2026年2月28日 星期六

中國如何打造晶片產業,為何仍有所不足(2/2)

Recently the New York Times reported the following:

How China Built a Chip Industry, and Why It’s Still Not Enough (2/2)

More than a decade into Beijing’s push for self sufficiency, Chinese firms are producing fewer, lower-performing chips than their foreign competitors.

The NYT - By Meaghan Tobin reporting from Taipei, Taiwan ; Xinyun Wu contributed reporting from Taipei. Meaghan Tobin covers business and tech stories in Asia with a focus on China and is based in Taipei.

Feb. 14, 2026, 12:00 a.m. ET

(continue)

Huawei’s Pivot

In 2014, China was the world’s largest market for semiconductors. But 90 percent of the chips its companies used were made outside the country.

Concerned about that dependency, the State Council, China’s top governing body, approved a plan to spend billions and made a vow: China would be making every part of its semiconductor supply chain at home by 2030.

Policymakers had reason to be concerned about the risks that foreign technology posed to Chinese infrastructure. Earlier that year, documents provided by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden had disclosed that the U.S. government had monitored the communications of top executives at Huawei.

Then in 2017, President Trump fined the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions on Iran, crippling its business overnight. Although ZTE does not manufacture chips, the action gave China another lesson in its need for self reliance.

Next came Huawei. The first Trump administration embarked on a global campaign to get countries to stop using Huawei’s equipment in their telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei responded by offloading that business line and getting in step with Beijing’s self-sufficiency program.

“Huawei was unique in its capabilities and its alignment with China’s national goals,” said Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Brookings Institution who studies Chinese industrial policy. “Huawei’s experience was a microcosm of China’s broader experience: suddenly being cut off and now scrambling to build its own.”

Beijing also pushed foreign companies to turn over technology as a price of admission to the China market. Qualcomm, a San Diego tech giant, entered into a joint venture with Huaxintong Semiconductor in 2016. The Chinese government provided land and financing, and Qualcomm offered the technology and about $140 million in initial funding.

During this time, Huawei became one of China’s most popular smartphone makers. And it started working closely with chip factories to make chips for smartphones and A.I. systems.

Huawei has come out with a line of chips that are comparable to some of Nvidia’s older models. But analysts said those chips contained key components that foreign rivals like TSMC and Samsung had made.

Clouds and Clusters

The inability to get essential tools from ASML has been a major chokehold for Chinese chip makers. Since U.S. officials led an effort to lobby the Dutch government to block shipments to China, no Chinese company has been able to buy ASML’s most advanced tools.

Instead, Chinese chip makers have recruited engineers with experience using those machines at TSMC, the world’s top chip maker. And now, Chinese start-ups are trying to make their own chip manufacturing equipment.

A.I. systems require an immense amount of computing power to learn. China’s A.I. companies are trying to get the computing power they need by strapping together numerous less powerful chips. Huawei has taken such an approach, and the Chinese government has built what it calls “intelligent computing clusters” that are essentially state-run data centers.

But those clusters need a lot of chips. Experts and people who work in the industry say China’s most advanced chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Company, which does some work for Huawei, has struggled to produce enough chips. The chips it does produce are prone to defects and use more electricity than cutting-edge foreign ones. SMIC did not respond to a request for comment.

“Manufacturing volume is going to be an issue,” said Kendra Schaefer, a partner at Trivium China, a research and advisory firm.

Nonetheless, multiple Chinese A.I. researchers have reported breakthroughs in finding new ways to link chips together for maximum efficiency. Zhipu said last month that it had built its latest model entirely using Huawei’s chips and software.

So far, the efficiency gains have been limited and have not helped Chinese companies escape the fact that A.I. demands huge quantities of chips.

Another way China’s A.I. companies are getting the computing power they need is by paying cloud providers like Alibaba and Amazon for remote access to massive data centers stocked with powerful chips.

But the strategy is expensive.

Documents filed by Zhipu and Minimax, another Chinese A.I. start-up, with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange last month show that the two companies are spending a lot more buying cloud services than they are earning in revenue.

Translation

中國如何打造晶片產業,為何仍有所不足(2/2

 北京推進晶片自給自足已逾十年,但中國企業生產的晶片數量和性能卻不如外國競爭對手

 (繼續)

華為的轉型

2014年,中國是全球最大的半導體市場。但其企業使用的晶片中,90%產自國外。

出於對這種依賴性的擔憂,中國最高決策機構國務院批准了一項數十億美元的計劃,並承諾:到2030年,中國將實現半導體供應鏈所有環節的自主生產。

中國政策制定者有理由擔憂外國技術對中國基礎設施構成的風險。同年早些時候,前美國國家安全局承包商Edward J. Snowden提供的文件披露,美國政府曾監聽華為高層的通訊。

隨後在2017年,特朗普總統以中國涉嫌違反美國對伊朗的製裁為由,對中國電信巨頭中興通訊處以罰款,一夜之間重創了其業務。儘管中興通訊並不生產晶片,但這項舉措再次讓中國認識到自力更生的必要性。

接下來是華為。特朗普第一屆政府發起了一場全球運動,要求各國停止在其電信基礎設施中使用華為的設備。華為的回應是剝離了該業務線,並配合北京的自給自足計劃。

布魯金斯學會研究中國產業政策的研究員Kyle Chan表示:「華為的獨特之處在於其能力以及與中國國家目標的契合度」;「華為的經歷是中國整體經歷的一個縮影:突然被切斷聯繫,現在正努力構建自己的體系」。

北京也要求外國公司交出技術,以此作為進入中國市場的准入條件。總部位於聖地牙哥的科技巨頭Qualcomm2016年與Huaxintong半導體成立了一家合資企業。中國政府提供土地和資金,而Qualcomm則提供技術和約1.4億美元的初期資金。

在此期間,華為成為中國最受歡迎的智能手機製造商之一。它開始與晶片工廠密切合作,為智能型手機和人工智能系統生產晶片。

華為推出了一系列晶片,其性能可與英偉達的一些早期型號相媲美。但分析師指出,這些晶片包含的關鍵組件是由台積電和三星等外國競爭對手生產的。

雲端和集群

一直是困擾中國晶片製造商的一大難題是無法從ASML獲得關鍵工具。自從美國官員主導遊說荷蘭政府阻止向中國出口ASML設備以來,沒有一家中國公司能夠購買ASML最先進的設備。

取而代之的是,中國晶片製造商從世界頂級晶片製造商台積電(TSMC)招募了擁有相關設備使用經驗的工程師。如今,中國新創公司正嘗試自行研發晶片製造設備。

人工智能系統需要強大的運算能力才能進行學習。中國的人工智能公司正試圖透過將眾多性能較低的晶片組合在一起來獲得所需的運算能力。華為就採用了這種方法,而中國政府也建造了所謂的“智能計算集群”,這些集群本質上是國有數據中心。

但這些集群需要大量的晶片。專家和業內人士表示,中國最先進的晶片製造商 - 中芯國際(SMIC),它為華為提供部分晶片製造服務 - 一直難以生產足夠的晶片。中芯國際生產的晶片缺陷率高,而且比國外最先進的晶片耗電量更大。中芯國際未對此置評。

研究顧問公司 Trivium China 的合夥人 Kendra Schaefer 表示:「產量將是一個問題」。

儘管如此,多位中國人工智能研究人員報告稱,他們在尋找將晶片連接起來以實現最高效率的新方法方面取得了突破。智普人工智能(Zhipu AI) 上個月表示,其最新型號完全使用了華為的晶片和軟件。

到目前為止,效率提升有限,也未能幫助中國企業擺脫人工智能需要大量晶片的困境。

中國的人工智能公司是獲取所需運算能力的另一種方式是向阿里巴巴和亞馬遜等雲端服務供應商付費,利用遠端去用配備有強大晶片的大型數據中心的服務。

但這種策略成本高。

智普(Zhipu AI)和另一家中國人工智能新創公司 Minimax 上個月向香港證券交易所提交的文件顯示,這兩家公司在購買雲端服務上的支出遠遠超過了它們的收入。

So, in the development of AI, one thing was holding back China: They needed more superfast semiconductors. China’s most advanced chip maker has struggled to produce enough chips. The chips it does produce are prone to defects and use more electricity than cutting-edge foreign ones. One solution for China’s A.I. companies is to get the computing power they need by paying cloud providers such as Alibaba and Amazon for their services, but the strategy is expensive. Apparently, China is facing a dilemma in its development in AI.

