The shadow of aging Chinese economy, looming "baby boomers" retirement, shrinking domestic demand

Recently Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic version reported the following:

中国経済に高齢化の影　迫る「団塊」退職、しぼむ内需

貿易摩擦 中国・台湾

2020/1/17 23:00日本経済新聞　電子版

中国経済に少子高齢化の影が忍び寄ってきた。17日発表した2019年の実質国内総生産（GDP）成長率は6.1%にとどまり、18年から0.5ポイントも縮小した。米国との貿易戦争が主因だが、生産年齢人口の減少による個人消費の弱含みも無視できない。中国版「団塊の世代」が退職し始める22～23年から下押し圧力は本格化する見通しで、世界第2の経済に大きな重荷となる。

「成長率は依然として世界1位だ」。中国国家統計局の寧吉喆局長は記者会見で1人あたりGDPが1万ドル（約110万円）を突破したと誇った。

ただ、12年の習近平（シー・ジンピン）指導部の発足以降、不自然なほど安定していた成長率は一気に0.5ポイントも落ちた。目を引くのは米国の追加関税で打撃を受けた製造業など第2次産業の成長率が5.7%と0.1ポイントの減速にとどまったの対し、サービスなど第3次産業は6.9%と0.7ポイントも縮小したことだ。

背景にあるのは内需の不振だ。経済成長への消費の寄与度は3.5ポイントと18年より1.5ポイントも縮小し、30年ぶりの低水準だった。成長を支えたのは皮肉にも外需で、寄与度は18年のマイナス0.6ポイントから19年は0.7ポイントに改善した。輸入低迷による「悪い貿易黒字増」がなければ、成長率は5%を割っていた計算だ。

「14億人の巨大市場」に元気がない理由は携帯電話の販売動向から浮かぶ。中国情報通信研究院によると19年の出荷台数は3億8900万台と3年連続で前年割れし、16年からの減少幅は1億7千万台に及ぶ。

実はこのわずか3年間で18～30歳の若者は3千万人も減った。90年代に「一人っ子政策」が浸透し、99年生まれは1400万人と90年生まれ（2800万人）の半分しかいない。スマホや自動車、衣服が売れないのは消費意欲が旺盛な若者の減少も大きな要因だ。

17日発表した19年の出生数は前年比58万人減の1465万人と3年連続で減った。1人の女性が生涯に生む子どもの数を示す「合計特殊出生率」は12～16年平均で1.2程度。出産適齢期の女性も25年までの10年間に約4割減り、出生数の減少は今後も続く。

中国では15～64歳の生産年齢人口は13年の10億人をピークに減り始めた。一人っ子政策で出産を抑えたため、総人口に占める生産年齢人口の比率は10年に75%まで上昇し、日本（ピーク時に70%）よりも高い。一般に生産年齢人口やその比率が拡大すれば、経済成長を押し上げる「人口ボーナス」が働く。中国はそのメリットを最大限に享受してきたが、逆回転が始まる。

高速成長を支えた「農民工」らも頭打ちだ。農村部からの人口流入は都市部でマンションの爆発的な需要を生んだ。だが戸籍のある場所を離れて暮らす「流動人口」は19年末に2億3600万人と5年連続で減った。高齢化した農民工が故郷に帰っているからだ。

中泰証券の李迅雷首席エコノミストは「23年ごろから人口動態の経済への下押し圧力がはっきりする」とみる。約2700万人いる63年生まれが60歳で定年退職するからだ。中国で62～76年生まれは各年2千万人以上いる「団塊の世代」だ。60歳定年が中国では厳格に実施されており、仮に15～59歳を生産年齢人口とすると22年からは毎年約1千万人（約1%）ずつ減る。

問題は生産年齢人口が減り始めたのに、国全体は豊かになっていない「未富先老（豊かになる前に老いる）」だ。生産年齢人口がピークだった1995年の日本の1人あたりGDPは円高もあって米国の1.5倍だったが、13年の中国は米国の7分の1以下だ。

医療や年金など社会保障への財政支出も17年の1.2兆元（約20兆円）から急拡大する。19年には中国社会科学院が「公的年金の積立金が35年に底をつく」との試算を公表した。軍事や治安などの支出も圧迫しそうで、習指導部が掲げる「中華民族の偉大な復興」にも影を投げかける。

（北京=原田逸策）

Translation

The shadow of an aging population was sneaking into the Chinese economy. Real GDP growth in 2019 announced on the 17th was 6.1%, down 0.5 points from 2018.  Mainly due to the trade war with the United States, weakness in personal consumption caused by the shrinking working-age population could not be ignored. In the Chinese version of the baby boomer retirement starting from 2022 to 2023, downward pressure was expected to increase in earnest, placing a heavy burden on the world's second biggest economy.

