俄羅斯人正在接受普京在烏克蘭的戰爭 (1/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

Russians Are Coming to Terms With Putin’s War in Ukraine (1/2)

Bloomberg News

Tue, May 7, 2024 at 4:08 a.m. PDT·7 min read

(Bloomberg) -- Russians are learning to live with the war that Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Ukraine.

With Putin being sworn in on Tuesday for another six years as president, the invasion has become part of everyday life for many Russians, confounding expectations that the pressure of international sanctions and deepening isolation would eventually turn them against him. Far from protesting, many are rallying around the flag.

The Kremlin is using Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II to reshape Russia, combining strident nationalism involving a potent mix of Soviet-era and imperial nostalgia with an intensifying crackdown on dissent. As a result, Putin faces little domestic pressure to end the fighting despite massive military casualties, posing a challenge for Ukraine’s US and European allies as they seek to raise the cost for Russia of continuing the war that’s now in its third year.

That’s in sharp contrast to the first months after the February 2022 invasion when many Russians reacted with anger, depression and shock, according to Anna Kuleshova, a sociologist at the Social Foresight Group who left Russia when the war started and now lives in Luxembourg.

“When there is no way out of a situation with dignity, there is no way to leave, and there is a need to earn money and raise children, then it’s easier to accept a new reality than to resist it endlessly,” Kuleshova said.

The war has permeated every level of Russian society. In many schools, children send gifts and letters to frontline soldiers, and must attend special lessons where teachers drum home the Kremlin’s message that the country is at war with the West in Ukraine and acted to defend itself by carrying out the unprovoked invasion.

TV and radio shows are often filled with war themes, casting those fighting in Ukraine as successors of the generation that defeated the Nazi German invasion in the “Great Patriotic War,” ignoring the fact that Russia is the aggressor this time. Army recruitment campaigns offer lucrative signing bonuses and salaries for those who’ll “be a man” and join up as contract soldiers.

Platon Mamatov, 41, signed a contract in April to return to Ukraine after spending six months at the front last year. He said people in his native Urals city of Ekaterinburg often approach him to offer help and support when they see him in uniform. While not everyone supports the invasion, there’s been a “consolidation of society” behind the army, he said.

“Everyone realized that this is a war and that it concerns everyone,” he said. “Border territories are shelled daily, factories are burning inside Russia, drones are flying, funerals and disabled people are coming back from the front.”

Putin declared his intention to form a new political and business elite from those “who have proved their loyalty to Russia” in the war shortly before he gained a fifth term with a record 87% in the March presidential election. The Kremlin presented the pre-determined election in which he faced no real competition as evidence the public fully supports Putin’s showdown with the West.

Sanctions failed “to create enough economic discomfort at the personal level, to expose to Russians the link between the wars they launch and the erosion of their own wellbeing,” said Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. The impact on Russians’ living standards is “too small to radically change the public mood,” she said.

Indeed, as Russia adjusted to the unprecedented sanctions that failed to collapse its economy, many Russians found a financial upside to the war. Deepening labor shortages exacerbated by the military’s demand for recruits have added to spiraling wage pressures as businesses hike salaries to retain staff or fill vacancies.

Russia’s war economy is growing strongly for now as the government pours money into the defense industry and seeks to shield domestic businesses from the impact of sanctions. The Kremlin continues to reap income from oil and gas sales, pivoting to countries such as India and China after Europe shunned Russian energy.

“Indicators of public sentiment about the socio-economic situation are at the level of 2008, the peak of Putin’s stability,” said Denis Volkov, director of the independent Levada Center pollster, referring to the energy-driven consumer boom during the president’s first two terms. “The state spends huge resources on creating the feeling that everything is in order, that we live as usual.”

Still, Russia is using up reserves in its national wealth fund to support surging state expenditure, while inflation is running at almost twice the central bank’s 4% target. The Bank of Russia has hiked the key interest rate to 16% and the government has imposed capital controls to ease pressure on the ruble.

(to be continued)

Translation

（彭博）—俄羅斯人正在學會與普京在烏克蘭發動的戰爭共存。

隨著普京週二宣誓就任總統另一個六年，入侵已成為許多俄羅斯人日常生活的一部分，這打破了人們的預期，即國際制裁的壓力和日益加深的孤立最終會讓他們反對他。 許多人非但沒有抗議，反而作出幫助或支持。

克里姆林宮正在利用二戰以來歐洲最嚴重的衝突來重塑俄羅斯，將強烈的民族主義與對異議的嚴厲鎮壓結合起來，其中強烈地融合了蘇聯時代和帝國懷舊情緒。 因此，儘管造成大量軍事人員傷亡，普京在國內幾乎沒有面臨結束戰鬥的壓力，這對烏克蘭的美國和歐洲盟友構成了挑戰，因為他們試圖提高俄羅斯繼續這場現已進入第三年的戰爭的成本。

Social Foresight Group 的社會學家 Anna Kuleshova 表示，這與2022 年2 月入侵後的頭幾個月形成鮮明對比，當時許多俄羅斯人的反應是憤怒、沮喪和震驚。她在戰爭開始時離開了俄羅斯，現在住在盧森堡。

Kuleshova說： “當無法有尊嚴地擺脫困境、無法離開、需要賺錢和撫養孩子時，接受新的現實比無休止地抵抗更容易。”

戰爭已經滲透到俄羅斯社會的各個層面。 在許多學校，孩子們給前線士兵禮物和信件，並且必須參加特殊課程，老師們會向老師們灌輸克里姆林宮的信息，即該正國在烏克蘭與西方國家交戰，並透過在没有被挑舋之下去入侵烏克蘭來保衛自己。

電視和廣播節目常常充斥著戰爭主題，將烏克蘭的戰鬥人員描繪成在「衛國戰爭」中擊敗納粹德國入侵的一代人的接班人，而忽略了這次侵略者是俄羅斯的事實。 陸軍徵兵活動為那些將「成為真漢子」並作為合約士兵加入的人, 提供豐厚的簽約獎金和薪水。

41 歲Platon Mamatov 去年在前線服役了六個月後，於 4 月簽署了返回烏克蘭的合約。 他說，他的家鄉烏拉爾市 Ekaterinburg 的人們在看到他穿著制服時, 經常向他提供幫助和支持。 他說，雖然並非所有人都支持入侵，但軍隊背後有「社會的堅實」支持。

他說: 「每個人都意識到這是一場戰爭，它關係到每個人」。 「邊境地區每天都遭到砲擊，俄羅斯境內的工廠在燃燒，無人機在飛行，舉行葬禮, 和殘疾人從前線回來」。

普京在3月份的總統選舉中以創紀錄的87%的支持率獲得第五個任期前不久，宣布打算從那些在戰爭中「證明了對俄羅斯忠誠」的人中組建新的政治和商業精英。 克里姆林宮利用了一個他沒有真正競爭, 預先確定結果的選舉，作為公眾完全支持普京與西方攤牌的證據。

位於華盛頓的戰略與國際研究中心的歐洲,俄羅斯和歐亞計劃高級研究員 Maria Snegovaya 表示，制裁未能「在個人層面上造成足夠的經濟不適，也未能讓俄羅斯人認識到他們發動的戰爭與自身福祉受到侵蝕之間的關聯」。 她說，制裁對俄羅斯人生活水平的影響「太小，無法從根本上改變公眾情緒」。

事實上，隨著俄羅斯適應前所未有的制裁，它未能使其經濟崩潰，許多俄羅斯人發現了戰爭帶來的經濟好處。 軍方對新兵的需求加劇了勞動力短缺，隨著企業提高薪資以留住員工或填補空缺，薪資壓力不斷上升。