2026年2月26日 星期四

中國如何打造晶片產業,為何仍有所不足(1/2)

Recently the New York Times reported the following:

How China Built a Chip Industry, and Why It’s Still Not Enough (1/2)

More than a decade into Beijing’s push for self sufficiency, Chinese firms are producing fewer, lower-performing chips than their foreign competitors.

The NYT - By Meaghan Tobin reporting from Taipei, Taiwan ; Xinyun Wu contributed reporting from Taipei. Meaghan Tobin covers business and tech stories in Asia with a focus on China and is based in Taipei.

Feb. 14, 2026, 12:00 a.m. ET

At a conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing in January, a group of the most influential executives and founders working in artificial intelligence in China gathered to discuss the state of their industry. The mood was bullish. One of the companies in the room, which included people from Tencent, Alibaba and Zhipu AI, could soon lead the world, they agreed.

But one thing was holding them back: They needed more superfast semiconductors.

This year, Chinese chip makers are likely to produce a small fraction of the number of advanced chips made by foreign firms. Huawei, the telecommunications and electronics company leading China’s chip charge, has said it will need almost another two years to make chips that can perform as well as the current offerings from Nvidia of Silicon Valley.

“Even the national champion is fighting an uphill battle,” said Xiaomeng Lu, a director with Eurasia Group, a political consultancy and research group in Washington.

Still, while Chinese chip companies make fewer, slower chips — in large part because U.S. policies have prevented them from importing key tools — there is no shortage of momentum in the country’s A.I. industry.

While Washington’s export controls have slowed China’s chip development, they have added fuel to Beijing’s decade-long push to make strategic technologies like semiconductors and A.I. entirely at home.

Government and private money has been pouring into the development of Chinese artificial intelligence. Chinese tech stocks have made huge gains — Alibaba soared more than 94 percent last year. A stream of Chinese A.I. start-ups are going public. Last month, two of China’s most promising A.I. companies raised more than $1 billion in Hong Kong listings.

The gap between the money flowing into China’s A.I. sector and the reality that Chinese companies produce fewer chips than the country needs underlines the urgency of Beijing’s self-sufficiency efforts, and how much the Chinese A.I. industry still depends on foreign chips.

In December, President Trump extended China a lifeline when he allowed Nvidia to sell some of its advanced chips to Chinese companies, reversing years of U.S. policy. But whether China will get broad access to those chips remains an open question ahead of Mr. Trump’s planned visit to Beijing next month.

The Memory Chip Lag

The Chinese government’s push to make cutting-edge chips at home began more than a decade ago. And it has spent more than $150 billion on the drive.

China’s biggest tech companies, including Huawei, Alibaba and the TikTok parent company ByteDance, have started chip design businesses. Chip makers, many working with Huawei, are building dozens of factories and have hired top engineers from Taiwan and South Korea.

But the task of catching up has gotten progressively more difficult. While Chinese companies have been building their own supply chain for chip making, officials in Washington have tried to hold them back. Three presidential administrations have used export controls to keep Chinese companies from buying advanced chips and the tools to make them, over concerns the technology could fuel China’s economic and military power.

The restrictions have kept Chinese companies from buying equipment made by the Dutch company ASML that performs a crucial step in the chip making process. The lack of access to these machines, which are the size of school buses, is one reason Chinese companies are making chips that lag the performance of the top of the line from Nvidia.

Those are the kinds of chips that power artificial intelligence systems. Chinese companies will most likely make just 2 percent as many A.I. chips as foreign firms do this year, said Tim Fist, a director at the Institute for Progress, a think tank in Washington.

The production gap between Chinese and foreign manufacturers is especially big for memory chips, which are essential for the large calculations done by A.I.

Companies outside China will make 70 times as much memory storage capacity this year as Chinese chip makers will, Mr. Fist said.

The leading makers of memory chips are the South Korean conglomerates Samsung and SK Hynix. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s biggest chip producer, dominates production of the most advanced chips.

(to be continued)

Translation

中國如何打造晶片產業,為何仍有所不足1/2

北京推進晶片自給自足已逾十年,但中國企業生產的晶片數量和性能卻不及國外競爭對手。

今年1月,在北京清華大學舉行的會議上,一群中國人工智能領域最具影響力的企業主管和創辦人齊聚一堂,探討產業現況。會場氣氛樂觀。企業包括騰訊、阿里巴巴和智普人工智能在內的多家公司,其中一家預計他們很快就會引領全世界,與會者一致認同。

但有一點阻礙了他們:他們需要更多超高速半導體。

今年,中國晶片製造商生產的先進晶片數量可能僅為外國公司產量的一小部分。引領中國晶片產業發展的電信和電子公司華為表示,還需要近兩年時間才能生產出性能與矽谷英偉達現有產品相當的晶片。

華盛頓政治諮詢和研究機構歐亞集團的董事Xiaomeng Lu表示:「即使是國家的冠軍也面臨著一場艱苦的戰鬥」。

儘管中國晶片公司生產的晶片數量較少、速度較慢 - 這在很大程度上是因為美國的政策阻止了它們進口關鍵設備 - 但中國的人工智能產業並不缺乏動力。

雖然華盛頓的出口管制減緩了中國晶片的發展速度,但這卻為北京十年來致力於實現半導體和人工智能等戰略技術完全自主研發的努力注入了動力。

政府和私人資金一直湧入中國人工智能的研發領域。中國科技股漲幅驚人 - 阿里巴巴去年股價飆漲超過94%。大量中國人工智能新創公司紛紛上市。上個月,兩家中國最有前景的人工智能公司在香港上市,融資超過10億美元。

流入中國人工智能領域的資金,與中國企業晶片產量遠低於國內需求的現實之間存在巨大差距,凸顯了北京推進晶片自給自足的迫切性,以及中國人工智能產業對外國晶片的依賴程度。

去年12月,特朗普總統允許英偉達向中國企業出售部分先進晶片,此舉推翻了美國多年來的政策,為中國提供了一線生機。但中國能否廣泛取得這些晶片,在特朗普下個月訪華之前仍是個未知數。

記憶體晶片的滯後

中國政府推動自主研發尖端晶片的計劃始於十多年前,並已為此投入超過1500億美元。

包括華為、阿里巴巴和TikTok母公司位元組跳動在內的中國大型科技公司已開始涉足晶片設計業務。許多與華為合作的晶片製造商正在建造數十家工廠,並從台灣和韓國聘請了頂尖工程師。

