US-China: collided with the bedrock, state-led economy could not be given up

Recently the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition reported the following:

米中、突き当たった岩盤　国家主導経済 譲らず

2019/5/12 2:00日本経済新聞　電子版

合意寸前とみられていた米中貿易交渉が暗礁に乗り上げた。ワシントンでの閣僚級協議は平行線に終わり、米国は制裁関税の対象を中国からの全輸入品に広げる「第4弾」の詳細を13日公表すると発表した。両国は交渉継続では一致したが、根底にある国家システムを巡る対立の溝は深い。世界景気の最大のリスクである米中衝突は再び激化する懸念が強まってきた。

「閣僚級での合意は難しい。トランプ米大統領と習近平（シー・ジンピン）国家主席の首脳同士で決着してほしい」

米通商代表部（USTR）で9～10日開いた閣僚級協議。中国の劉鶴副首相はライトハイザーUSTR代表とムニューシン米財務長官を前にこう繰り返すだけだった。米国による制裁関税引き上げ期限をはさんだ瀬戸際の交渉はわずか3時間あまりで終了した。

2018年12月、トランプ氏と習氏は首脳会談で貿易問題の打開策を探る方針で一致した。5カ月間に及んだ閣僚級協議では中国の産業補助金削減や知的財産権保護、為替政策の透明化など7分野で協定文を作成し、150ページの文言を英語、中国語で互いに詰める段階まで進んでいた。

トランプ氏も「歴史的な取引は間近だ」と早期解決を示唆してきたが、5月に入って中国側は協定文の見直しを突如要請した。ライトハイザー氏から報告を受けたトランプ氏は「中国が約束を破った」と激怒し、交渉は一気に暗転した。

「劉氏は共産党内の保守派から集中砲火を浴びている」。北京の外交筋は打ち明ける。5月1日の北京での前回協議を終えて党内に根回しをしたところ、「米国に譲歩しすぎだ」と不満が噴き出した。特に産業補助金の削減には既得権を脅かされる国有企業幹部らの反対が強かったもようだ。

地方政府が補助金で産業を誘致し、経済成長を競い合う仕組みは中国の「国家資本主義」の根幹だ。市場経済を志向する改革派の劉氏には外圧をてこに国内経済の革新を図る思惑もあったとみられる。だが習氏の幼なじみで地方経験もないまま出世してきた同氏へのやっかみも加わり、強い拒否反応を引き起こした。

習氏自身も産業政策の変更に伴う国内法の改正など、国家主権に関わる問題を米国との協定で縛られることに反対したフシがある。香港紙サウスチャイナ・モーニング・ポストによると、習氏は劉氏らが示した対米譲歩案を拒否し、「すべての責任は私が取る」と伝えたという。

農産品の輸入拡大など貿易問題は譲歩しても、共産党の一党支配を揺るがしかねない問題では絶対に譲らない――。米中貿易交渉は最終局面になって中国の体制維持という「岩盤」に突き当たった。

トランプ氏は閣僚級協議の終了後、ツイッターへの投稿で「建設的な協議だった。交渉は続く」と強調した。だがムニューシン氏は記者団に「次回協議の日程は未定だ」と語り、行き詰まり感を漂わせた。

トランプ氏は協議中に「（第4弾の）手続きは始まっている」と投稿するなど、関税を脅しに使う姿勢を再び鮮明にしている。対中交渉の難航を当初から予想していたライトハイザー氏の政権内での影響力も増しており、対中強硬路線に一段と傾く可能性も大きい。

制裁関税第4弾が経済にもたらす衝撃はこれまで以上に大きい。UBSの試算によると、米国がすべての中国製品に25%の追加関税をかけると、中国の国内総生産（GDP）成長率は1.6～2ポイント低下する。景気対策で底打ちの兆しがみられた中国経済が再び急減速し、米経済にも跳ね返りかねない。

米中の関税合戦はすでに経済合理性からは正当化できない規模にエスカレートし、将来の覇権をかけた争いという対立の本質をあらわにし始めている。

Translation

2019/5/12 2:00 Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition

The US-China trade negotiations, which were considered to be nearing an agreement, had run into unseen difficulties. The ministerial-level talks in Washington ended without any agreement, and the United States announced on the 13th that it would release the details of the "fourth wave" that expanded the target of tariff to all imports from China. The two countries had agreed to continue negotiations, but the gap between the two countries over the underlying national system was deep. There was growing concern that the US-China clash, the biggest risk to the global economy, would intensify again.

