橢圓形辦公室辦公桌前的人們，是他們讓這一切發生」。他的解決方案可能會失敗。關稅和出口管制最終可能會為矽谷帶來比深圳更大的問題。不過，在對問題根源的分析上，特朗普是有道理。美國認為自由貿易會改變中國領導人；事實上為他們注入能力。現在，美國面臨痛苦的轉型。

       So, Donald Trump has launched a multipronged attack on China’s economy. Now the US stance on China has swung from cautious engagement to something between fierce rivalry and outright hostility. Currently China’s exports to the US equal about 3% of gross domestic product. That means even if half of China’s exports to the US get wiped out, the blow to the overall economy is just 1.5%. Apparently, as a free-market democracy, the US has a capacity for course correction that is missing from China’s state-controlled, single-party system. Ultimately it is a competition between two philosophies in governance.

Note:

1. Switching equipment in telecommunications, such as telephone switches, is crucial for routing calls and enabling communication between different systems. These systems facilitate interoperability across diverse platforms. Examples include the 1ESS switch. The switching matrix within these systems is responsible for directing calls to their intended destinations. This technology allows for seamless communication and is a fundamental component of telecommunication networks. (Sider Fusion)

中國已做好迎接貿易戰的準備，美國仍有許多需要學習的地方（1/2）

Recently Yahoo News on-line picked up the following:

China Came Ready for This Trade Fight, and the US Has a Lot to Learn (1/2)

Bloomberg - Tom Orlik, Eric Zhu and Jennifer Welch

Wed, August 13, 2025 at 3:00 a.m. PDT 8 min read

(Bloomberg Markets) -- Under President Donald Trump, the US has launched a multipronged attack on China’s economy. Since Chairman Mao Zedong’s reign, China has seen it coming. A US system built around the ideal of openness and interdependence is facing off against a Chinese counterpart constructed as a fortress of control. Both sides have powerful resources. Only one has been preparing for the fight for decades.

Since the beginning of Trump’s first term in 2017, the US stance on China has swung from constructive if increasingly cautious engagement to something between fierce rivalry and outright hostility. China’s exports to the US face duties running close to 40%. Supply of bleeding-edge semiconductors for China’s technology companies has been curtailed. The country’s science, technology, engineering and math students, once welcomed into US university labs, are checked at the border. The social media app TikTok, owned by Chinese parent ByteDance Ltd., is on a stay of execution in the US market.

The assumption in Washington is that China must now be floundering. Isn’t it hooked on US customers and technologies? It’s only a matter of time, surely, before President Xi Jinping picks up his red phone to call the White House and concede defeat.

The reality is rather different. It’s certainly true that Trump’s policy pivot is a problem for Beijing. Bloomberg Economics calculations show tariffs at the current levels would erase more than 50% of sales to the US. But it’s far from the end of China’s development story.

China’s exports to the US equal about 3% of gross domestic product—down from a peak of 7% two decades ago, after a campaign to diversify away from American consumers that’s been every bit as deliberate as US efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. That means even if half of China’s exports to the US get wiped out, the blow to the overall economy is just 1.5%. Not good news, to be sure, but far from a disaster.

With the US starting a trade war against not just China but everyone else as well, its losses may well be around the same size. Model-based estimates from Bloomberg Economics flag a hit of about 1.6% of GDP as import prices rise and supply chains snarl.

The algorithmic outperformance of DeepSeek (China’s answer to ChatGPT) shows its coders are smart enough to work around the US embargo on semiconductor supplies. Control of rare earth elements critical for manufacturing and defense industries has given China an export-controls weapon of its own—one it’s used in this year’s negotiations in Geneva and London to extract concessions from the US.

The upshot: Even after almost a decade of US efforts to contain its manufacturing might, China’s share of global exports remains elevated.

Why is China proving so resilient? Because for more than a century, from the last gasp of the Qing dynasty, through a short-lived Republic, to the chaos of Maoism and the progress of the reform era, there’s been one outstanding constant: preparation for the struggle now playing out.

It started in the late 19th and early 20th century, when, after humiliation from foreign invaders, China’s thinkers started to aim at “self-strengthening” through modernization. Born in 1854, and graduating from the British naval academy, intellectual and educator Yan Fu translated into Chinese the works of Western scholars such as English biologist Thomas Huxley and Scottish economist Adam Smith. From Huxley he introduced the idea of “survival of the fittest,” making the case that nations, like species in the natural world, must continually build themselves up to avoid falling prey to more powerful rivals.

In the 1930s struggle between Mao’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists, Mao’s promise of effective resistance against the Japanese invaders, as much as the dream of a more egalitarian society, was the center of his appeal. In power from 1949, he instituted a forced-march approach to industrialization that ended in the graveyard for many Chinese. The path was winding, but the aim was unwavering: Stave off foreign threats. “The American imperialists have always wanted to destroy us,” he warned.

In the reform era that began soon after Mao’s death in 1976, the self-strengthening objective remained the same, but the policies to deliver it were vastly improved. In the 1980s and ’90s, He Xin—a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar whose work ­circulated among top leaders—warned that as China rose, “developed countries feeling threatened by the increase in ­competition will seek to hold China down.” He had a plan to respond: “With the constant threat of being destroyed, building a fully self-reliant industrial system should naturally be the most realistic option for China.”