但追趕的難度卻與日俱增。儘管中國企業一直在建造自己的晶片製造供應鏈,但華盛頓的官員卻試圖阻撓它們。三屆美國總統政府都曾動用出口管制,阻止中國企業購買先進晶片及其製造設備,理由是擔心這項技術會增強中國的經濟和軍事實力。

這些限制使得中國企業無法購買荷蘭ASML公司生產的設備,而這些設備正是晶片製造過程中至關重要的一環。無法獲得這些在體積上堪比一輛校車的機器,是中國企業生產的晶片性能落後於英偉達頂級晶片的原因之一。

而這些晶片正是人工智能系統的核心。華盛頓智庫「進步研究所」(Institute for Progress)主任 Tim Fist表示,中國企業今年生產的人工智能晶片數量很可能只有外國公司的2%

中國製造商與外國製造商在記憶晶片領域的產量差距尤其巨大,而記憶晶片對於人工智能(AI)的大規模運算至關重要。

Fist先生指出,今年中國以外公司的記憶體晶片產量將是中國晶片製造商的70倍。

領先的記憶體晶片製造商是韓國的三星和SK海力士兩大企業集團。台積電(TSMC)是全球最大的晶片生產商,在最先進晶片的生產中佔據主導地位。

(待續)

2026年2月24日 星期二

《蘋果日報》判決凸顯香港媒體危機新時代

Recently the New York Times reported the following:

Apple Daily Sentences Show a New Era of Media Peril in Hong Kong

Two editors and an opinion writer from Jimmy Lai’s now-shuttered newspaper were each sentenced to 10 years in prison, a significant escalation in media prosecution in the once freewheeling city.

By David Pierson - Reporting from Hong Kong

Feb. 9, 2026

Updated 3:46 a.m. ET

The Hong Kong court that sentenced the pro-democracy media mogul, Jimmy Lai to 20 years in prison on Monday also issued heavy sentences to six former employees of his now-shuttered newspaper, setting a new standard for the city’s limits on press freedom.

The newspaper, Apple Daily, was one of Hong Kong’s most independent and widely read news outlets for years until it was forced to shut in 2021 as part of a crackdown on dissent. It was rambunctious, often sensational and proudly pro-democracy. Many Hong Kongers see it as a symbol of the civil liberties that have been lost as Beijing has tightened its grip over the city.

On Monday, the court handed down 10-year prison terms to the paper’s leading editorial voices: Editor-in-Chief Law Wai-kwong, Executive Editor Lam Man-chung, and an editorial writer, Fung Wai-kong.

Others received significant terms as well: Yeung Ching-kee, another editorial writer, was sentenced to seven years and three months; an associate publisher Chan Pui-man, seven years, and Cheung Kim-hung, a publisher, six years and nine months.

The sentences were longer than those given in 2024 to two editors who ran another pro-democracy news site, Stand News, also now defunct. Two of the new outlet’s journalists, Chung Pui-kuen, and his successor, Patrick Lam, were convicted of conspiring to publish seditious materials. Mr. Chung was sentenced to 21 months, and Mr. Lam, who has a serious health condition, to the time he had already served between his arrest and his release on bail — slightly less than a year.

Rights activists and journalist groups have said the prosecution of editors and journalists in Hong Kong illustrated the decline of press freedom in the city and raised questions about what journalistic activities the authorities might consider illegal. The government has hit back at those criticisms, saying that journalists have to abide by Hong Kong’s laws.

But the lines have clearly been redrawn. Several journalists and photographers have been denied work visas or barred from entering the city, including an Associated Press photographer who previously photographed Mr. Lai walking in a barbed wire enclosure.

Many local news outlets have stopped reporting on efforts by Hong Kong activists, now in exile, who draw attention to China’s crackdown on the city. Press freedom advocates say the territory’s national security laws significantly raise the risks for journalists operating in the city. Hong Kong’s vague definition of external interference can be broadly applied to regular journalistic work, the activists say.

“The rule of law has been completely shattered in Hong Kong,” Jodie Ginsberg, the chief executive of the Committee to Protect Journalists, said in a statement after Mr. Lai’s sentencing. “Today’s egregious decision is the final nail in the coffin for freedom of the press in Hong Kong.”

Translation

《蘋果日報》判決凸顯香港媒體危機新時代

黎智英旗下現已停刊的報紙《蘋果日報》的兩名編輯和一名評論員分別被判處10年監禁,這標誌著這座曾經自由開放的城市對媒體的打壓顯著升級

香港法院週一判處民主派媒體大亨黎智英20年監禁,同時對其已停刊報紙的六名前僱員也判處重刑,這為香港新聞自由的限制樹立了新的準則。

《蘋果日報》曾是香港最獨立、發行量最大的新聞媒體之一,直到2021年因香港鎮壓異議人士而被勒令停刊。它既喧鬧,又常以聳人聽聞的手法呈現,並且以身為親民主派為榮。許多香港人將其視為北京加強對香港控制後,公民自由逐漸失去的象徵。

週一,法庭判處該報幾位主要編輯十年監禁:總編輯Law Wai-kwong、執行編輯Lam Man-chung和社論撰稿人Fung Wai-kong

其他被判處重刑計有:另一社論撰稿人Yeung Ching-kee被判七年零三個月;副出版人Chan Pui-man被判七年;出版人Cheung Kim-hung被判六年零九個月。

這些刑期比2024年判處另一家民主派新聞網站「立場新聞」(現已停刊)兩名編輯的刑期更長。該新聞網站的兩名記者Chung Pui-kuen及其繼任者Patrick Lam被判犯有串謀出版煽動性材料罪。Chung先生被判處21個月監禁,而身患重病的Lam先生則被判處從被捕到保釋期間已服刑的時間 - 略少於一年。

人權活動人士和記者團體表示,香港對編輯和記者的起訴凸顯了該市新聞自由的衰落,並引發了人們對當局究竟將哪些新聞活動視為非法的質疑。政府反駁了這些批評,並表示記者必須遵守香港的法律。

但界線顯然已被重新劃定。多名記者和攝影師被拒絕工作簽證或被禁止入境香港,其中包括一名美聯社攝影師,他此前曾拍攝過黎智英在鐵絲網圍欄內行走的照片。

許多本地新聞媒體已停止報道目前流亡海外的香港活動人士的活動,這些活動人士一直致力於揭露中國對香港的鎮壓。新聞自由倡議者表示,香港的國安法顯著增加了在港記者面臨的風險。活動人士表示,香港對「外部干涉」的模糊定義可以廣泛適用於常規新聞工作。

保護記者委員會執行長Jodie Ginsberg在黎智英被判刑後發表聲明稱:“香港的法治已被徹底摧毀”; 今天這項令人髮指的判決,無疑是令香港新聞自由死亡最終的一擊。”

 So, a Hong Kong court  sentences Jimmy Lai to 20 years behind bars, and also long imprisonment terms to his six former employees. Apparently, the Hong Kong national security laws have significantly raised the risks for journalists working in the city.