隨著政府向國防工業投入資金,並尋求保護國內企業免受制裁的影響，俄羅斯的戰時經濟目前正在強勁成長。克里姆林宮繼續從石油和天然氣銷售中獲得收入, 在歐洲避開俄羅斯能源後，將焦點轉向印度和中國等國家。

獨立的 Levada Center民調機構主任Denis Volkov表示：「公眾對社會經濟狀況的情緒指標處於2008 年的水平，即普京穩定的頂峰。」他指的是總統前兩屆任期內由能源驅動的消費熱潮。 “國家花費了大量資源來營造一切都井然有序、我們如常生活的感覺。”

儘管如此，俄羅斯仍在動用其國家財富基金的儲備來支持激增的國家支出，而通膨率幾乎是央行 4% 目標的兩倍。 俄羅斯央行將關鍵利率上調至16%，政府實施資本管制以緩解對盧布的壓力。

(to be continued)

Note:

1. Anna KULESHOVA is an independent researcher as disclosed in her web-site. She says that she also holds the position of Chairwoman at the Russian Council on the Ethics of Scientific Publications and is the founder of Social Researchers Across Borders. Her contributions extend to the literary world as a co-author of “Open Question: Public Opinion Polls in the Modern History of Russia” and “Parenthood 2.0”. Her collaboration in international research projects includes partnerships with eminent scientists from Hanguk University, Seoul. (https://kuleshova.org/)

北韓武器正在殺害烏克蘭人。 意義深遠 (2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger (2/2)

BBC Jean Mackenzie - Seoul correspondent

Sun, May 5, 2024 at 1:49 a.m. PDT·9 min read

(continue)

Even so, Mr Byrne was frustrated to learn how many components in the missile had come from the West. It proved that North Korea's procurement networks were more robust and effective than even he, who investigates these networks, had realised.

From his experience, North Koreans based overseas set up fake companies in Hong Kong or other central Asian countries to buy the items using predominantly stolen cash. They then send the products onto North Korea, usually over its border with China. If a fake company is discovered and sanctioned, another will quickly pop up in its place.

Sanctions have long been considered an imperfect tool to combat these networks, but to have any hope of working they need to be regularly updated and enforced. Both Russia and China have refused to impose new sanctions on North Korea since 2017.

By buying Pyongyang's weapons, Moscow is now violating the very sanctions it once voted for as a member of the UN Security Council. Then earlier this year it effectively disbanded a UN panel that monitored sanctions breaches, likely to avoid scrutiny.

"We are witnessing the real-time crumbling of UN sanctions against North Korea, which buys Pyongyang a lot of breathing space", Mr Byrne said.

All this has implications that reach far beyond the war in Ukraine.

"The real winners here are the North Koreans", said Mr Byrne. "They have helped the Russians in a significant way, and this has bought them a tonne of leverage".

In March, RUSI documented large amounts of oil being shipped from Russia to North Korea, while railcars filled with what are thought to be rice and flour have been spotted crossing the countries' land border. This deal, thought to be worth hundreds of millions of pounds, will boost not only Pyongyang's economy, but its military.

Russia could also supply the North with the raw materials to continue making its missiles, or even military equipment such a fighter jets, and - at the most extreme end - the technical assistance to improve its nuclear weapons.

Additionally, the North is getting the chance to test its latest missiles in a real-war scenario for the first time. With this valuable data, it will be able to make them better.

Pyongyang: A major missile supplier?

More troubling still is that the war is providing North Korea with a shop window to the rest of the world.

Now that Pyongyang is mass producing these weapons, it will want to sell them to more countries, and if the missiles are good enough for Russia, they will be good enough for others, said Dr Lewis - especially as the Russians are setting the example that it is okay to violate sanctions.

He predicts going forward that North Korea will become a big supplier of missiles to countries in the China-Russia-Iran bloc. In the wake of Iran's assault on Israel this month, the US said it was "incredibly concerned" that North Korea could be working with Iran on its nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes.

"I see a lot of gloomy faces when we talk about this problem," said Mr Spleeters. "But the good news is that now we know how reliant they are on foreign technology, we can do something about it".

 Mr Spleeters is optimistic that by working with manufacturers they can cut off North Korea's supply chains. His team has already succeeded in identifying and shutting down an illicit network before it was able to complete a critical sale.

But Dr Lewis is not convinced.

"We can make it harder, more inconvenient, maybe raise the cost, but none of this is going to prevent North Korea from making these weapons," he said, adding that the West had ultimately failed in its attempt to contain the rogue state.

Now not only are its missiles a source of prestige and political power, but they are also generating it vast amounts of money, Dr Lewis explained. So why would Kim Jong Un ever give them up now?

Translation

（繼續）

即便如此，Byrne先生還是對得知飛彈中有多少部件來自西方感到沮喪。 事實證明，北韓的採購網絡比負責調查這些網路的他所意識到的還要強大和有效。

根據他的經驗，駐紮在海外的北韓人在香港或其他中亞國家設立假公司，主要使用偷來的現金購買這些物品。 然後他們將產品運送到北韓，通常是越過與中國的邊界。 如果一家假公司被發現並受到製裁，另一家公司很快就會出現取代它的位置。

長期以來，制裁一直被認為是打擊這些網路的不完美工具，要發揮作用，制裁就需要定期更新和執行。 自2017年以來，俄羅斯和中國都拒絕對北韓實施新的製裁。

莫斯科由於購買平壤的武器，現在違反了它曾經作為聯合國安理會成員投票支持的制裁措施。 今年早些時候，它實際上解散了一個負責監測違反制裁行為的聯合國小組，莫斯科由此能避開受到審查。

Byrne表示： “我們正在目睹聯合國對北韓制裁的即時崩潰，這為平壤贏得了許多喘息空間。”

所有這一切的影響遠遠超出了烏克蘭戰爭的範圍。

Byrne先生說: 「這裡真正的贏家是北韓」。 「他們重要地幫助了俄羅斯，為他們贏得了巨大的籌碼」。

今年 3 月，RUSI 記錄了大量石油從俄羅斯運往北韓，同時也發現裝滿米和麵粉的鐵路車穿越兩國陸地邊界。 這筆交易被認為價值數億英鎊，不僅將促進平壤的經濟，而且還將促進其軍事。

俄羅斯還可以向北韓提供繼續製造飛彈的原材料，甚至是戰鬥機等軍事裝備，並且在最極端的情況下，提供改進其核武的技術援助。

此外，北韓首次有機會在真實戰爭場景中測試其最新飛彈。 有了這些有價值的數據，就能讓他們變得更優良。

平壤：主要飛彈供應者？

更令人不安的是，這場戰爭為北韓向世界其他地區提供了一個購物窗口。

Lewis博士說，既然平壤正在大規模生產這些武器，它就會想把它們賣給更多的國家，如果這些飛彈對俄羅斯來說足夠好，那麼對其他國家來說也足夠好 - 特別是當俄羅斯人正在樹立榜樣:違反制裁是可以的。

他預測，北韓未來將成為中國、俄羅斯、伊朗集團國家的飛彈主要供應國。 在伊朗本月攻擊以色列後，美國表示「極度擔心」北韓可能與伊朗合作進行核武和彈道武器計劃。

Spleeters 先生說: 「當我們談論這個問題時，我看到很多沉重的面孔」。 「但好消息是，現在我們知道他們對外國技術的依賴程度，我們可以採取一些措施」。

Spleeters 樂觀地認為，透過與製造商合作，他們可以切斷北韓的供應鏈。 他的團隊已經成功地在非法網路能夠完成關鍵銷售之前, 識別並關閉了該網路。

但 Lewis 博士並不相信。

他說：「我們可以令銷售變得更困難、更不方便，也許會提高成本，但這都無法阻止北韓製造這些武器」。他補充說，西方遏制這個流氓國家的嘗試最終失敗了。

Lewis 博士解釋說，現在它的飛彈不僅是聲望和政治權力的來源，而且還為其帶來了大量資金。 那麼金正恩為什麼現在要放棄它們呢？

So, according to this article, the real winners are the North Koreans. Their missiles have helped the Russians in a significant way, and this has bought them a tonne of leverage. Missiles boost not only Pyongyang's economy, but its military. the North Koreans are getting the chance to test the latest missiles in a real-war scenario for the first time. There is a chance that the war will provide North Korea a shopping window to the rest of the world. To the north Korean, missile is source of prestige and political power, they can generate vast amounts of money, there is little reason for Kim Jong Un to give them up. Obviously, the Ukraine war is strengthening the alliance between Russia, China, and North Korea.

