Recently Business Inside carried the following article:
It’s official: The era of China’s global dominance is
over (1/3)
Linette Lopez – Business Insider
Mon, October 16, 2023 at 2:22 a.m. GMT+8
We've reached the end of an era for the Chinese economy.
For the past three decades, China has been on the upswing of
a supercycle that saw an almost uninterrupted expansion of the country's
capacity to manufacture, appetite to consume, and ability to project power
across the world economy. The Chinese Communist Party relentlessly pursued
economic development over all else, even when that single-mindedness pushed the
party to make debilitating policy mistakes — creating a massive bubble in the
property market, saddling provinces with loads of debt, and failing to
transition away from an overreliance on investment. There was no time to stop
for corrections while China's mind was on money alone.
This era of expansion was not only a
boon for Beijing, it also helped fuel global demand. Countries relied on
China's hunger for speedy modernization and industrial might to supercharge
their own development. Even American companies saw China as the next great
global market — and made bets accordingly.
They lost those
bets.
President Xi Jinping has shifted the
CCP's raison d'être to national security over the economy. Getting rich isn't
China's big project anymore; the project is power. As a result, both the
government's priorities and behavior have changed. In the past, whenever it
seemed like a recession was on the horizon, the CCP came to rescue. There's no
hefty stimulus coming this time. Nor will the explosive growth that experts
once expected from China return. Beijing's relationship with the outside world
is no longer guided by the principles of economic rationality, but rather its
yearning for political power.
"This isn't about the economy anymore, it's all about
advanced technology and weaponry," Lee Miller, the founder of the Chinese
economic surveyor China Beige Book, told me.
In response, American businesses
need to consider how else Beijing's decision-making may now be flipped on its
axis. For everyone from American farmers to pharmaceutical companies, this
means shrinking demand and unstable supply chains. For policymakers, it means a
China that is harder to mollify when conflicts arise. For the rest of us, it's
a more precarious world.
A spent economic
system
The Chinese economy has been bending under the weight of its
structural problems for almost a decade now, but since the end of Xi's
COVID-lockdown policy, it's become clear that its growth model is well and
truly broken. Beijing's story so far has been to claim that, like other
economies on the mend from the pandemic, China will in time resume its normal
growth pattern. Instead, it looks like the economy is falling behind.
Let's start with the country's real-estate market, the
importance of which cannot be overstated. Not only is it the biggest source of
wealth for Chinese households, real estate is also the mechanism through which
local governments are financed. Instead of property taxes, municipalities sell
large swaths of land to property developers and then use the revenue for basic
social services like fixing roads and paying out pensions. Cities like Shanghai
and Beijing get a lot of attention, but they make up just a fraction of the
property market. Property firms did the most building in third-tier cities
where people aren't as wealthy. This is where you'll find China's infamous
ghost cities.
It's been clear for years that the Chinese real-estate market
has been in trouble. China has a population of 1.4 billion, but it has built
housing for a population of 3 billion, according to expert estimates. Many of
the mega-developments became empty monuments to Beijing's insatiable desire for
growth. In Shenyang, farmers have taken over a development of empty mansions
for cattle grazing.
Worried that the sector would implode, Beijing attempted on
multiple occasions to limit the credit that was fueling the bubble. But because
real estate played such a vital role as a government-funding mechanism, China
had to keep building, despite these troubles. Authorities didn't want to change
the way local governments funded themselves or allow Chinese household finances
to crumble, so they could not let prices fall. That credit addiction remains.
Chinese real estate
But this system, supported by speculation and easy money, is
starting to break down. Country Garden, China's largest real-estate developer,
is on the brink of collapse. In a sign that Beijing has grown tired of this
game, Xu Jiayin, the chairman of Evergrande, another embattled real-estate
behemoth, has been detained by authorities. Money-starved provinces are being
forced to ask for bailouts — which the federal government doesn't want to give
— and sell assets that the local governments claim are illiquid. The country's
massive, opaque shadow-banking sector, which served as the backbone for the
real-estate boom, is also under pressure. At least one $87 billion money
manager, Zhongrong Trust, skipped
payments to investors this summer, sparking protests.
"We've not been in a situation where so many developers
are defaulting and consumers are questioning whether or not they should prepay
for an apartment," Charlene Chu, the managing director and senior analyst
at Autonomous Research, told me. "Before they were thinking, 'Prices are
rising so fast, I need to get in.' Now prices are declining and the urgency to
buy has vanished, so they're waiting."
Official data has shown relatively modest price declines so
far, but like a lot of official economic data coming from Beijing these days,
it's hard to take those numbers seriously. Private data shows prices falling by
15% in metropolises like Shenzhen and Shanghai. In tier-two and tier-three
cities, prices have fallen by as much as 50%, according to Bloomberg.
"Eighty percent of all sales by area are in tier-three and below
cities," Chu said, adding that many of these places are facing long-term
structural problems. "If their market doesn't come back, the entire market
doesn't come back."