2026年2月22日 星期日

Russia's GDP last year increased 1% year-on-year, the first significant slowdown in three years

 Recently NHK News on-line reported the following:

ロシア 去年のGDP 前年比プラス1 3年ぶりに大きく減速

202628日午前148

ロシア

ロシアによるウクライナへの侵攻が長期化する中、ロシアの去年1年間のGDP=国内総生産の伸び率は、前の年と比べてプラス1%となり、3年ぶりに大きく減速しました。

ロシア連邦統計局は6日、去年1年間のGDPを発表し、前の年と比べた実質の伸び率は、プラス1%となりました。

ウクライナへの侵攻後、巨額の軍事費が経済をけん引し、2023年と2024年は成長率がいずれも4%を超えていましたが、大きく減速しました。

戦時下の人手不足などで物価が上昇したため、ロシア中央銀行は、政策金利を現在16%と高い水準に維持していて、金利の重い負担が、消費の落ち込みや企業の生産活動の低迷を招きました。

また、戦費を調達するために増税も相次いで行われ、このうち日本の消費税にあたる付加価値税の税率は先月から2%引き上げられ、22%になりました。

モスクワの市民からは物価の上昇や軍事作戦への不満の声が聞かれます。

男性は、「価格も家賃も上がっている。特別軍事作戦、制裁、すべてが生活に影響を与えている」と話していました。

また、女性は、軍事作戦が物価の上昇に関係していると思うかとの質問に、「関係あります。だからみんな『いつ終わるのか』と言っているのです」と答え、早期の和平を望んでいました。

Translation

Russia's GDP last year increased 1% year-on-year, the first significant slowdown in three years

February 8, 2026, 1:48 AM

Russia

As Russia's invasion of Ukraine dragged on, Russia's GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate for the past year increased 1% compared to the previous year, being the first significant slowdown in three years.

On the 6th, the Federal Statistics Service of Russia announced GDP figures for the past year, showing a real growth rate of 1% compared to the previous year.

After the invasion of Ukraine, massive military spending drove the economy, and growth rates exceeded 4% in both 2023 and 2024, but had since slowed down significantly.

Due to rising prices because of wartime labor shortages and other factors, the Russian Central Bank had maintained its policy interest rate at a high level at 16% currently. The heavy interest burden had led to a decline in consumption and a slump in corporate production.

Also, a series of tax increases had been implemented to raise funds for the war, including a 2% increase in the value-added tax (VAT) last month to reach 22%, it was an equivalent to Japan's consumption tax.

Moscow residents’ dissatisfaction with rising prices and military operations could be heard.

One man said, "Prices and rents are going up. The special military operations, the sanctions, everything is affecting our lives."

When asked if she thought the military operations were related to rising prices, the woman replied, "It is related. That's why everyone is asking, 'When will it end?'" and expressed hope for an early peace.

So, Russia's GDP growth rate has increased merely 1% compared to the previous year.  Prices of commodities and rents are going up and affecting the daily lives of the Russian. Apparently, Putin is also facing the pressure to end the war.

2026年2月21日 星期六

4億年前陸地上最大的生物體,科學家至今無法解釋

Recently CNN.com reported the following:


The largest life-form on land 400 million years ago was one that scientists can’t explain

CNN - By Katie Hunt

Updated Feb 5, 2026

Some 400 million years ago, long before dinosaurs or even trees had evolved, an enigmatic organism towered over the landscape like a prehistoric monolith.

Now, new research makes the case that the ancient life form is not a plant, animal or fungi and instead may be a completely unknown form of multicellular life.

“What we can say, based on all of those new analyses, is that it’s so different from any modern group we have,” said Corentin Loron, a palaeontologist at Edinburgh University and a co-lead author of the research, which published in the journal Science Advances last month.

First identified 160 years ago, the fossils — known as Prototaxites — measure up to 30 feet (around 9 meters) tall and have long defied easy classification.

In the 19th century, scientists initially thought Prototaxites was the rotten trunk of a conifer. Subsequent study, however, revealed it was composed of interwoven tubes, rather than the block-like cells that make up plant tissue.

Other scientists argued that it was a lichen-like mass, a symbiotic association between a fungus and algae. In recent years, some researchers thought the organism more closely resembled a fungus, in part because it didn’t appear to produce energy through photosynthesis.

The new research focused on three Prototaxites fossils unearthed in the Rhynie chert, a prehistoric land ecosystem near Aberdeen, Scotland. The Rhynie chert is home to the best-preserved examples of the earliest plants, fungi and fauna that colonized land 400 million years ago, during a period known as the early Devonian. The site was once an ancient hot spring like Yellowstone.

The exceptional preservation of the fossils embedded in the rock at the Rhynie chert allows scientists, with the right tools, to detect the chemical signatures of long-vanished molecules, known as fossilization products.

“We are able to still have signatures that inform us about the original composition of those fossils, meaning it’s not overcooked, it’s not overly transformed by the geology,” Loron explained.

Unanswered questions

The new analysis by Loron and his colleagues suggests that the biomarkers in Prototaxites fossils were chemically distinct from those of fossilized fungi found at the site and preserved in similar conditions. Fungi fossils preserved in the chert contained compounds from the breakdown of chitin and glucan, key structural molecules in fungi. Prototaxites, however, lacked these biomarkers.

“If Prototaxites was fungi, we would have expected it to follow the same trend as the fungi because they are next to each other in the same burial conditions,” Loron said.

Other structural features — such as a complex branching pattern within dark spherical spots in the fossil that could have carried out a gas, nutrient, water, or served another exchange function — were distinct from all known fungi, whether living or extinct, the researchers noted in the study. Based on these results, it is too early to shoehorn Prototaxites into a specific category, according to the team.

Different species of Prototaxites might have varied in size, but the largest would have really towered over the landscape at a time when plants were less than 1 meter tall, said Kevin Boyce, a professor of Earth and planetary sciences at Stanford University. His work on Prototaxites fossils has shown that the ancient organisms didn’t use photosynthesis to produce energy from light like plants, but likely consumed carbon sources in the environment — just as some living fungi live off decomposing organic matter.

“People have compared it to specific fungi or algae in the past, and they were doing their best with the information they had at the time, but we now have a much better handle on the overall tree of life and Prototaxites is too old for those comparisons to be valid,” Boyce, who wasn’t involved in the study, said in an email.

“You can compare it to mushrooms, but mushrooms just aren’t that old,” he added. “That doesn’t mean Prototaxites is or isn’t a fungus (or anything else), just that its form would have evolved independently from the mushrooms and other complex multicellular examples amongst fungi that we have now.”

Marc-André Selosse, a professor at the Natural History Museum in Paris, said the authors of the new study conducted “wonderful analyses” but noted the research only examined one of 25 known species of Prototaxites. Selosse, who also didn’t take part in the work, said he thought it was still possible that the organism functioned in a lichen-like way.

“The sampling is not encompassing the diversity of Prototaxites species,” Selosse said. “So for me, it doesn’t make it as a finished story.”

Loron said there is still much that is unknown about Prototaxites. For example, it’s not clear how Prototaxites were anchored to the ground or whether the organism, which is thought to have grown slowly, was upright for its whole lifespan. His team is planning follow-up studies on fossilized tubular organisms similar to Prototaxites to further the research.

“Sometimes it’s scary to not know what something is, but it’s also scientifically exciting,” Loron said.