(to be continued)

Translation

中國已做好迎接貿易戰的準備，美國仍有許多需要學習的地方（1/2）

（彭博市場）—在特朗普總統的領導下，美國對中國經濟發動了多管齊下的攻擊。自毛澤東主席執政以來，中國就已預見此一趨勢。以開放和相互依存為理念建構的美國體系，正與以控制堡壘為核心建構的中國體系對峙。雙方都擁有強大的資源。只有一方為這場鬥爭準備了數十年。

自2017年特朗普第一任期開始以來，美國對華立場已從建設性但日益謹慎的接觸，轉變為介於激烈競爭和徹底敵對之間的一種狀態。中國對美出口面臨近40%的關稅。中國科技公司尖端半導體的供應已受到限制。曾經受美國大學實驗室歡迎的中國科學、技術、工程和數學專業的學生，如今卻在邊境受到檢查。其中國母公司字節跳動旗下的社群媒體應用程式TikTok 在美國的市場被暫停營運。

華盛頓的假設是，中國現在肯定陷入困境。難道它不依賴美國客戶和科技嗎？ 習近平主席會拿起他的紅色電話致電白宮承認失敗肯定只是時間上的問題。

現實情況並非如此。特朗普的政策轉向確實對北京構成了問題。彭博經濟研究的計算顯示，以目前的水平徵收關稅將使中國對美銷售額減少50%以上。但這遠非中國發展過程的終點。

中國對美出口約佔國內生產毛額（GDP）的3%，低於20年前7%的最高峰。此前，中國積極推動經濟多元化，減少對美國消費者的依賴，這與美國減少對中國供應鏈的依賴的努力同樣深思熟慮。這意味著，即使中國對美出口減少一半，對整體經濟的打擊僅1.5%。這當然不是好消息，但遠非災難。

隨著美國不僅對中國發動貿易戰，也對其他國家發動貿易戰，其損失很可能與美國本身大致相同。彭博經濟研究基於模型的估計顯示，由於進口價格上漲和供應鏈混亂，GDP將受到約1.6%的衝擊。

DeepSeek（中國版ChatGPT）演算法的優異表現表明，其程式設計師足夠聰明，能夠繞過美國的半導體供應禁運。中國對製造業和國防工業至關重要的稀土元素的控制，讓它擁有了出口管制的武器 - 在今年日內瓦和倫敦的談判中，中國也利用了這項武器迫使美國讓步。

結果：即使美國近十年來一直試圖遏制中國製造業實力，中國在全球出口中的份額仍然保持在高位。

中國為何如此堅韌？因為一個多世紀以來，從清朝的末期，到曇花一現的民國，再到毛澤東時代的混亂和改革開放的進步，中國始終堅持一個突出的原則：為現今的鬥爭做好準備。

這始於19世紀末20世紀初，當時飽受外敵侵略之辱的中國思想家開始致力於透過現代化去實現「自強」。嚴復 (Yan Fu)出生於1854年，畢業於英國海軍學院，是一位知識分子和教育家，他將英國生物學家 Thomas Huxley 和蘇格蘭經濟學家亞 Adam Smith 當等西方學者的著作翻譯成中文。他從Huxley的著作中引入了「適者生存」的概念，認為國家如同自然界中的物種一樣，必須不斷自我發展，才能避免被更強大的對手吞噬。

在1930年代毛澤東領導的共產黨與蔣介石領導的國民黨之間的鬥爭中，毛澤東的核心號召力是承諾有效抵抗日本侵略者的，以及建立一個更加平等社會的夢想。 1949年上台後，他推行了強行推進工業化的路線，但最終卻讓許多中國人走向了墳墓。這條路雖然曲折，但目標堅定不移：抵禦外來威脅。他警告說： “美帝國主義者一直想毀滅我們。”

1976年毛澤東去世後不久中國開啟的改革開放時期，自強不息的目標依然如故，但去實現這一目標的政策卻得到了極大的改進。在1980年代和1990年代，中國社會科學院學者何新 (He Xin) （其著作曾在高層領導人中流傳）曾警告稱，隨著中國的崛起，「已開發國家感受到競爭加劇帶來的威脅，將試圖壓制中國」。他制定了應對計劃：「面對持續存在的被摧毀的威脅，建立一個完全自給自足的工業體係自然應該是中國最實際的選擇。」

（待續）

Note:

1. Yan Fu (嚴復)（1854–1921）, born in 1854 in Fuzhou of China, began his scholarly journey at a young age. His early education was rooted in traditional Chinese learning, starting at a private school around age seven, then under the tutelage of esteemed scholars from age eleven, laying a strong foundation in the Confucian classics. After his father’s death in 1866 that plunged the family into hardship, Yan Fu entered the Foochow Arsenal Academy in 1867, where he studied English, mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, navigation, and other practical subjects. He graduated with top honors in 1871 and then served aboard naval vessels for five years. In 1877, Yan Fu was sent to Europe to further his studies. He first studied in Portsmouth in Britain before earning admission to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich in London. There, he excelled in advanced mathematics, chemistry, physics, naval tactics, maritime law, and artillery fortifications. During his time in Britain, he immersed himself beyond his assigned courses by frequently visiting libraries, attending court sessions, and exploring Western political, economic, and social philosophies, fueling his lifelong quest to understand the sources of Western strength. (ChatGPT)