北韓武器正在殺害烏克蘭人。意義深遠 (1/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger (1/2)

 BBC Jean Mackenzie - Seoul correspondent

Sun, May 5, 2024 at 1:49 a.m. PDT·9 min read

On 2 January, a young Ukrainian weapons inspector, Khrystyna Kimachuk, got word that an unusual-looking missile had crashed into a building in the city of Kharkiv. She began calling her contacts in the Ukrainian military, desperate to get her hands on it. Within a week, she had the mangled debris splayed out in front of her at a secure location in the capital Kyiv.

She began taking it apart and photographing every piece, including the screws and computer chips smaller than her fingernails. She could tell almost immediately this was not a Russian missile, but her challenge was to prove it.

Buried amidst the mess of metal and spouting wires, Ms Kimachuk spotted a tiny character from the Korean alphabet. Then she came across a more telling detail. The number 112 had been stamped onto parts of the shell. This corresponds to the year 2023 in the North Korean calendar. She realised she was looking at the first piece of hard evidence that North Korean weapons were being used to attack her country.

"We'd heard they had delivered some weapons to Russia, but I could see it, touch it, investigate it, in a way no-one had been able to do before. This was very exciting", she told me over the phone from Kyiv.

Since then, the Ukrainian military says dozens of North Korean missiles have been fired by Russia into its territory. They have killed at least 24 people and injured more than 70.

For all the recent talk of Kim Jong Un preparing to start a nuclear war, the more immediate threat is now North Korea's ability to fuel existing wars and feed global instability.

Ms Kimachuk works for Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an organisation that retrieves weapons used in war, to work out how they were made. But it wasn't until after she had finished photographing the wreckage of the missile and her team analysed its hundreds of components, that the most jaw-dropping revelation came.

It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.

"This was the biggest surprise, that despite being under severe sanctions for almost two decades, North Korea is still managing to get its hands on all it needs to make its weapons, and with extraordinary speed," said Damien Spleeters, the deputy director at CAR.

Over in London, Joseph Byrne, a North Korea expert at the defence think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), was equally stunned.

"I never thought I would see North Korean ballistic missiles being used to kill people on European soil," he said. He and his team at RUSI have been tracking the shipment of North Korean weapons to Russia ever since Mr Kim met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Russia in September of last year to strike a suspected arms deal.

Using satellite imagery, they have been able to observe four Russian cargo ships shuttling back and forth between North Korea and a Russian military port, loaded with hundreds of containers at a time.

In total RUSI estimates 7,000 containers have been sent, filled with more than a million ammunition shells and grad rockets - the sort that can be fired out of trucks in large volleys. Their assessments are backed up by intelligence from the US, UK and South Korea, though Russia and North Korea have denied the trade.

"These shells and rockets are some of the most sought-after things in the world today and are allowing Russia to keep pounding Ukrainian cities at a time when the US and Europe have been faltering over what weapons to contribute," Mr Byrne said.

Buying and firing

But it is the arrival of ballistic missiles on the battlefield that has concerned Mr Byrne and his colleagues the most, because of what they reveal about North Korea's weapons programme.

Since the 1980s North Korea has sold its weapons abroad, largely to countries in the North Africa and the Middle East, including Libya, Syria and Iran. They have tended to be old, Soviet-style missiles with a poor reputation. There is evidence that Hamas fighters likely used some of Pyongyang's old rocket-propelled grenades in their attack last 7 October.

But the missile fired on 2 January, that Ms Kimachuk took apart, was seemingly Pyongyang's most sophisticated short-range missile - the Hwasong 11 - capable of travelling up to 700km (435 miles).

Although the Ukrainians have downplayed their accuracy, Dr Jeffrey Lewis, an expert in North Korean weapons and non-proliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, says they appear to be not much worse than the Russian missiles.

The advantage of these missiles is that they are extremely cheap, explained Dr Lewis. This means you can buy more and fire more, in the hope of overwhelming air defences, which is exactly what the Russians appear to be doing.

This then raises the question of how many of these missiles the North Koreans can produce. The South Korean government recently observed North Korea has sent 6,700 containers of munitions to Russia, it says that Pyongyang's weapons factories were operating at full-tilt, and Dr Lewis, who has been studying these factories through satellites, reckons they can churn out a few hundred a year.

Still reeling from their discovery, Mr Spleeters and his team are now trying to work out how this is possible, given that companies are banned from selling parts to North Korea.

Many of the computer chips that are integral to modern weapons, that guide them through the air to their intended targets, are the same chips that are used to power our phones, washing machines and cars, Mr Spleeters explained.

These are being sold all over the world in staggering numbers. Manufacturers sell to distributors in their billions, who sell them on in their millions, meaning they often have no idea where their products end up.

(to be continued)

Translation

1 月 2 日，一名年輕的烏克蘭武器檢查員 Khrystyna Kimachuk 獲悉，一枚看起來不尋常的導彈墜入了哈爾科夫市的一座建築物。 她開始給烏克蘭軍方的聯絡人打電話，迫切地想得到它。 一週之內，在首都基輔的一個安全地點, 殘破的碎片在她面前攤開出來。

她開始把它拆開並拍攝每一個部件，包括比她指甲還小的螺絲和電腦晶片。 她幾乎立刻就能看出這不是俄羅斯飛彈，但她面臨的挑戰是證明這一點。

Kimachuk 女士埋在一堆金屬和湧出的電線中，發現了韓文字中的一個細小字母。 然後她發現了一個更能說明問題的細節。 外殼的部分部位印有數字 112。 這相當於朝鮮曆法的 2023 年。 她意識到她正在尋找北韓武器被用來攻擊她的國家的第一個確鑿證據。

她在來自基輔的電話告訴我: “我們都有聽說他們向俄羅斯運送了一些武器，但我可以看到它、觸摸它、調查它，這是一種前人沒有能夠做到的方式。這非常令人興奮” 。

此後，烏克蘭軍方表示，俄羅斯已向烏克蘭境內發射了數十枚北韓飛彈。 他們已造成至少 24 人死亡、70 多人受傷。

儘管最近有很多關於金正恩準備發動核戰的言論，但現在更直接的威脅是北韓助長現有戰爭, 和加劇全球不穩定的能力。

Kimachuk 女士在衝突軍備研究 (CAR) 工作，該組織負責回收戰爭中使用的武器，以查明這些武器的製造方式。 但直到她拍攝完導彈殘骸,而她的團隊分析了導彈的數百個部件後，最令人瞠目結舌的發現才出現。

它充满最新的外國技術。大多數電子零件都在在前幾年在美國同歐洲製造。 甚至有在2023年3月才生產出的美國電腦芯片。 意味着朝鮮非法採購重要的武器部件，把它們偷偷運回到該国，組裝導彈，然後秘密運往俄羅斯，然後從那處被運送到前線並發射 - 所有都是在幾個月內完成。