Translation

4億年前陸地上最大的生物體,科學家至今無法解釋

大約4億年前,遠在恐龍甚至樹木出現之前,一種神秘的生物體如同史前巨石般聳立於大地之上。

如今,一項新的研究表明,這種古代生物體並非植物、動物或真菌,可能是一種完全未知的多細胞生物。

愛丁堡大學古生物學家、該研究的共同第一作者Corentin Loron說道:「基於所有這些新的分析,我們可以說,它與我們已知的任何現代生物類群都截然不同」。這項研究已於上月發表在《科學進展》(Science Advances)雜誌上。

這些化石-被稱為原杉菌(Prototaxites- 160年前首次被發現,它們高達30英尺(約9公尺),長期以來一直難以被歸類。

19世紀,科學家最初認為原杉菌(Prototaxites)是針葉樹腐爛的樹幹。然而,隨後的研究表明,它是由交織的管子組成,而不是構成植物組織的塊狀細胞。

另一些科學家則認為它是一種類似地衣的團塊,是真菌和藻類之間的共生體。近年來,一些研究人員認為這種生物更接近真菌,部分原因是它似乎不會透過光合作用產生能量。

這項新研究聚焦於蘇格蘭Aberdeen附近, 稱為瑞尼燧石層(Rhynie chert)的近史前陸地生態系中出土的三塊原杉菌化石。瑞尼燧石層保存著4億年前稱為Devonian(泥盆紀)最早期興盛的植物、真菌和動物群的最佳化石標本。該遺址曾像黃石公園一樣,是個古老的溫泉。

瑞尼燧石層中化石保存得異常完好,這使得科學家能夠借助合適的工具,探測到早已消失的分子(即化石化產物)的化學特徵。

Loron解釋道: 「我們仍然能夠獲得這些特徵,它們可以告訴我們這些化石的原始成分,這意味著它們沒有被過度熱化,也沒有被地質作用過度改變」。

未解之謎

Loron及其同事的最新分析表明,原杉菌化石中的生物標記與在同一地點發現的、保存條件相似的真菌化石的生物標記在化學成分上截然不同。保存在燧石中的真菌化石含有甲殼質和葡聚糖分解產生的化合物,而甲殼質和葡聚糖是真菌的關鍵結構分子。然而,原杉菌化石卻缺乏這些生物標記。

Loron: 「如果原杉菌是真菌,我們原本預期它會與真菌的生物標記呈現相同的趨勢,因為它們彼此相鄰,且處於相同的埋藏條件下」。

研究人員在研究中指出,其他結構特徵 - 例如化石中深色球狀斑點內複雜的枝狀結構,這些結構可能負責氣體、營養物質、水分的輸送,或發揮其他交換功能 - 與所有已知的真菌(無論現存或已滅絕)都截然不同。研究團隊認為,基於這些結果,現在就將原杉菌(Prototaxites)歸入某個特定類別還為時過早。

史丹佛大學地球與行星科學教授Kevin Boyce表示,不同種類的原杉菌體型可能有所差異,但最大的原杉菌出現在一般植物高度不足1米的時代,無疑會成為地貌上的龐然大物。他對原杉菌化石造出的研究表明,這些遠古生物不像植物那樣利用光合作用從光中獲取能量,而是可能像某些現存真菌以分解有機物為生一樣,從環境中吸收碳源為生。

並未參與這項研究的Boyce 在一封電子郵件中寫道:「過去人們曾將它與特定的真菌或藻類進行比較,他們當時也只是盡力利用已有的信息進行分析。但現在我們對整個生命之樹有了更深入的了解,而原杉菌的出現時間太早了,當時的比較已經不再有效了」。

他補充道:“你可以把它和蘑菇比較,但蘑菇的出現時間並沒有那麼早”,“這並不意味著原杉菌是或不是真菌(或其他任何生物),只是說它們與我們現在所知的蘑菇和其他複雜的多細胞真菌是獨立地去演化的產物。

巴黎自然歷史博物館的教授Marc-André Selosse表示,這項新研究的作者進行了“精彩的分析”,但他指出,這項研究只考察了已知的25種原杉菌中的一種。Selosse也未參與這項研究,但他表示,他認為這種生物體仍然有可能以類似地衣的方式運作。

Selosse: “目前的採樣並未涵蓋原杉菌物種的全部” “所以對我來說,這還不足以說已寫出了一個完整的故事。”

Loron表示,關於原杉菌,我們仍然有很多未知之處。例如,目前尚不清楚原杉菌是如何固定在地面上的,也不清楚這種被認為生長緩慢的生物是否終生保持直立。他的團隊計劃對與原杉菌類似的管狀化石生物進行後續研究,以推進相關調查。

Loron: 「有時候,不知道某些東西是什麼會讓人感到害怕,但從科學角度來說,這也令人興奮的」。

So, some 400 million years ago, long before dinosaurs or even trees had evolved, an enigmatic organism called Prototaxites towered over the landscape like a prehistoric monolith. Now, new research makes the case that this ancient life form is not a plant, animal or fungi and instead may be a completely unknown form of multicellular life. There is still much that is unknown about Prototaxites. Apparently, further the research is needed in order to know more about this organism.

Note:

1.Prototaxites (原杉菌) is an extinct genus of large macroscopic eukaryote dating from the Late Silurian until the Late Devonian periods. Prototaxites formed large trunk-like structures up to 1 metre (3 ft) wide, reaching 8 metres (26 ft) in height, made up of tiny interwoven tubules around 50 micrometres (0.0020 in) in diameter, making it by far the largest land-dwelling organism of its time. The taxonomy of Prototaxites has long been the subject of debate. (Wikipedia)

2. Rhynie chert (瑞尼燧石層) refers to a type of fossil-rich silica rock that originates from the Early Devonian period. It is significant in paleontology for preserving some of the oldest known land plants and their associated organisms. (ChatGPT)

3. The Devonian (泥盆紀) is a geologic period and system of the Paleozoic era during the Phanerozoic eon, spanning 60.3 million years from the end of the preceding Silurian period at 419.62 million years ago, to the beginning of the succeeding Carboniferous period. It is named after Devon, South West England, where rocks from this period were first studied. (Wikipedia)

2026年2月20日 星期五

長壽的秘訣?科學家稱,或許就藏在基因裡

Recently The Guardian has reported the following:

The secret to long life? It could be in the genes after all, say scientists

New study into ‘heritability’ shows that 50% of the variation in human lifespan could be down to genetics

The Guardian - Nicola Davis Science correspondent

Thu 29 Jan 2026 19.00 GMT

Some people who live to a great age put it down to an evening tot of whisky, others to staying out of trouble. Now scientists think they may have unlocked a key secret to long life – quite simply, genetics.

Writing in the journal Science, the researchers described how previous studies that had attempted to unpick the genetic component of human lifespan had not taken into account that some lives were cut short by accidents, murders, infectious diseases or other factors arising outside the body. Such “extrinsic mortality” increases with age, as people often become more frail.

Prof Uri Alon and colleagues at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel say the true genetic contribution to the variation in human lifespan has been masked.

The team looked at “heritability”, the proportion of change in a characteristic such as height, body weight or lifespan within a population that can be attributed to genetics rather than environmental factors. Previous studies for human lifespan have thrown up a wide range of values – with heritability ranging from 6% of the variation to 33%.

But Alon, who co-authored the research, and his colleagues said such figures were underestimates. “I hope this will inspire researchers to make a deep search for the genes that impact lifespan,” Alon said. “These genes will tell us the mechanisms that govern our internal clocks.

“These can one day be turned into therapy to slow down the rate of ageing and in that way slow down all age-related disease at once.”

The team created a mathematical model that takes into account extrinsic mortality and the impact of biological ageing, and calibrated it using correlations of lifespan from historical datasets of thousands of pairs of twins in Denmark and Sweden.

