這是正式的：中國稱霸全球的時代已經結束 (2/3)

Recently Business Insider carried the following article:

It’s official: The era of China’s global dominance is over (2/3)

Linette Lopez – Business Insider

Mon, October 16, 2023 at 2:22 a.m. GMT+8

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Little fires everywhere all at once

The real-estate sector is the most visible sign of China's fading star, but other key parts of the economy are showing strain as well. While the rest of the world is battling inflation, China is still in deflationary mode. August CPI came in at 0.1%, up from minus-0.3% the month before, showing an overall lack of domestic demand. Exports — which make up 40% of the country's GDP growth — hit their lowest level in three years in July, falling 14% from the same time a year before. August export figures showed some improvement but still came in down 8.8% from the year before.

Overall, Autonomous expects China's exports to slow 8% compared to last year. Chu — who has been called the "rock star" of Chinese debt analysis — told me that this weakness is not just a result of a cyclical downturn; it's a part of a more permanent shifting of supply chains caused by trade tensions with Europe and the US. These are powerful forces that are not easily reversed. Once multinational corporations no longer see China as a source of steady growth, they could begin changing their plans to invest. At the same time, domestic anxiety about shrinking employment may change the basic consumer behavior that powered China's rise. This can create a vicious, self-reinforcing cycle that keeps investment out and spending low.

Chu started the year with one of the weakest growth outlooks for China on Wall Street, and the second half is looking worse. Autonomous' proprietary growth index for China, the Real Autono Economic Activity Composite, projects the country's economy to grow by 3.8% for all of 2023, down from its original 4.2% projection in January — and worse than Autonomous projected during the depths of China's COVID lockdown. Beijing is projecting 5% growth — and given how tightly the CCP likes to manage expectations, officials will stick to that number come hell or high water. It's a far cry from the double-digit growth policymakers used to demand and a signal to the Chinese people that Beijing is not going to direct its banks to spew credit to get the economy moving faster again.

Victor Shih, an associate professor and the director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California San Diego, told me that when people ask him if there will be a financial crisis in China, he tells them that China "is constantly in a financial crisis." It's like the authorities are playing a game of whack-a-mole, trying to contain any shocks to the financial system because they fear social instability. That means there can be no correction, but if there's no correction, there's no deleveraging, and if there's no deleveraging, the moles will only multiply.

Zombies in the Middle Kingdom

The economy has put Beijing in a bind. There's too much for the Chinese Communist Party to do, and not enough money or time to do it. Allowing a property-market correction, bailing out local governments, creating a new funding mechanism for them, developing a social safety net for the people through all this instability — all of it costs money. And even if the capital were there, policymakers fear what this disruption could do to their grip on power. Falling property prices and shrinking exports would weigh on the Chinese people's wealth, and the government is concerned that a meaningful correction would cause unrest.

"Every time there are severe property-price declines, Beijing views it as a risk to social stability," Chu said. 

Plus, Beijing may need to conserve its firepower for other concerns coming down the pipeline. In the long-term, the CCP has to worry about China's demographics. Thanks to government mandates like the one-child policy, the country's population is rapidly aging — and even started to decline in 2022. The workforce will soon begin shrinking: Right now there are three working-age adults for every retired person in China, according to data compiled by J Capital Research, and by 2050, that ratio will hit one to one. Without booming property prices or continued growth, the growing pool of retirees will put a heavy burden on China's threadbare social safety net. GDP per capita is currently about $12,800. When Japan started struggling in 1991 with a similar dynamic — aging population, sky-high debt, and slowing growth — its GDP per capita was more than triple that amount, at $41,266 in today's dollars. China will get old before it gets rich, placing the task of growing the economy on fewer and fewer people as time goes on.

"What's really a shame is that China never seized the opportunity on the way up to build a comprehensive social safety net where people feel they don't have to save a lot of money for a rainy day — for healthcare, education, what have you," Chu told me. "Most Chinese people do not feel they are covered for everything they need … This is what's going to make moving to the domestic, demand-driven model difficult."

Unless dramatic action is taken, the future of China's economy is looking less like a young dynamo and more like an old, slow-moving blob. Last week, Bloomberg reported that policymakers are considering a modest $137 billion stimulus — just enough to meet its already comparatively low annual growth target, and nothing in the way of reform.

"There are healthy parts of the economy, it's just the zombie parts that have to be dealt with," Shih said. "It doesn't look like they are doing that now, but it will be a bigger and bigger drag on growth. I think the slow growth will cause such a serious employment and capital-flight problem, there could be political instability."

But again, that's could, not will. And because its priority is now power — where gains are much more idiosyncratic — it's a risk that Beijing has shown it is willing to take.