"Agreement is difficult at the ministerial level. It is hoped that it would be settled in a submit between US President Trump and Chairman Xi Jinping together with the leaders."

Ministerial talks were held on 9th-10th at the US Trade Representative (USTR) office. China's Deputy Prime Minister Liu He was just repeating requests in front of Lighthizer of USTR and US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin. This negotiations which was held on the brink of the United States sanction in the form of tariff increase came to an end in just over three hours.

In December 2018, Trump and Xi agreed at a summit meeting that they would seek solutions to trade problems. The five-month ministerial-level talks reached agreement texts in seven fields such as China's industrial subsidy reduction, intellectual property right protection, currency policy transparency, etc.  It had progressed to a stage where written texts corresponding in English and Chinese of up to 150 pages were reciprocally put together.

Trump had also suggested there could be early resolution, saying "a historical trade is near," but in May, the Chinese suddenly requested a review of the agreement. Mr. Trump, who received a report from Lighthizer, and was furious that "China broke his promise," and the negotiations in one go turned for the worse.

"Mr. Liu is under fire from the conservatives within the Communist Party." This was revealed in Beijing's diplomatic circle. After the last talks, in Beijing on May 1st during a discussion with people concerned in the party, which was being regarded as an informal process of quietly laying the foundation for the proposed changes, dissatisfaction erupted, saying that "too much was given to the United States." In particular, there seemed to have opposition from state-owned business executives who felt their vested interests were threatened when industrial subsidies were to be reduced.

The mechanism in which local governments attracted industries with subsidies and let them compete for economic growth was the basis of China's “national capitalism”. It seemed that Mr. Liu, who was a reformist aiming at the market economy, had a desire to use foreign pressure as a leverage to innovate  domestic economic reforms. However, Liu as Mr. Xi’s childhood friend who did not have local experience since birth, had envy being added on him and a strong rejection response was created.

On revising domestic laws in line with changes in industrial policy etc. and to be bound by an agreement with the United States on matters relating to national sovereignty, Mr. Xi himself also had a different tune. According to the Hong Kong newspaper South China Morning Post, Xi rejected the concession to the US put forward by Liu and others, saying that "I shall take up all the responsibility."

Even concessions might be given on trade issues such as the expansion of imports of agricultural products, matters that could shake the party rule of the Communist Party would never be given up. The US-China trade negotiations reached the final stage and hit the "bedrock" that was maintaining China's system.

After the ministerial-level talks, Mr. Trump emphasized in his post on Twitter that "it was a constructive talk. Negotiations will continue." But Munushin told reporters, "The schedule for the next round of talk is not decided," a sense of deadlock could be felt afloat.

Trump had re-emphasized his attitude to use tariff to threat, such as his posting that "the (fourth wave) procedure is starting” made during the discussion. The influence of Mr. Lighthizer, who had initially anticipated difficulties in negotiations with China, was also increasing within the administration, and there was a great possibility that it would lean further towards hard-line policy on China.

The impact of the fourth sanctions on the economy was greater than ever. According to UBS estimates, China's GDP growth rate would fall 1.6 to 2 points when the US put an additional 25% tariff on all Chinese products. China's economy, which showed signs of bottoming out due to economic stimulus measures, would rapidly decelerate again, and the US economy might also bounce back.

The US-China tariff war had already escalated into a scale that could not be justified by economic rationality, and it had begun to reveal the nature of the confrontation of future wars.

          The above article by Nikkei has given readers a simple summary on the final phase of the Sino-US trade talk that was ended with a dead-lock.