They removed the impact of extrinsic mortality to reveal the signal from biological ageing, which is caused by genetics. The results suggest about 50% of the variation in human lifespan is due to genetics – a figure the researchers said was on a par with that seen in wild mice in the laboratory.

The other 50% of variation in human lifespan, they said, was probably explained by factors such as random biological effects and environmental influences.

“That’s where we would expect to find all the usual suspects – lifestyle, diet, exercise, social relations, environment, and more,” said Ben Shenhar, who co-authored the research, adding that lifestyle and environment were likely to become more important as we age.

The team tested their results using data from a US study of siblings of centenarians, and found a heritability of lifespan of about 50%.

Further testing using another Swedish dataset revealed that as extrinsic mortality fell from the start of the 20th century – likely due to factors such as improvements in public health – the estimated genetic contribution to lifespan rose, supporting the idea that extrinsic mortality was a key factor when looking at heritability. The team also found the heritability of lifespan varied depending on the cause of death, such as cancer or dementia, and age.

Shenhar added that day-to-day experience showed genetics played an important role in longevity. “Around 20% of centenarians, for example, reach age 100 without any serious debilitating illnesses,” he said, adding that could suggest their genes had a protective effect. “Studies have been conducted to identify these protective genes, and many have been found, but surely there are many still left to discover,” he said.

While the new study does not take into account the influence that genes can have on the immune system, Prof Richard Faragher of the University of Brighton said the research suggested humans did not seem to be an outlier when it came to the heritability of lifespan.

“And that’s useful because it means humans look quite like a species that we study ageing in, [and] gives you a certain amount of confidence that interventions that will work in mice will carry over into humans,” he said.

Translation

長壽的秘訣?科學家稱,或許就藏在基因裡

一項關於「遺傳性」的新研究表明,人類壽命差異的50%可能源自於基因

有些長壽者將長壽歸功於睡前小酌一杯威士忌,有些人則認為長壽的秘訣在於遠離麻煩。如今,科學家認為他們可能已經揭開了長壽的關鍵秘密 - 其實很簡單,就是基因。

研究人員在《科學》雜誌上撰文指出,以往試圖揭示人類壽命遺傳因素的研究忽略了這樣一個事實:有些人因意外事故、謀殺、傳染病或其他體外因素而英年早逝。這種「外在死亡率」會隨著年齡的增長而增加,因為人們往往會趨向更加脆弱。

以色列Weizmann科學研究所的Uri Alon教授及其同事表示,真正的遺傳因素對人類壽命差異的貢獻一直被掩蓋。

該團隊研究了“遺傳性”,即在人群中,身高、體重或壽命等特徵變化中可歸咎於遺傳而非環境因素的比例。以往關於人類壽命的研究得出了各種各樣的數值 - 遺傳性佔變異因素的比例從6%33%不等。

但作為研究的共同作者之一,Alon教授及其同事表示,這些數字被低估了。 Alon教授說: 「我希望這項研究能激勵研究人員深入探索影響壽命的基因」; 「這些基因將揭示控制我們生理時鐘的機制」。

“這些機制或許有一天能夠轉化為治療方法,從而減緩衰老速度,進而減緩所有與年齡相關的疾病。”

研究團隊創建了一個數學模型,該模型考慮了外在死亡和生物老化的影響,並使用來自丹麥和瑞典數千對雙胞胎的歷史數據, 利用期相關性對其進行校準

他們剔除了外在死亡的影響,從而揭示了由遺傳因素導致的生物老化訊號。結果表明,人類壽命差異的約50%是由遺傳因素造成的 - 研究人員表示,這一比例與實驗室中觀察野生小鼠的結果一致。

他們表示,人類壽命差異的另外50%可能由隨機生物效應和環境影響等因素解釋。

該研究的合著者Ben Shenhar說道:「我們預計會在這裡找到所有常見的可疑因素 - 生活方式、飲食、運動、社會關係、環境等等」,並補充說,隨著年齡的增長,生活方式和環境可能會變得更加重要。

研究團隊利用美國一項針對百歲老人兄弟姊妹的研究數據檢驗了他們的結果,發現因遺傳而長壽約為佔 50%

使用另一個瑞典數據集進行的進一步測試顯示,自 20 世紀初以來,外在死亡率有所下降。(這很可能是由於公共衛生水平的提高等因素),遺傳因素對壽命的貢獻估計值上升,這支持了外源性死亡率是影響遺傳因素的關鍵。研究團隊也發現,壽命的遺傳性會因死亡原因(如癌症或失智症)和年齡而異。

Shenhar補充說,日常經驗表明,遺傳在長壽中扮演著重要角色。 他說道:「例如,大約20%的百歲老人活到100歲時沒有任何嚴重的衰弱性疾病」,並補充說這可能表明他們的基因具有保護作用。他又說: 「一些研究來識別這些保護性基因已經開展,並且已經發現了很多,但肯定還有許多基因有待發現」。

雖然這項新研究沒有考慮基因對免疫系統的影響,布萊頓大學的Richard Faragher教授表示,這項研究表明,就壽命的遺傳性而言,人類似乎並非特例。

他說:「這很有用,因為它意味著人類與我們研究衰老的物種非常相似,[並且]讓我們有理由相信,在小鼠身上有效的干預措施也能在人類身上得到應用」。

So, now scientists think that a key secret to long life is genetics. Researchers described how previous studies that attempted to unpick the genetic component of human lifespan had not taken into account that some lives were cut short by accidents, murders, infectious diseases or other factors arising outside the body and thus underestimated the impact of heritability. Apparently, this is an interesting finding that may help our research to extend our lifespan in the future.

2026年2月19日 星期四

Mandatory allergy labeling: "Cashew nuts" to be newly added

 Recently NHK News on-line reported the following:

アレルギーの表示義務 新たに「カシューナッツ」追加へ

202626日午後430

消費者庁

アレルギーを引き起こすおそれのある食品として、表示を義務づける特定原材料に新たに「カシューナッツ」を追加する案が、国の消費者委員会の専門部会で了承されました。4月から「カシューナッツ」を使用した加工食品は、表示が義務化される見通しです。

国の食品表示制度では、アレルギーを引き起こすおそれのある食品について、現在卵や小麦など8品目が特定原材料として表示を義務づけられ、大豆やいくらなど20品目が表示を推奨されています。

このうちカシューナッツは表示が推奨されている20品目のうちの一つですが、消費者庁が2023年に行った食物アレルギーの健康被害の実態調査で、症例数が279件にのぼり、大幅に増加していることが明らかになったということです。

中には「意識がなくなる」などの重い症例も37件報告されています。

このため消費者庁は、カシューナッツの表示を義務化する食品表示基準の改正案をまとめ、6日開かれた国の消費者委員会の食品表示部会で了承されました。

あわせて「ピスタチオ」についても、表示を推奨する品目に新たに追加するとしています。

消費者庁では今後、消費者委員会の正式な答申を経て基準の改正を行うことにしていて、ことし4月から「カシューナッツ」を使用した加工食品は、原材料への表示が義務づけられる見通しです。

Translation

Mandatory allergy labeling: "Cashew nuts" to be newly added

Consumer Affairs Agency

A proposal to add "cashew nuts" to the list of specified ingredients that might cause allergies and require labeling had been approved by a specialist committee of the National Consumer Affairs Commission. Starting from April, for processed foods containing cashew nuts labeling would become mandatory.

Under the national food labeling system, eight items, including eggs and wheat, were currently required to be labeled as specified ingredients for foods that might cause allergies, and 20 items, including soybeans and salmon roe, were recommended for labeling.