(to be continued)

Translation

（繼續）

瞬間到處都是火头

房地產行業是中國衰落之星最明顯的跡象，但經濟的其他關鍵領域也顯示出壓力。 當世界其他地區正在對抗通膨時，中國仍處於通貨緊縮模式。 8 月 CPI 為 0.1%，高於上月的負 0.3%，顯示國內需求整體不足。 佔該國 GDP 成長 40% 的出口在 7 月觸及三年來的最低水平，比去年同期下降 14%。 8 月出口數據有所改善，但仍比去年同期下降 8.8%。

整體而言，Autonomous 預計中國出口將比去年放緩8%。 Chu - 被稱為中國債務分析的「搖滾明星」- 告訴我，這種疲軟不僅是周期性衰退的結果， 這是與歐洲和美國的貿易緊張局勢造成的供應鏈更持久移位的一部分。 這些都是難以輕易逆轉的強大力量。 一旦跨國公司不再將中國視為穩定成長的源泉，他們可能會開始改變投資計畫。 同時，國內對就業萎縮的擔憂可能會改變推動中國上升的基本消費行為。 這可能會形成一個惡性的、自我強化的循環，導致投資外流和消費低迷。

今年年初，Chu對中國的成長前景提出了華爾街最成增長乏力的看法，而下半年的情況看起來更糟。Auton 中國的 Autonomous' proprietary growth 指數－ Real Autonomous Economic Activity Composite 預計，2023 年中國經濟將成長3.8%，低於1 月最初預測的4.2%，而且比在中國新冠疫情封鎖最嚴重時期的預測還要差。 北京預計經濟將成長 5%，考慮到中共對預期的控制程度，官員將堅持這個數字，無論情況如何。 這與政策制定者過去要求的兩位數增長相去甚遠，也是向中國人民發出的一個信號，即北京方面不會指示銀行大量信貸以推動經濟再次加速發展。

加州大學聖地牙哥分校副教授兼21世紀中國中心主任 Victor Shih 告訴我，當人們問他中國是否會發生金融危機時，他告訴他們，中國 “一直處於金融困境”。這就像當局正在玩打地鼠遊戲，試圖遏止任何對金融體系的衝擊，因為他們擔心社會不穩定。 這意味著不可能有糾正，但如果不糾正，就沒有去槓桿化，如果無去槓桿化，地鼠只會倍增。

中國的殭屍化

經濟令北京陷入了困境。 中國共產黨要做的事情太多了，卻沒有足夠的金錢和時間去做。 允許房地產市場調整、救助地方政府、為地方政府建立新的融資機制、為人民建立一個社會安全網以應對所有這些不穩定因素 - 所有這些都需要花錢。 即使有資金本錢，政策制定者也擔心這種插手干預可能會影響他們對權力的控制。 房價下跌和出口萎縮將給中國人民的財富帶來壓力，政府擔心有作用的調整會引發動盪。

Chu說: 「每次房價大幅下跌，北京都會將其視為對社會穩定的風險」。

此外，北京可能需要保留火力，以應對即將出現的其他問題。 從長遠來看，中共不得不擔心中國的人口結構。 由於獨生子女政策等政府規定，中國人口正在迅速老化，甚至在 2022 年已開始下降。勞動力很快就會開始萎縮：根據 Capital Research 編製的數據，目前中國每一個退休人就對應三個工作年齡的成年人。到2050 年，這一比例將達到一比一。 如果房價不上漲或經濟不持續增長，不斷增加的退休人員將給中國陳舊的社會保障體系帶來沉重負擔。 目前人均GDP約12,800美元。 當日本在 1991 年開始陷入類似的困境時 - 人口老化、高額債務和成長放緩 - 其人均 GDP 是那数目的的三倍多，以今天的美元計算為 41,266 美元。 中國將未富先老，隨著時間的推移，發展經濟的任務落在越來越少人的身上。

Chu告訴我: 「真正令人遺憾的是，中國從來沒有抓住崛起過程中的機遇，建立一個全面的社會保障網，讓人們覺得他們不必存很多錢以備不時之需 - 醫療、教育等等” 。 “大多數中國人覺得自己沒有得到所需的一切所保障……這將使轉向國內由需求驅動的模式變得困難。”

除非採取重大行動，否則中國經濟的未來看起來不再像一個年輕的發電機，而更像一個古老的、移動緩慢的胖子。 上週，彭博社報道稱，政策制定者正在考慮實施 1,370 億美元的適度刺激措施 - 僅足以實現本已相對較低的年度成長目標，不是向改革進發。

Shih說: 「經濟中有健康的部分，必須處理的只有殭屍化的部分，」。 “看起來他們現在並沒有這樣做，這將會對增長造成越來越大的拖累。我認為緩慢的增長會導致一個極為嚴重的就業和資本外逃問題，也可能會出現政治不穩定。”

但同樣，那只是可能性，而不是一定性。 由於現在它的首要任務是權力 - 其得着更為有癖瘾性 - 北京已經表明它願意承擔這一風險。

（待續）

Note:

Proprietary Index means a designated group of securities or instruments that measures or represents the performance of a specific segment of the market.