CAR 的副主任 Damien Spleeters 說: 「這是最大的出奇，儘管近二十年來一直受到嚴厲制裁，北韓仍然設法以驚人的速度獲得製造武器所需的一切」。

在倫敦，國防智庫皇家聯合軍種研究所 (RUSI) 的北韓問題專家 Joseph Byrne 同樣感到震驚。

他說: 「我從未想過會看到北韓彈道飛彈被用來在歐洲土地上殺人」。 自去年 9 月金正恩在俄羅斯會見俄羅斯總統普京, 並達成一項可疑的武器交易以來，他和他的 RUSI 團隊一直在追蹤北韓武器運往俄羅斯的情況。

利用衛星影像，他們能夠觀察到四艘俄羅斯貨船在北韓和俄羅斯軍港之間來回穿梭，每次裝載數百個貨櫃。

RUSI 估計總共發送了 7,000 個貨櫃，裡面裝滿了超過 100 萬枚彈藥和級火箭 - 可以從卡車上進行大規模齊射的那種。 他們的評估得到了美國、英國和韓國情報的支持，儘管俄羅斯和北韓否認了這項貿易。

Byrne表示： “這些砲彈和火​​箭是當今世界上最受歡迎的東西，在美國和歐洲一直在猶豫要提供什麼武器的時候，俄羅斯可以繼續襲擊烏克蘭城市。”

購買和發射

但最讓Byrne先生和他的同事們擔憂的是彈道飛彈抵達戰場的事實，因為他們揭露了北韓的武器計劃。

自 1980 年代以來，北韓已向國外出售武器，主要銷往北非和中東國家，包括利比亞、敘利亞和伊朗。 它們往往是老式的蘇聯式飛彈，聲譽不佳。 有證據表明，哈馬斯武裝分子在去年 10 月 7 日的襲擊中可能使用了平壤的一些舊火箭推進式手榴彈。

但 Kimachuk 女士拆解的 1 月 2 日發射的飛彈似乎是平壤最先進的短程飛彈 - 火星 11 - 射程可達 700 公里（435 英里）。

儘管烏克蘭人對飛彈的準確性不放在心，但 Middlebury 國際研究學院北韓武器和防擴散專家Jeffrey Lewis 博士表示，它們似乎不並比俄羅斯的飛彈更差劣。

Lewis 博士解釋說，這些飛彈的優點是極其便宜。 這意味著你可以購買更多並發射更多，以期壓倒防空系統，而這似乎是俄羅斯人正在做的事情。

這就引出了北韓能夠生產多少飛彈的問題。 南韓政府最近觀察到北韓已向俄羅斯運送了6,700個貨櫃的彈藥，並稱平壤的武器工廠正在全速運作，Lewis博士一直透過衛星研究這些工廠，認為他們一年可以生產幾百個貨櫃。

Spleeters與他的團隊對發現感到震驚，仍然試圖弄清楚這怎可能發生，因為公司是被禁止向北韓出售零件。

Spleeters先生解釋說，許多現代武器不可或缺的電腦晶片, 即用以引導武器在空中到達預定目標那種, 是與為我們的手機、洗衣機和汽車提供動力的晶片相同。

這些產品銷往世界各地，數量驚人。 製造商以數十億美元的價格賣給分銷商，分銷商又以數百萬美元的價格出售它，這意味著他們常常不知道自己的產品最終去了哪裡。

（待續）

中國數十億資金幫助習近平在東歐結交有用的朋友 (2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

China’s Billions Help Xi Make Useful Friends in Eastern Europe (2/2)

Andrea Dudik, Misha Savic and Marton Kasnyik

Sun, May 5, 2024 at 9:00 p.m. PDT·8 min read

(continue)

Orban has consistently vetoed the EU’s statements critical of Beijing. For him, the links with China are part of his “Eastern opening” strategy of boosting ties, often by leveraging Hungary’s membership in the EU, which grants the nation a veto over some of the most important decisions. Hungary also gives Chinese investors access to the world’s largest trading bloc.

“Many talk about decoupling and de-risking these days, which means isolating Europe’s economy from China’s,” Orban told the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October, where he was the only EU leader in attendance. “Those who support connectivity, like Hungary, reject that policy.”

The country wants to add projects to the Belt and Road cooperation in the areas of logistics, infrastructure development and the expansion of electric vehicle charging stations, Economy Minister Marton Nagy said last week.

The danger is that China will have too much leverage over the Hungarian government, which is already “absolutely subservient,” according to Hegedus at the German Marshall Fund.

Links with China also stretch beyond money. Hungary has been home to the region’s biggest Chinese minority of about 20,000. The Jegenye street area in Budapest’s 10th district is full of discrete Chinese-owned shops, stores and restaurants in former industrial buildings, an improvement from the old Chinese market that closed just over a decade ago.

The first and biggest wave of Chinese arrived following the Tiananmen Square crackdown just as Hungary was transitioning from communism to democracy. Thousands more arrived via a Golden Visa program Hungary opened in 2013 and which the government is looking to restart this year.

Other moves have been more controversial. Three years ago, thousands of Hungarians rallied against a plan to finance the private campus of Fudan University in Budapest with taxpayer funds. Hungary has also allowed Chinese police officers to patrol its streets, ostensibly to help Hungarian counterparts liaise with the community.

In Serbia, the relationship also runs deeper than money. China won public praise for support during the coronavirus pandemic after it shipped Sinopharm vaccines, as it did to Hungary. China has invested $5.5 billion, mainly into copper mining and a steel processing plant, and the impact is very visible.

A case in point is Bor, Serbia’s main mining hub, which was a desolate place in a pariah state under international sanctions following the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Even after then-Yugoslavia’s isolation ended in 2000, the government-owned RTB Bor mining and smelting complex was struggling with debt and unable to fix its decrepit, polluting facilities that caused acid rain.

The plant’s fate changed in 2018, when China’s Zijin Mining bought a majority of RTB Bor with a pledge to inject at least $1.5 billion. Six years later, the city’s grimy facades are scrubbed and repainted. The mining complex rebounded to employ more than 6,000, offering average net pay of $1,300 a month, more than 50% above the national average.

Local real estate prices have almost tripled since the takeover, while dust and sulfur-oxide pollution are under legal limits for the first time in decades. Banners around the facility tell workers their safety paramount. Zijin plans to make the Serbian facility into the biggest copper producer in Europe by 2030, Chen Jinghe, the company’s chairman, said in late April.

“Every part of our production has been upgraded, modernized,” said Nemanja Anicic, a 42-year-old manager of the open-pit Krivelj mine, the biggest in Serbia, as he watched screens in the control room that monitor every truck and bulldozer roaming the vast pit. “It’s a rebirth for the industry.”

Serbia’s turn toward China reflects the need for investment with EU membership looking further out. China is Serbia’s biggest trading partner after Germany, with exports and imports totaling $6.2 billion last year.

Bilateral trade deals will end once the country joins the EU, Vucic pledged last year, but in the meantime “we have to live before EU accession.”

The rail link north from Belgrade shows how the country is doing it: On the way to Novi Sad, the high-speed train goes over a bridge rebuilt with EU funds to replace the one destroyed by NATO in 1999.

“You can cooperate” with China, said Bojan Stanic, assistant director for strategic analysis and data at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, “and still have your independence, your European values.”

--With assistance from Zoltan Simon, Ania Nussbaum and Tom Fevrier.