(to be continued)
Translation
我們已經走到了中國經濟時代的終點。
過去三十年來，中國一直處於一個超級週期的上升階段，其製造能力、消費慾望以及在世界經濟中投射力量的能力幾乎不間斷地擴張。 中國共產黨堅持不懈地追求經濟發展高於一切，即使這種專注導致該黨犯下嚴重的政策錯誤 - 在房地產市場製造巨大泡沫，讓各省背負沉重債務，以及未能擺脫過度依賴投資經濟的轉型。 當中國的心思只在金錢上時，沒有時間停下來修正。
這個擴張時代不僅有利於北京，也有助於刺激全球需求。 各國依賴中國對快速現代化和工業實力的渴望來推動自身發展。 就連美國公司也將中國視為下一個龐大的全球市場，並做出了相應的押注。
他們輸掉了那些押注。
習近平主席已將中共存在的理由存轉向國家安全而非經濟。 致富不再是中國的大工程； 大工程就是政治權力。 結果，政府的優先事項和行為都發生了變化。 過去，每當經濟衰退即將到來時，中共都會出手相救。 這次沒有重大刺激措施。 專家們曾經預期中國的爆炸性成長也不會重現。 北京與外部世界的關係不再以經濟理性原則為指導，而是以對政治權力的渴望為指導。
中國經濟調查機構中國褐皮書的創始人 Lee
Miller
告訴我: 「這不再是經濟的問題，而是先進技術和武器裝備的問題」。
作為回應，美國企業需要考慮北京的決策現在可能如何轉變。 對於從美國農民到製藥公司的所有人來說，這意味著需求萎縮和供應鏈不穩定。 對政策制定者來說，這意味著中國在衝突時更難安撫。 對我們其他人來說，這是一個更不穩定的世界。
一個已耗盡的經濟體系
近十年來，中國經濟一直受到結構性問題的重壓，但自習近平的新冠封鎖政策結束以來，很明顯，其成長模式已被徹底打破。 迄今為止，北京方面的說法一直是聲稱，與其他從疫情中恢復過來的經濟體一樣，中國將及時恢復正常的成長模式。 相反，經濟似乎正在落後。
讓我們從中國的房地產市場開始，其重要性怎麼強調都不為過。 房地產不僅是華人家庭最大的財富來源，也是地方政府用來融資的機制。 市政府不徵收物業稅，而是將大片土地出售給房地產開發商，然後將收入用於修路和支付退休金等基本社會服務。 上海和北京等城市受到了許多關注，但它們只佔房地產市場的一小部分。 房地產公司在人們不那麼富裕的三線城市建造了最多的建築。 在這裡你會發現中國臭名昭著的無人入住鬼城。
多年來，中國房地產市場一直陷入困境是顯而易見的。 根據專家估計，中國有14億人口，但為30億人口建造了住房。 許多大型開項目都成為了北京永不能滿足的成長慾望的見証空碑。 在瀋陽，農民接管了一片空置的豪宅用於放牧之用。
由於擔心該產業會崩潰，北京多次試圖限制助長泡沫的信貸。 但由於房地產作為政府融資機制發揮如此重要的作用，因此儘管存在這些問題，中國仍必須繼續建造。 當局不想改變地方政府的融資方式, 或讓中國家庭財務崩潰，因此他們不能讓價格下跌。 對信貸的成癮依然存在。
中國房地產
但這個由投機和寬鬆貨幣支持的體係正在開始崩潰。 中國最大的房地產開發商碧桂園正處於崩潰的邊緣。 另一個陷入困境的房地產巨頭恆大集團董事長許家印已被當局拘留，這表明北京已經厭倦了這場遊戲。 資金匱乏的省份被迫尋求紓困（中央政府不想提供紓困），並出售地方政府聲稱缺乏流動性的資產。 作為房地產繁榮支柱的中國規模龐大、不透明的影子銀行業也面臨壓力。 今年夏天，至少一家價值 870 億美元的基金管理公司中融信託沒有向投資者還款，引發了抗議。
Autonomous Research 董事總經理兼高級分析師 Charlene Chu 告訴我： “我們還沒有遇到過如此多的開發商違約、消費者質疑是否應該預付買房子的費用。” “以前他們思考
‘價格上漲如此之快，我需要入市’。” 現在價格正在下降，購買的緊迫性已經消失，所以他們正在等待。”
到目前為止，官方數據顯示價格下跌相對溫和，但就像最近來自北京的許多官方經濟數據一樣，很難認真看待這些數字。 私人數據顯示，深圳和上海等大都市的房價下跌了15%。 根據彭博社報道，二、三線城市的房價下跌幅度高達
50%。 Chu說「以地區計算，80%的銷售活動都發生在三線及以下城市，」，並補充說，其中許多地方都面臨著長期的結構性問題。 “如果他們的市場沒有恢復，整個市場就不會恢復。”
（待續）
