【分析】特朗普的國家安全戰略是對其前任所建立的世界秩序的徹底否定（2/2）

Recently Google News on-line picked up the following:

[Analysis] Trump’s National Security Strategy is a dramatic rejection of the world order his predecessors created (2/2)

The Globe and Mail - 8 Dec 2025

Analysis

By David Shribman - Special to The Globe and Mail (a Canadian newspaper printed in five cities in western and central Canada)

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Even George H.W. Bush’s grandly titled “New World Order,” set forth in a 1991 speech before Congress, didn’t remotely approach Mr. Trump’s panoramic new vision. The Bush conception of a “new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law,” and his plea that “such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children’s future,” could seamlessly be added to the text of John F. Kennedy’s 1963 “peace speech” without a soul discerning the intrusion.

If earlier presidents can be accused of thematic plagiarism from their predecessors, then Mr. Trump can be accused of a heist of Robert Graves’s 1929 dip into disillusionment, in an autobiography written a decade after the end of the First World War and titled Good-Bye to All That.

This “goodbye” comes in perhaps the most remarkable written passage in modern American foreign policy, with implications even greater than Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, drafted during the worldwide conflict that so alienated Mr. Graves.

“Our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the American people saw no connection to the national interest,” the 2025 statement argues. “They overestimated America’s ability to fund, simultaneously, a massive welfare-regulatory-administrative state alongside a massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign aid complex. They placed hugely misguided and destructive bets on globalism and so-called ‘free trade’ that hollowed out the very middle class and industrial base on which American economic and military preeminence depend. They allowed allies and partners to offload the cost of their defense onto the American people, and sometimes to suck us into conflicts and controversies central to their interests but peripheral or irrelevant to our own.”

One element of the Trump doctrine has powerful antecedents in American life: disdain for Europe, a notion dating to the poet Philip Freneau’s 1784 critique of “Europe’s proud, despotic shores.”

Even so, as late as the mid-1960s, American schools gave far more emphasis to teaching French (spoken by a mere six million people in the Western Hemisphere, principally in Quebec) than Spanish (spoken by as many as 200 million in the hemisphere). This was because French was explicitly regarded as the language of diplomacy and spoken by elites from Chopin to Churchill throughout the continent that Mr. Trump has singled out for facing the “stark prospect of civilizational erasure.”

One signal departure: James Monroe didn’t call his 1823 vow to keep European interests from the Western Hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine, Harry Truman didn’t call his 1947 pledge to support nations battling communism the Truman Doctrine, and Mr. Nixon didn’t call his 1969 pledge to honour existing commitments the Nixon Doctrine.

But this document, in classic Trump self-promotion, plainly speaks of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. If the “Trump Corollary” term were added to embellish the President’s image and to establish him as a major figure in American history, it was completely unnecessary. Both this document and the precedent-shattering of the first year of his second term have done that with dramatic effectiveness and steely efficiency.

Translation

特朗普的國家安全戰略是對其前任所建立的世界秩序的徹底否定（2/2）

（繼續）

即使是老布殊在1991年國會演講中提出的、標題宏大的“新世界秩序”，也遠不及特朗普的宏偉新願景。老布殊構想的“新世界秩序，即不同國家為了共同的目標走到一起，實現人類的普遍願望 - 和平與安全、自由和法治”，以及他呼籲“這樣的世界值得我們為它奮鬥，也值得我們子孫後代的未來”，可完全無縫地添加到約翰·F·甘迺迪1963年 的 “和平演講” 中，而不會察覺到任何突兀之處。

如果說之前的總統可以被指責抄襲前人的主題，那麼特朗普也可以被指責剽竊了Robert Graves在1929年陷入失望的自傳《告別這一切》（Good-Bye to All That）中的論述。Robert Graves在第一次世界大戰結束十年後寫下了這部自傳。

這個「告別」或許出自現代美國外交政策中最引人注目的文字，影響甚至超過了Woodrow Wilson在世界大戰期間起草, 令Graves深感反感的「十四點原則」。

2025年的聲明如此寫道: 「我們的精英十分錯誤地估計美國願意永遠承擔全球重擔的意願，而美國人民認為這些重擔與國家利益毫無關聯」。「他們高估了美國同時維持龐大的福利、監管和行政體係以及龐大的軍事、外交、情報和對外援助體系的能力。精英們對全球化和所謂的「自由貿易」進行了極其錯誤且具有破壞性的押注，導緻美國賴以維持經濟和軍事霸權的中產階級和工業基礎被掏空。他們允許盟友和夥伴將國防開支轉嫁給美國人民，有時甚至將我們拖入對他們自身利益至關重要, 但對我們美國自身利益無關緊要的衝突和爭議中」。

特朗普主義的一個要素在美國社會有著深遠的淵源：對歐洲的蔑視。這個概念可以追溯到詩人Philip Freneau 1784 年對「歐洲驕傲的專制海岸」的批判。

即便如此，直到1960年代中期，美國學校仍然更重視法語（西半球僅有600萬人使用，主要集中在魁北克省）的學習，而非西班牙語（西半球有多達2億人使用）。這是因為法語被明確視為外交語言，從蕭邦到邱吉爾，整個歐洲大陸的精英都使用法語，而特朗普特別指出，該地區正面臨「文明被抹掉的嚴峻前景」。

一個顯著的例外是：James Monroe並沒有將他1823年關於阻止歐洲利益染指西半球的承諾稱為“門羅主義”，Harry Truman也沒有將他1947年關於支持與共產主義作鬥爭的國家的承諾稱為“杜魯門主義”，Nixon也沒有將他1969年關於履行現有誓約的承諾稱為“尼克遜主義”。

但這份文件，以典型的特朗普式自我宣傳手法，直白地提出了「特朗普對門羅主義的附加條款」。如果「特朗普附加條款」一詞的加入是為了美化總統形象，將他塑造成美國歷史上的重要人物，那完全沒有必要。這份文件以及他第二任期第一年打破先例的種種舉措，已經以驚人的效力和堅定的效率達到了這一目的。

So, Donald Trump is taking steps to change world politics. David Shribman concludes that Trump’s 33-page National Security Strategy document amounts to a repudiation of the core precepts of three-quarters of a century of American foreign policy, and the world order that Mr. Trump’s predecessors have created. Apparently, Trump is still very interest in keeping a strong US presence globally from a new perspective: trying to acquire Greenland to protect American interests, deterring Chinese expansion by arming Taiwan, trying to “clean up” the mess in south American countries, the backyard of the US.