Translation

（繼續）

歐爾班一貫否決歐盟批評北京的聲明。 對他來說，與中國的聯繫, 是他去加強關係的「東方開放」策略的一部分，通常是利用匈牙利的歐盟成員國身份，這賦予了該國對一些最重要決定的否決權。 匈牙利也為中國投資者提供了進入全球最大貿易區的機會。

歐爾班十月份在北京舉行的「一帶一路」論壇上表示: 「現在很多人都在談論脫鉤和去風險，這意味著將歐洲經濟與中國經濟隔離」; 他是唯一出席該論壇的歐盟領導人。 「像匈牙利這樣支持互聯互通的國家是會拒絕這項政策」。

經濟部長 Marton Nagy 上週表示，該國希望在物流、基礎設施發展和擴建電動車充電站等領域增加「一帶一路」合作項目。

德國馬歇爾基金會的 Hegedus 表示，危險在於中國將對匈牙利政府擁有過多的影響力，而匈牙利政府已經「絕對順從」。

匈牙利與中國的聯繫也不僅限於金錢。 匈牙利是該地區最大的華人少數民族的家園，人口約 20,000 人。 布達佩斯第 10 區的 Jegenye 街區, 前身是工業大厦遍布着離散的中國人開的商店、雜貨和餐館，這是對十多年前已關閉的舊中國市場的改進。

天安門廣場鎮壓之後，第一批也是規模最大的中國人抵達匈牙利，當時匈牙利正從共產主義過渡到民主。 還有數千人透過匈牙利於 2013 年啟動的黃金簽證計劃抵達，該國政府希望在今年重新啟動該計劃。

其他措施則更具爭議性。 三年前，數千名匈牙利人舉行集會，反對用納稅人的資金資助布達佩斯復旦大學私立校園的計劃 。 匈牙利也允許中國警察在街上巡邏，表面上是為了幫助匈牙利同行與社區聯絡。

在塞爾維亞，關係也比金錢更深入。 正如曾對匈牙利所做出的, 中國運送出國藥疫苗 。 之後中國在冠狀病毒大流行期間作出的支持, 贏得了公眾讚譽。 中國已投資55億美元，主要用於銅礦開採和鋼鐵加工廠，效果非常明顯。

塞爾維亞主要採礦中心 Bor 就是一個典型的例子，在 20 世紀 90 年代巴爾幹戰爭之後，這裡是一個受到國際制裁及被鄙視排斥國家中的一個荒涼之地。 即使在 2000 年南斯拉夫的孤立狀態結束後，政府擁有的 RTB Bor 採礦和冶煉廠仍在債務中掙扎，無法修復由酸雨導致的破舊污染設施。

該工廠的命運在 2018 年發生了變化，當時中國紫金礦業收購了 RTB Bor 的大部分股權，並承諾注資至少 15 億美元。 六年後，這座城市骯髒的外牆被擦洗並重新粉刷。 該礦區員工數量回升至 6,000 多人，每月平均淨工資為 1,300 美元，比全國平均高出 50% 以上。

自接管以來，當地房地產價格幾乎上漲了兩倍，而灰塵和硫氧化物污染幾十年來首次受到法律限制。 工廠周圍的橫幅告訴工人說他們的安全是至關重要。 紫金礦業董事長 Chen Jinghe 在4月底表示，該公司計劃在2030年將塞爾維亞工廠打造成歐洲最大的銅生產商。

塞爾維亞最大的 Krivelj 露天礦的 42 歲經理 Nemanja Anicic，在看著控制室裡的屏幕, 監控着每輛卡車和推土機在廣闊的坑中移動時說道: 「我們生產的每個部分都已升級、現代化」。 「這是這個行業的重生」。

塞爾維亞轉向中國反映了其投資需求,而歐盟成員國則放眼於別處。 中國是塞爾維亞僅次於德國的最大貿易夥伴，去年進出口總額達62億美元。

武契奇去年承諾，一旦該國加入歐盟，雙邊貿易協定就會終止，但同時「我們必須在加入歐盟之前生存」。

從貝爾格萊德向北延伸的鐵路線展示了該國的做法：在前往 Novi Sad 的 途中，高速列車經過一座由歐盟資金重建的橋樑，以取代 1999 年被北約摧毀的橋樑。

塞爾維亞商會戰略分析和數據的助理處長 Bojan Stanic 表示，與中國 “你可以合作” ， “同時仍然保持獨立性和持有歐洲價值觀。”

         So, China has directly invested $15 billion in car battery plants in Hungary and copper mining in Serbia. Serbia’s turning toward China reflects the need for investment while EU members are looking at elsewhere. China, through investments, is trying to create influence over Europe through Hungary and Serbia. I am wondering why so many Chinese want to migrate to Hungary.

中國數十億資金幫助習近平在東歐結交有用的朋友 (1/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

China’s Billions Help Xi Make Useful Friends in Eastern Europe (1/2)

Andrea Dudik, Misha Savic and Marton Kasnyik

Sun, May 5, 2024 at 9:00 p.m. PDT·8 min read

(Bloomberg) -- It’s 10 a.m. and the high-speed train leaves Belgrade’s new, glass-and-steel station right on time. Thirty-six minutes later it pulls into Serbia’s northern city of Novi Sad, the first completed section of a 350 kilometer-long (217 mile) upgrade going up to Budapest in Hungary.

The route is the kind of European modernity that Serbia has coveted for years. Yet the line — being built by China — also represents something more political: how Beijing is helping transform a corner of Europe when much of the continent now views it as a strategic rival.

The Belgrade-Budapest rail link will unite the capitals of two countries that have tightened their embrace of China and provided it with a backdoor to a continent that’s torn over its dealings with the world’s second-largest economy.

From car battery plants in Hungary to copper mining in Serbia, direct Chinese investment in the two countries exceeds $15 billion with more coming. The new high-speed railway will be highlighted by President Xi Jinping during a trip to Europe this week, where he will stop in Belgrade and Budapest after Paris.

The relationship is based on money — loans, investment, trade — politics, and even health. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic says he wants to take his nation into the European Union, though has maintained his country’s east-west balancing act with China and Russia. Both countries back Belgrade’s stance to not recognize Kosovo’s independence. Dropping opposition to Kosovo’s statehood is a condition of EU membership for Serbia.

In Hungary, an EU member for two decades now, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has forged his own nationalist path, clashing with the bloc over rule of law and funding and threatening to veto aid for Ukraine.

For Xi and his government, there’s the political dividend of having closer ties with two European states willing to listen to Beijing as well as Brussels and Berlin. Vucic and Orban, for example, both met Vladimir Putin at an international forum hosted by China last October.

The message to other countries in Eastern Europe is look “what opportunity you missed,” according to Daniel Hegedus, a senior fellow focused on central Europe at the German Marshall Fund.

“What we see is actually the Chinese demonstrating that we are rewarding our friends, those who stay with us, those who work with us ultimately benefit,” he said. “The Chinese are building a wonder child of Chinese investment to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation with China.”

The broadening economic footprint is filling a void left by the EU, which is still the region’s biggest investor. The bloc is increasingly seen as a distant dream in Serbia and getting a negative report card in Hungary, where Orban talks of the decline of western civilization.

“Xi’s visit is definitely a gesture, a sign of gratitude to Hungary and Serbia,” said Gergely Salat, a researcher at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, a government think tank. “With the string of new investments, especially coupled with the prospect of cheap Chinese loans, the government in Budapest can claim this as a resounding success.”

In Novi Sad, that’s definitely how Veselin Simovic sees it. The railway manager proudly showed off the soon-to-be unveiled refurbished main train station hall in the city. Workers were welding stair railings and laying tiles.

The train link costs $2.9 billion, and rising. For Simovic, it’s a demonstration of how Chinese loans and know-how bring a taste of 21st century technology, precision and efficiency to the volatile Balkans. He hit back at critics who say Vucic has deepened ties with China and jeopardized EU membership one day.