Cashew nuts were one of the 20 recommended items, and a 2023 survey on food allergy health damage conducted by the Consumer Affairs Agency revealed a significant increase in the number of cases that had reached 279.

Among them, 37 severe cases including loss of consciousness, had been reported.

In response to this, the Consumer Affairs Agency compiled a proposed revision to the food labeling standards, which would mandate the labeling of cashew nuts, and it was approved at a meeting of the Food Labeling Committee of the Consumer Commission held on the 6th.

Pistachios could also be added to the list of items for which labeling was recommended.

The Consumer Affairs Agency would revise the standards following a formal report from the Consumer Affairs Commission. From April of this year, it was expected that processed foods using cashew nuts could be required to label their ingredients.

So, a proposal to add "cashew nuts" to the list of specified ingredients that may cause allergies and require labeling has been approved. Meanwhile, Pistachios will also be added to the list of items for which labeling is recommended. Apparently, Japan is more careful about food allergies than many other countries.

2026年2月18日 星期三

中國將於2027年起禁止汽車使用隱藏式門把手

Recently the Google News on-line picked up the following:

China to ban hidden door handles on cars starting 2027

By The Associated Press - Chan Ho-him, The Associated Press

Published: February 03, 2026 at 7:24AM EST

HONG KONG — China will ban hidden door handles on cars, commonly used on Tesla’s electric vehicles and many other EV models, starting next year.

All car doors must include a mechanical release function for handles, except for the tailgate, according to details released by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on Monday.

Officials said the policy aims to address safety concerns after fatal EV accidents where electronic doors reportedly failed to operate and trapped passengers inside vehicles.

The new requirement will take effect on Jan. 1, 2027. For car models that were already approved, carmakers will have until Jan. 1, 2029, to make design changes to match the regulations.

Vehicles including Tesla’s Model Y and Model 3, BMW’s iX3, and other models by many Chinese brands feature retractable car door handles that could be subject to the new rules.

Chris Liu, a Shanghai-based senior analyst at technology research and advisory group Omdia, said the global impact of China’s new rules could be substantial and other jurisdictions may follow suit on retractable door handles. Carmakers will be facing potentially costly redesigns or retrofits.

“China is the first major automotive market to explicitly ban electrical pop-out and press-to-release hidden door handles,” he said. “While other regions have flagged safety concerns, China is the first to formalize this into a national safety standard.”

It’s likely that regulators in Europe and elsewhere will reference or align with China’s approach, Liu said. The new requirements would impact premium EVs more as retractable door handles “are treated as a design and aerodynamic statement,” he added.

A draft of the proposed rules was published by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in September for public comment.

Last year, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration opened an investigation into cases where Tesla’s electronic door handles reportedly failed to work.

Translation

中國將於2027年起禁止汽車使用隱藏式門把手

香港 中國將於明年起禁止汽車使用隱藏式門把手,這種門把手常見於特斯拉電動車和其他許多電動車車型。

根據中國工業和資訊化部周一公佈的細節,除後行李箱門外,所有車門都必須配備機械式開啟裝置。

官員表示,這項政策旨在解決先前發生的電動車致命事故引發的安全隱患,據報道,這些事故中,電子門失靈導致乘客被困在車內。

新規將於202711日生效。對於已核准的車型,汽車製造商可在202911日前進行設計修改,以符合新規。

包括特斯拉Model YModel 3BMWiX3以及眾多中國品牌車型在內的多款汽車都配備了可伸縮門把手,這些門把手可能受到新規的約束。

上海科技研究顧問公司Omdia的高級分析師Chris Liu表示,中國新規的全球影響可能相當巨大,其他地區也可能效仿,對可伸縮門把手進行限制。汽車製造商將面臨成本高昂的重新設計或改裝。

他表示:“中國是首個明確禁止電動彈出式和按壓式隱藏門把手的主要汽車市場; 雖然其他地區也曾提出過安全隱患,但中國是第一個將其正式納入國家安全標準的國家。”

Liu認為,歐洲和其他地區的監管機構很可能會參考或效法中國的做法。他還補充道,由於可伸縮門把手 “被視為設計和空氣動力學的陳述展示” ,因此新規對高端電動車的影響更大。

中國工業和資訊化部於9月發佈了擬議規則的草案,徵求公眾意見。

去年,美國國家公路交通安全管理局對特斯拉電子門把手據稱失靈的案件展開了調查。

So, China will ban hidden door handles on cars that is commonly used on electric vehicles starting next year. It’s likely that regulators in Europe and elsewhere will align with China’s approach. Apparently, for safety reasons, all electric cars should do this.

    

2026年2月17日 星期二

關稅的影響:特朗普的貿易實驗一年後(2/2)

Recently the New York Times reported the following:


The Effects of Tariffs, One Year Into Trump’s Trade Experiment (2/2)

Five charts show the impact on the economy after a year of sweeping trade changes by the Trump administration.

By Ana Swanson - Ana Swanson covers international trade and reports from Washington.

Feb. 2, 2026

Updated 11:34 a.m. ET

(continue)

Mixed results for the factory sector

One goal Mr. Trump hasn’t accomplished is helping factory workers. Despite the tariffs, the manufacturing sector continued to shed jobs last year.

Many of Mr. Trump’s supporters argue that it will take time for factories to be built and this trend to be reversed. They have pointed to recent gains in industrial production and capital expenditure to suggest that the country is on the verge of a manufacturing boom because of tariffs.

But there are reasons to be skeptical. Much of the upturn in industrial production is attributable to growth in the aerospace and electronics sectors, which are among the least burdened by tariffs. For makers of cars and car parts, which have been subject to hefty tariffs, production fell last year. Some manufactures say tariffs are harming them by increasing the cost of the metal and machinery they need to run their factories.

And while spending on the construction of new factories is much higher than before the pandemic, it’s down from the end of the Biden administration, when grants to semiconductor and battery factories were encouraging construction.

There are forces other than tariffs that may be helping industries, like a boom in A.I. data center construction and new tax policies that allow companies to write off the cost of new equipment.

Tariffs have pushed up prices

Unsurprisingly, tariffs pushed up the prices of imported goods last year. Economic tracking shows that prices began climbing particularly after Mr. Trump announced sweeping global tariffs in April, reversing a trend of falling prices in previous months.

The price effects from tariffs have, however, been somewhat smaller than many originally anticipated, partly because companies have been hesitant to raise prices for fear of losing customers.

The picture for U.S. inflation has also improved, partly because of a gradual cool-down for inflation in services. But economists say it would look better without tariffs: By one estimate, the Consumer Price Index in August, which was 2.9 percent, would have been 2.2 percent without tariffs.

Beyond the economic data, many Americans remain concerned about high prices, and they have turned more skeptical of Mr. Trump’s handling of the economy, which has traditionally been a strength for him.

A poll from The New York Times and Siena University in January found that 54 percent of voters oppose Mr. Trump’s tariffs, and 51 percent said the president’s policies had made life less affordable for them.