"Growth is still number one in the world." At the press conference, China's National Statistics Bureau director Ningjii was proud of the fact that GDP per capita exceeded $ 10,000 (About 1.1 million yen).

However, since the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership in 2012, unnatural stable growth rate dropped 0.5 points at a stretch. It was noteworthy that the growth rate of secondary industries such as manufacturing, which was hit by additional U.S. tariffs, slowed down 0.1 points to 5.7%, while tertiary industries such as services shrank 0.7 points to 6.9%.

Behind this was the sluggish domestic demand. The contribution of consumption to economic growth was 3.5 points, down 1.5 points from 2018, being the lowest level in 30 years. Ironically, it was external demand that supported the growth, with a contribution that made an improvement from minus 0.6 point in 2018 to 0.7 point in 2019. Without a "bad trade surplus increase" due to sluggish imports, the growth rate calculation would have been cut by 5 percent.

 The reason why the “1.4 billion giant market” was not doing well was indicated from the mobile phone sales trend. According to the China Institute of Information and Communications, shipments in 2019 were 389 million units, going downward from the previous year for the third consecutive year, and the decreased amount since 2016 reached 170 million units.

In fact, the number of young people aged 18 to 30 had dropped by 30 million in just these three years. The “one child policy” prevailed in the 1990s, with 14 million born in 1999 that was only half of those born in 1990 (28 million). The inability to sell smartphones, cars, and clothing was largely due to a decline in young people with a strong desire to consume.

The number of births in 2019, announced on the 17th, decreased by 580,000 from the previous year to 14.65 million, a consecutive decrease for the third year. The “total fertility rate”, which indicated the number of children a woman had in her lifetime, was around 1.2 on average for 2012 to 2016. The number of women in childbearing age would decrease by about 40% over the 10 years up to 2025, and the number of births would continue to decline.

In China, the working-age population aged 15-64 had begun to decline from the peaking of 1 billion in 2013. As a result of the one-child policy to reduce births, the ratio of working-age population to total population had risen to 75% in 2010, higher than in Japan (70% at peak). In general, if the working-age population and its proportions increased, a "population bonus" would kick in that could boost economic growth. China had enjoyed this benefits to the fullest extent, but a reversal had begun.

 “Peasant workers”, which supported high-speed growth, had reached a plateau. Rural population inflows had created explosive demand for condominiums in urban areas. However, the "moving population" who lived away from their family register decreased to 236 million at the end of 2019 which was a decline for the fifth consecutive year. Aging farmers were returning home.

Lee Xunrai, the chief economist of Zhongtai Securities said "from around 2023, downward pressure on the demographic economy will be clear". About 27 million people born in 1963 would retire at the age of 60. People born in China in 1962-76, with more than 20 million people each year, were the baby boomers. The retirement age of 60 was strictly enforced in China, and if the working age population was between 15 and 59, it might decrease about 10 million (about 1%) people every year from 2022.

  

The problem was that the working-age population had begun to decline, but the whole country was not rich: " Wèi fù xiān lǎo (become old before being rich). In 1995, when the working-age population in Japan was at the peak, its GDP per capita was 1.5 times that of the United States due to the yen's appreciation, but in China in 2013 it was less than one-seventh of the United States.

Fiscal expenditures on social security such as healthcare and pensions standing at 1.2 trillion yuan (about 20 trillion yen) in 2017 had increased sharply. In 2019, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences released an estimate that "public pension reserves will bottom out in 2035." Expenditures on the military and security were likely to be tight, casting a shadow on the "Great Chinese Revival" advocated by Xi’s leadership. (Beijing = Harada Mistake)

              So, China’ economy is beginning its downward trend, probably it will create a game-changing situation globally. Watch out!