“Those who say that, why didn’t they give us such help?” said Simovic, 63, who saw infrastructure in the city destroyed during NATO’s air strikes against the country in 1999 because of the war in Kosovo. “This is a quantum leap. I didn’t expect to see anything like this in my professional lifetime.”

Xi’s trip to Europe is his first since 2019, except for visiting Russia, and the itinerary encapsulates China’s view. He will be in Belgrade on the 25th anniversary of the deadly US bombing of the Chinese embassy in the city. The site has since been turned into a giant cultural center, and workers were fixing the roads around it in preparations for the Xi’s arrival.

The president’s schedule caused a wrinkle in Paris, which would have preferred him to visit only France because Belgrade and Budapest have a different agenda, said a person familiar with preparations for the trip who declined to be identified.

Indeed, that agenda is on full display in Hungary, where Chinese companies are investing more than $10 billion.

Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. is building a giant €7.3 billion ($7.8 billion) battery plant near the eastern city of Debrecen to supply German auto makers. Electric car producer BYD chose the southern city of Szeged near the border with Serbia for its first factory in Europe.

(to be continued)

Translation

（彭博）— 現在是上午 10 點，高速列車準時從貝爾格萊德新建的玻璃纖維車站出發。 36 分鐘後，它駛入塞爾維亞北部城市諾維薩德(Novi Sad)，這是通往匈牙利布達佩斯的 350 公里（217 英里）長的升級工程中的第一個完成的路段。

這條路線是塞爾維亞多年來一直覬覦的歐洲現代化路線。 然而，這條由中國建造的線路也代表了一些更具政治性的東西：當歐洲大陸的大部分國家將北京視為戰略競爭對手時，北京如何幫助改變歐洲的一個角落。

貝爾格萊德 - 布達佩斯鐵路線將把兩國首都聯合起來，這兩個國家加強了對中國的擁抱，並為中國提供了通往因與世界第二大經濟體為交易而撕裂的歐洲大陸的後門。

從匈牙利的汽車電池廠到塞爾維亞的銅礦開採，中國對兩國的直接投資超過 150 億美元，更多投資還會到來。 習近平主席本週將在歐洲之行中重點介紹這條新高鐵，他將在巴黎之後訪問貝爾格萊德和布達佩斯。

這種關係是基於金錢 - 貸款、投資、貿易 - 政治，甚至健康。 塞爾維亞總統武契奇表示，他希望讓自己的國家加入歐盟，但仍維持塞爾維亞與中國和俄羅斯的東西方平衡。 兩國都支持貝爾格萊德不承認科索沃獨立的立場。 放棄對科索沃建國的反對是塞爾維亞加入歐盟的條件。

在加入歐盟二十年的匈牙利，總理歐爾班開闢了自己的民族主義道路，在法治和資金問題上與歐盟發生衝突，並威脅否決對烏克蘭的援助。

對於習近平和他的政府來說，與兩個願意傾聽北京, 以及布魯塞爾和柏林的歐洲國家建立更密切的關係, 可以帶來政治紅利。 例如，武契奇和歐爾班去年10月都在中國主辦的國際論壇上會見了普京。

德國馬歇爾基金會中歐問題高級研究員 Daniel Hegedus 表示，北京向東歐其他國家傳達的訊息:看看「你們錯過了哪些機會」。

他說: 「我們看到的實際上是中國人表明我們正在回報我們的朋友，那些和我們在一起的人、那些與我們一起工作的人最終受益」。 「中國人正在建構一個神奇小子般的中國投資奇蹟，以展示與中國合作的好處」。

不斷擴大的經濟足跡正在填補歐盟留下的空白，歐盟仍然是該地區最大的投資者。 在塞爾維亞，歐盟越來越被視為一個遙遠的夢想，而在匈牙利，得到了負面的評分表，歐爾班談論西方文明的衰落。

作為政府智庫的匈牙利國際事務研究所的研究員 Gergely Salat 說: 「習近平的訪問絕對是一種姿態，是對匈牙利和塞爾維亞表示感謝的標誌」。 「憑藉一系列新投資，特別是加上廉價中國貸款的前景，布達佩斯政府可以說這是一次巨大的成功」。

在諾維薩德，Veselin Simovic 就是這麼看的。 作為鐵路經理的他自豪地展示了即將揭幕的翻新後的城市火車總站大廳。 工人們正在焊接樓梯欄桿、鋪設瓷磚。

這條火車線路耗資 29 億美元，而且還在增加。 對 Simovic 來說，這展示了中國的貸款和技術如何為動盪的巴爾幹地區帶來21世紀的技術、精確性和效率。 他回擊了批評者所聲稱武契奇加深了與中國的關係，並有一天危及該國成為歐盟成員的資格。

63 歲的Simovic 說: “說那些的人，為什麼不給我們這樣的幫助呢？” 他在1999 年，由於科索沃戰爭，北約對該國進行空襲，親眼目睹了這座城市的基礎設施被摧毀。 “這是一個巨大的飛躍。 我沒想到在我的職業生涯中會看到這樣的事情。

這是習近平自2019年以來首次訪問歐洲，俄羅斯除外，行程也反映了中國的觀點。 他將在貝爾格萊德記念美國致命轟炸中國駐貝爾格萊德大使館的25週年。 此後，該地點已變成一個巨大的文化中心，工人們正在修復周圍的道路，為習近平的到來做準備。

一位不願透露姓名的知情人士表示，中國主席的日程安排在巴黎引起了不滿，巴黎本來希望他只訪問法國，因為與貝爾格萊德和布達佩斯有不同的政治議程。

事實上，這政治議程在匈牙利得到了充分體現出來，中國公司在那裡投資超過 100 億美元。

Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd 正在東部城市 Debrecen 附近建造一座耗資 73 億歐元（合 78 億美元）的巨型電池工廠，為德國汽車製造商供貨。 電動車生產商比亞迪選擇靠近塞爾維亞邊境的南部城市 Szeged 作為其在歐洲的第一間工廠。

（待續）

中國首次公開其聲稱的2016年與菲律賓的協議 (2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on -line reported the following:

China publicizes for the first time what it claims is a 2016 agreement with Philippines (2/2)

Associated Press -CHRISTOPHER BODEEN

Fri, May 3, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. PDT·5 min read

(continue)

Duterte, who nurtured cozy relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his six-year presidency while openly being hostile to the United States for its strong criticism of his deadly campaign against illegal drugs.

While he took an almost virulently anti-American stance during his 2016 visit to Washington's chief rival, he has said he also did not enter into any agreement with Beijing that would have compromised Philippine territory. He acknowledged, however, that he and Xi agreed to maintain “the status quo” in the disputed waters to avoid war.

“Aside from the fact of having a handshake with President Xi Jinping, the only thing I remember was that status quo, that’s the word. There would be no contact, no movement, no armed patrols there, as is where is, so there won’t be any confrontation,” Duterte said.

Asked if he agreed that the Philippines would not bring construction materials to strengthen a Philippine military ship outpost at the Second Thomas Shoal, Duterte said that was part of maintaining the status quo but added there was no written agreement.

“That’s what I remember. If it were a gentleman’s agreement, it would always have been an agreement to keep the peace in the South China Sea,” Duterte said.

House Speaker Ferdinand Martin Romualdez, Marcos’s cousin and political ally, has ordered an investigation into what some are calling a “gentleman’s agreement.”

China has also claimed that Philippine officials have promised to tow away the navy ship that was deliberately grounded in the shallows of the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to serve as Manila’s territorial outpost. Philippine officials under Marcos say they were not aware of any such agreement and would not remove the now dilapidated and rust-encrusted warship manned by a small contingent of Filipino sailors and marines.