Translation

關稅的影響:特朗普的貿易實驗一年後(2/2

(繼續)

製造業喜憂參半

特朗普先生未能實現的目標之一是幫助工廠工人。儘管徵收了關稅,製造業去年仍在持續裁員。

特朗普先生的許多支持者認為,工廠的建設和這種趨勢的扭轉需要時間。他們指出,近期工業生產和資本支出的成長表明,由於關稅,美國即將迎來製造業繁榮。

但我們有理由對此持懷疑態度。工業生產的成長主要歸功於航空航太和電子產業的蓬勃發展,這兩個產業受關稅影響最小。而汽車及零件製造商由於受到高關稅的影響,去年的產量有所下降。一些製造商表示,關稅推高了工廠運作所需的金屬和機械設備的成本,損害了他們的利益。

雖然新廠的建設支出遠高於疫情前水平,但仍低於拜登政府末期的水平。當時,政府對半導體和電池工廠的補貼政策刺激了工廠建設。

除了關稅之外,還有其他因素可能也在推動產業發展,例如人工智能數據庫建設的蓬勃發展以及允許企業抵消新設備成本的新稅收政策。

關稅推高了價格

不出所料,關稅推高了去年進口商品的價格。經濟追蹤數據顯示,尤其是在特朗普總統4月宣佈在全球全面徵收關稅之後,價格開始攀升,扭轉了此前幾個月價格下跌的趨勢。

然而,關稅對價格的影響比許多人最初預期的要小一些,部分原因是企業擔心失去客戶而遲遲不願漲價。

美國通膨情勢也有所改善,部分原因是服務業通膨逐漸降溫。但經濟學家表示,如果沒有關稅,情況會更好:據估計,8月的消費者物價指數為2.9%,如果沒有關稅,則應為2.2%

除了經濟數據之外,許多美國人仍然對高物價感到擔憂,並且對特朗普先生的經濟政策越來越持懷疑態度,而經濟政策歷來是他的強項。

《紐約時報》和錫耶納(Siena)大學1月的一項民調顯示,54%的選民反對特朗普先生的關稅政策,51%的選民表示總統的政策讓他們的生活更加難以負擔。

So, over the past year, President Trump carried out what was essentially a grand experiment with the U.S. economy by raising tariffs. The new surcharges have had a significant impact. They have caused businesses to speed up, delay and cancel purchases, or find new countries to source products from. They have raised a significant amount of revenue for the government, much of it from American businesses. And they have caused the U.S. trade deficit to shrink and prices of American goods to rise. At this moment, many Americans remain concerned about high prices and they are still skeptical of Mr. Trump’s handling of the economy.

2026年2月16日 星期一

關稅的影響:特朗普的貿易實驗一年後(1/2)

Recently the New York Times reported the following:


The Effects of Tariffs, One Year Into Trump’s Trade Experiment (1/2)

Five charts show the impact on the economy after a year of sweeping trade changes by the Trump administration.

By Ana Swanson - Ana Swanson covers international trade and reports from Washington.

Feb. 2, 2026

Updated 11:34 a.m. ET

Over the past year, President Trump carried out what was essentially a grand experiment with the U.S. economy, by raising tariffs to levels not seen in a century. It was an exercise that pitted Mr. Trump, a longtime proponent of tariffs, against business owners who paid the levies and mainstream economists who criticized the plan.

America imports trillions of dollars of foreign goods each year, and tariffs are a tax on those purchases. Over the past year, Mr. Trump raised average U.S. tariffs to about 17 percent, the highest level since 1932, in the wake of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Mr. Trump’s stated aim was to reinvigorate American industry and bring jobs back to the United States.

These new surcharges have had a significant impact. They have caused businesses to speed up, delay and cancel purchases, or find new countries to source products from. They have raised a significant amount of revenue for the government, much of it from American businesses. And they have caused the U.S. trade deficit to shrink and prices of American goods to rise. At the same time, they have not yet been the panacea for the factory sector that Mr. Trump had promised.

Here are some of the effects.

Skyrocketing revenue

One of the most tangible effects of Mr. Trump’s trade policy has been a drastic increase in the revenue the government takes in from tariffs. The United States collected an estimated $287 billion in customs duties, taxes and fees last year, nearly triple the amount in 2024.

This amount is still small compared with the more than $2 trillion earned annually from income taxes, but it gives the government a significant new source of money for its spending, whether that’s funding the military or Social Security, or paying interest on the U.S. debt.

There’s an important caveat, however. This money was paid to the government by so-called “importers of record,” most of which are American companies.

While the Trump administration has said that foreign firms will end up paying the tariffs, most economists believe that American businesses and consumers bear most of the burden.

A shrinking trade deficit

Mr. Trump has also sought to decrease the trade deficit, which is the gap between what the United States buys versus what it sells overseas. In recent months, he has succeeded. The trade deficit has fallen significantly, hitting its lowest level since 2009 in October, though it rebounded in November.

The president and his supporters see the trade deficit as a sign of economic weakness, though not all economists agree. While the trade deficit has fallen a lot in recent months, it had surged earlier in the year as Mr. Trump came into office and businesses rushed to bring goods into the country ahead of the tariffs. From January to November, the trade deficit is still up 4.1 percent from the previous year. The question now for economists is where the trade deficit will go from here.

(to be continued)

Translation

關稅的影響:特朗普的貿易實驗一年後1/2

五張圖表展示了特朗普政府推行全面貿易改革一年後對經濟的影響

過去一年,特朗普總統對美國經濟進行了一項堪稱「大實驗」的舉措,將關稅提高到百年未見的水平。這項舉措使長期以來支持關稅的特朗普與繳納關稅的企業擁有者, 以及批評該計劃的主流經濟學家之間產生了衝突。

美國每年進口數兆美元的外國商品,而關稅正是對這些商品徵收的一種稅。過去一年,特朗普先生將美國平均關稅提高至約17%,這是自1932年以來的最高水平,而1932年的關稅水平, 1930年《斯穆特-霍利關稅法》(Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act) 頒佈之後出台。特朗普先生公開表示,他的目標是重振美國產業,並將就業機會帶回美國。

這些新的附加稅產生了顯著影響。它們迫使企業加快採購速度、延遲採購、取消採購,或尋找新的產品來源國。它們為政府帶來了可觀的收入,其中大部分來自美國企業。它們也導至美國貿易逆差縮小,美國商品價格上漲。同時,它們亦未像特朗普先生承諾那樣成為對製造業的靈丹妙藥。

以下是一些影響:

收入飆升

特朗普先生貿易政策最顯著的影響之一是政府從關稅中獲得的收入大幅增加。去年,美國徵收的關稅、稅金和費用估計為2,870億美元,幾乎是2024年金額的三倍。

這筆金額相比每年超過2兆美元的薪俸稅收入仍然很小,但它為政府提供了一筆可觀的新資金來源,用於各種支出,無論是軍事費用、社會保障,還是支付美國國債利息。

然而,需要注意的是,這筆錢是由所謂在「登記冊的進口商」支付給政府的,其中大部分是美國公司。

儘管特朗普政府聲稱最終將由外國公司承擔關稅,但大多數經濟學家認為,美國企業和消費者才是主要負擔。

貿易逆差縮小

特朗普先生也致力於縮小貿易逆差,也就是美國進口額與出口額之間的差額。近幾個月來,他取得了成功。貿易逆差顯著下降,10月份達到2009年以來的最低水平,儘管11月份有所反彈。

總統及其支持者將貿易逆差視為經濟疲軟的標誌,但並非所有經濟學家都認同這一觀點。儘管貿易逆差在近幾個月來大幅下降,但今年早些時候,隨著特朗普上任,企業爭相在關稅生效前將商品運入美國,貿易逆差曾大幅飆升。 1月至11月,貿易逆差仍較上年同期成長4.1%。現在經濟學家面臨的問題是,貿易逆差的未來走向是如何。

(待續)