烏克蘭境內北韓飛彈碎片可能暴露採購網路 (2/2)

Recently Yahoo News on-line reported the following:

Debris from North Korean missile in Ukraine could expose procurement networks (2/2)

David Brunnstrom

Thu, February 22, 2024 at 2:20 p.m. PST·3 min read

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CAR said it was working with industry to trace the missile components and identify the entities responsible for their diversion to North Korea, so would not identify the companies linked to their production. It also did not identify specific components.

Martyn Williams of 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea project, said many components made by U.S. firms were easily available online or from electronics markets around the world.

"That North Korea can get these is not surprising at all, and I don't think anyone imagined the sanctions regime would be able to stop the flow of common components," he said.

"There are however much more specialized components in missiles and some of those are not a click away on the internet. Those are also the type of thing that sanctions are meant to stop, so the presence of more specialized components would be more worrying."

Katsu Furukawa, a former member of the U.N. Panel of Experts in charge of monitoring U.N. sanctions against North Korea, said the bulk of the components shown in a photo in the CAR report appeared to be widely available commercial items.

However in past U.N. investigations, he said, there were usually a few specific items such as pressure transmitters and flight control computers that enabled investigators to track procurement routes and identify the perpetrators.

38 North director Jenny Town said such specialized items could only be obtained from a small number of vendors and should have more of a procurement paper trail.

The U.S. State Department said Washington uses export controls, sanctions, and law enforcement actions to prevent North Korea acquiring technology for its weapons programs and to prevent Russia acquiring such weapons.

"We work closely with the U.S. private sector, as well as foreign allied and partner states, in these efforts," a spokesperson said.

(Reporting by David Brunnstrom; Editing by Don Durfee and Daniel Wallis)

Translation

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CAR 表示，它正在與業界合作追蹤飛彈零件並查明負責將其轉移到北韓的實體，因此不會透露與其生產相關的公司。 它還沒有指出具體的零件部分。

華盛頓的北韓計畫中的 38 North 的 Martyn Williams 表示，美國公司製造的許多零件很容易在網路上或從世界各地的電子市場獲得。

他說： “北韓能夠獲得這些材料一點也不奇怪，我認為沒有人想到制裁制度能夠阻止通用零件的流動。”

“然而，導彈中有些更特定的部件，其中一些不是通過互聯網點擊即可獲得的。這些也是制裁旨在阻止的種類，因此更特定部件的出現會更令人擔憂。”

負責監督聯合國對北韓制裁的聯合國專家小組前成員 Katsu Furukawa 表示，CAR 報告中照片中顯示的大部分零件似乎是廣泛使用的商業部件。

然而，他說在過去的聯合國調查中，通常有一些特定的物品，例如壓力傳送器和飛行控制電腦，使調查人員能夠追蹤採購路線並識別肇事者。

38 North 主管 Jenny Town 表示，此類特殊物品只能從少數供應商處取得，並且應該有更多的採購文件記錄。

美國國務院表示，華盛頓利用出口管制、制裁和執法行動來阻止北韓取得技術進行武器計劃，並阻止俄羅斯取得此類武器。

一位發言人表示： “在這些努力中，我們與美國私人公司以及外國盟友和夥伴密切合作。”

              So, the purpose of sanction is not to stop the flow of common components, there are usually a few specific items such as pressure transmitters and flight control computers that will be focused on so as to enable investigators to track procurement routes and identify suppliers.