China has long accused Manila of “violating its commitments” and “acting illegally” in the South China Sea, without being explicit.

Apart from China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims in the sea that is rich in fishing stocks, gas and oil. Beijing has refused to recognize a 2016 international arbitration ruling by a U.N.-affiliated court in the Hauge that invalidated its expansive claims on historical grounds.

Skirmishes between Beijing and Manila have flared since last year, with massive Chinese coast guard cutters firing high-pressure water cannons at Philippine patrol vessels, most recently off Scarborough Shoal late last month, damaging both. They have also accused each other of dangerous maneuvering, leading to minor scrapes.

The U.S. lays no claims to the South China Sea, but has deployed Navy ships and fighter jets in what it calls freedom of navigation operations that have challenged China’s claims.

The U.S. has warned repeatedly that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines — its oldest treaty ally in Asia — if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea.

 Translation

（繼續）

杜特爾特在六年的總統任期內與中國國家主席習近平建立了融洽的關係，同時公開敵視美國，因為美國強烈批評他的打擊非法毒品的致命行動。

儘管杜特爾特在 2016 年訪華期間採取了近乎惡毒的反美立場，但他表示，他也沒有與北京達成任何可能損害菲律賓領土的協議。 不過，他承認，他和習近平同意維持爭議海域的「現狀」以避免戰爭。

杜特爾特說: 「除了與習近平主席握手之外，我唯一記得的就是現狀，就是這個詞。 那裡不會有接觸、沒有行動、沒有武裝巡邏，現況那樣就那樣，所以不會有任何對抗」。

當被問及他是否同意菲律賓不會攜帶建築材料來加固仁愛礁的菲律賓軍艦前哨時，杜特爾特表示，這是維持現狀的一部分，但補充說，沒有書面協議。

杜特爾特說: 「這就是我所記得的。 如果這是君子協議，那麼它就永遠是維護南海和平的協議」。

馬可斯的表弟和政治盟友、眾議院議長 Ferdinand Martin Romualdez 已下令對某些人所說的「君子協議」進行調查。

中國也聲稱，菲律賓官員已承諾拖走1999年故意擱淺在仁愛礁淺灘、作為馬尼拉領土前哨的海軍艦艇。 馬可斯領導下的菲律賓官員表示，他們不知道有任何此類協議，也不會拆除這艘由一小批菲律賓水手和海軍陸戰隊員守護着, 現已破舊且鏽跡斑斑的軍艦。

中國長期以來一直指責馬尼拉在南海 “違反承諾” 和 “做出非法行為” ，但沒沒有加以清楚說明。

除了中國和菲律賓之外，越南、馬來西亞、台灣和汶萊也對這片富含漁業資源、天然氣和石油的海域提出了重疊的主權聲索。 北京拒絕承認2016年海牙聯合國附屬法院做出的一項國際仲裁裁決，該裁決以歷史為由宣告中國的廣泛主張無效。

自去年以來，北京和馬尼拉之間的小規模衝突不斷爆發，中國海警巡邏艦向菲律賓巡邏船發射高壓水砲，最近一次是上個月末在黃岩島附近海域，造成雙方船隻受損。 他們也互相指責對方採取了危險的行動，導致了輕微的擦傷。

美國沒有對南海提出主權聲索，但已部署海軍艦艇和戰鬥機進行其所謂的航行自由行動，挑戰中國的主權主張。

美國一再警告說，如果菲律賓軍隊、船隻或飛機受到武裝攻擊，包括在南中國海裡，美國有義務保衛菲律賓 - 其在亞洲最古老的條約盟友。

              So, China has publicized a statement to say that there is an unwritten 2016 agreement with the Philippines over access to South China Sea islands. The statement says that Duterte has agreed, among other things, to restrict the access of his military, coast guard and other official planes and ships to the 12 nautical mile (22 kilometer) limit of territorial waters. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.  has denied the existence of such an agreement. Probably conflicts and disputes in this region will continue.

中國首次公開其聲稱的2016年與菲律賓的協議 (1/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

China publicizes for the first time what it claims is a 2016 agreement with Philippines (1/2)

Associated Press - CHRISTOPHER BODEEN

Fri, May 3, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. PDT·5 min read

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — For the first time, China has publicized what it claims is an unwritten 2016 agreement with the Philippines over access to South China Sea islands.

The move threatens to further raise tensions in the disputed waterway, through which much of the world's trade passes and which China claims virtually in its entirety.

A statement from the Chinese Embassy in Manila said the “temporary special arrangement” agreed to during a visit to Beijing by former president Rodrigo Duterte allowed small scale fishing around the islands but restricted access by military, coast guard and other official planes and ships to the 12 nautical mile (22 kilometer) limit of territorial waters.

The Philippines respected the agreement over the past seven years but has since reneged on it to “fulfill its own political agenda,” forcing China to take action, the statement said.

“This is the basic reason for the ceaseless disputes at sea between China and the Philippines over the past year and more,” said the statement posted to the embassy's website Thursday, referring to the actions of the Philippines.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Duterte have denied forging any agreements that would have supposedly surrendered Philippine sovereignty or sovereign rights to China. Any such action, if proven, would be an impeachable offense under the country’s 1987 Constitution.

However, after his visit to Beijing, Duterte hinted at such an agreement without offering details, said Collin Koh, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and an expert on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.

“He boasted then that he not only got Chinese investment and trade pledges, but also that he secured Philippine fishermen access to Scarborough Shoal,” Koh said, referring to one of the maritime features in dispute.

Beijing's deliberate wording in the statement “is noteworthy in showing that Beijing has no official document to prove its case and thus could only rely mainly on Duterte’s verbal claim,” Koh said.

Marcos, who took office in June 2022, told reporters last month that China has insisted that there was such a secret agreement but said he was not aware of any.

“The Chinese are insisting that there is a secret agreement and, perhaps, there is, and, I said I didn’t, I don’t know anything about the secret agreement,” said Marcos, who has drawn the Philippines closer to its treaty partner the U.S. “Should there be such a secret agreement, I am now rescinding it.”

(to be continued)

Translation

台灣台北（美聯社）—中國首次公開了它聲稱的 2016 年與菲律賓就南海島嶼使用權達成的不成文協議。

此舉有可能進一步加劇有爭議水道的緊張局勢，世界上大部分貿易都經過該水道，而中國幾乎對整個水道聲稱擁有主權。

中國駐馬尼拉大使館的聲明稱，前總統杜特爾特在訪問北京期間同意的「臨時特別安排」承認在島嶼周圍進行小規模捕魚，但限制軍隊、海岸警衛隊和其他官方飛機和船隻進入 12 海裡（22 公里）領海界限。

聲明稱，菲律賓在過去七年裡一直遵守該協議，但後來卻背棄了該協議，以 “實現自己秘密的政治目標” ， 迫使中國採取行動。

周四大使館網站上發佈的聲明話: “這是過去一年多來中國和菲律賓之間海上爭端不斷的根本原因” ，指的是菲律賓的行動。

小馬可斯總統和杜特爾特否認簽署了任何據稱將菲律賓主權或主權權利移交給中國的協議。 根據該國 1987 年憲法，任何此類行為如果得到證實，都將構成可彈劾的罪行。

然而，新加坡南洋理工大學 S. Rajaratnam 國際研究學院高級研究員、印太海軍事務專家,特別是東南亞方面的 Collin Koh 表示，杜特爾特在訪問北京後暗示達成這樣的協議，但沒有提供細節。

Koh說: 「他當時吹噓說，他不僅得到了中國的投資和貿易承諾，而且還確保菲律賓漁民能夠進入黃岩島」，他指的是有爭議的海事上地標之一。

Koh說，北京在聲明中刻意的措辭 「是值得注意，表明北京沒有官方文件來證明其情況，因此只能主要依靠杜特爾特的口頭宣稱」。

2022 年 6 月上任的馬可斯上個月對記者表示，中國堅稱存在這樣一項秘密協議，但表示他對此並不知情。

馬可斯說:「中國人堅持認為有一項秘密協議，也許確實存在，但我說我沒有，我對這項秘密協議一無所知」，他拉近了菲律賓與條約夥伴美國更接近的關係。「如果有這樣的秘密協議，我現在就廢除它」。

（待續）

墨西哥的製造業正在蓬勃發展。 美國接受這事實- 中國也是如此 (2/2)

Recently CNN News on-line reported the following:

Manufacturing in Mexico is having its moment. The US is buying in — and so is China (2/2)

By John Towfighi, CNN Published 9:40 PM EDT, Sun April 28, 2024

(continue)

On Capitol Hill, the possibility that Chinese steel is ducking US tariffs has garnered attention from lawmakers. The Biden administration announced that it is working with the Mexican government to prevent China and other countries from evading US tariffs on steel and aluminum via US imports from Mexico.

As early as February, Tai inquired about “the lack of transparency” around Mexico’s steel and aluminum imports from “third countries” during a meeting with Raquel Buenrostro, Mexico’s secretary of economy.

Concerns of tariff evasion are drawing a response from the US president — and will continue to beyond November’s election. The USMCA is set to be reviewed in 2026.

Both US President Joe Biden and his challenger, former President Donald Trump, espouse goals to grow domestic manufacturing, but they diverge on how to go about doing so.

Biden told steelworkers in Pittsburgh recently that the US government should consider tripling tariffs on Chinese steel. And Trump has proposed a potential 60% tariff on Chinese goods if he returns to the presidency.

“With both US presidential candidates vying to win important Midwestern swing states that have significant auto industries, the issue of US-Mexico-China trade will only increase as the 2024 presidential campaign unfolds,” S&P Global’s Sevilla-Macip and Raines said.

A gradual shift

While supply chains are shifting, moving factories isn’t always that simple. It can take significant investment, from time to money to people. The companies that are moving forward, though, are creating long-term opportunities for the Mexican manufacturing industry.

“It certainly feels like things are booming in Monterrey,” a city in northern Mexico, said Christoffer Enemaerke, a portfolio manager at RBC. On a recent trip there, he told CNN, “we met with companies and experts in the real estate industry and the feedback was that nearshoring is likely to be a multi-year driver of growth for Mexico, particularly in the northern part of the country.”

Tesla (TSLA), for example, said last year that it would build a new plant in Monterrey. “We’re super excited about it,” CEO Elon Musk said during an investor day for the company, adding that the plant would add capacity, rather than replace capacity elsewhere.

Sentiment on the ground is exciting, but most investment flows are yet to be seen, Ramos told CNN.

Analysts at Morgan Stanley see the value of Mexico’s exports to the United States growing from $455 billion to about $609 billion in the next five years.

That also makes Mexico an attractive base for many Chinese companies. EV maker BYD, a global competitor to Musk’s Tesla, announced in February plans for a major expansion in Mexico.

While BYD doesn’t currently sell cars in the US market, a move to Mexico would provide better access to the Mexican market while preparing the company for a potential move into the US.

“Chinese investment and exports to Mexico are highly likely to become a headline issue ahead of the 2026 scheduled review of the USMCA,” Sevilla-Macip and Raines said.

Until then, though, places like Monterrey continue to reap the rewards.

Monterrey, said RBC’s Enemaerke, “feels booming, new and vibrant, more so than other industrial cities I’ve been to, which have mainly been in Asia.”

-----

CNN’s Michael Nam contributed to this report.

Translation

（繼續）

在國會山，中國鋼鐵逃避美國關稅的可能性引起了立法者的注意。 拜登政府宣布，正在與墨西哥政府合作，防止中國和其他國家透過美國從墨西哥進口鋼鐵和鋁來逃避美國的關稅。

早在2月份，Tai 在與墨西哥經濟部長 Raquel Buenrostro 會面時就詢問了墨西哥從 “第三國” 進口鋼鋁一事的 “缺乏透明度” 。

對逃稅的擔憂正在引起美國總統的回應，並將持續到 11 月大選後。 USMCA 將於 2026 年進行復檢。

美國總統拜登和他的挑戰者、前總統特朗普都支持發展國內製造業的目標，但他們在如何實現這一目標上存在分歧。

拜登最近在匹茲堡告訴鋼鐵工人，美國政府應該考慮對中國鋼鐵徵收三倍關稅。 特朗普還提議，如果他重新擔任總統，可能會對中國商品徵收 60% 的關稅。

S&P Global 的Sevilla-Macip 和Raines 表示：「由於兩位美國總統候選人都在爭奪擁有主要汽車工業的重要中西部搖擺州，隨著2024 年總統競選的展開，美墨中貿易問題只會變得更加嚴重。

 一個漸變

雖然供應鏈正在發生變化，但搬遷工廠並不是那麼簡單。 這可能需要大量的投資，從時間到金錢再到人員。 不過，正在向前邁進的公司正在為墨西哥製造業創造長期的機會。

加拿大皇家銀行 (RBC) 投資組合經 Christoffer Enemaerke 表示，「Monterrey 這座墨西哥北部城市確實給人一種蓬勃發展的感覺」。 他在最近一次訪問墨西哥時告訴美國有線電視新聞網（CNN），「我們會見了房地產行業的公司和專家，得到的回應是，近岸外包可能會成為墨西哥持續多年的成長動力，特別是在該國北部地區」。

例如，特斯拉（TSLA）去年表示將在 Monterrey 建造一座新工廠。 執行長馬斯克在該公司的投資者日上表示: 「我們對此感到非常興奮」，並補充說該工廠將增加產能，而不是取代其他地方的產能。

Ramos 告訴美國有線電視新聞網，在大眾之間的情緒是興奮的，但大多數的投資流向仍有待觀察。

摩根士丹利分析師預計，未來五年墨西哥對美國的出口額將從 4,550 億美元成長到約 6,090 億美元。

這也使墨西哥成為許多中國公司有吸引力的基地。 電動車製造商比亞迪是馬斯克旗下特斯拉的全球競爭對手，二月宣布計劃在墨西哥進行大規模擴張。

雖然比亞迪目前不在美國市場銷售汽車，但遷往墨西哥將為該公司提供更好的進入墨西哥市場的機會，同時為該公司可能進軍美國做好準備。

Sevilla-Macip 和 Raines 表示： “USMCA計劃於在 2026 年進行復檢之前，中國對墨西哥的投資和出口極有可能成為頭條新聞。”

但在那之前，像 Monterrey 這樣的地方將繼續獲得回報。

加拿大皇家銀行的 Enemaerke 表示，Monterrey “給人的感覺是蓬勃發展、新穎且充滿活力，比我去過的其他主要在亞洲的工業城市更明顯。”

              So, as US supply chains decouple from China, Mexico’s manufacturing sector is emerging as a winner. Manufacturing in Mexico is attractive to many companies. China is evading the tariff by exporting to Mexico by taking advantage of the USMCA. EV maker BYD, a global competitor to Musk’s Tesla, has announced plans for a major expansion in Mexico. Probably the US will create further new laws to protect its key manufacturing industries.

Note:

1. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered into force on July 1, 2020. The USMCA, which substituted the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a mutually beneficial win for North American workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses. The Agreement creates more balanced, reciprocal trade supporting high-paying jobs for Americans and grow the North American economy. (https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement)