China’s claims over South China Sea - US officially denied it as "Completely illegal"

Recently Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition reported the following:

南シナ海巡る中国主張、米が公式に否定　「完全に違法」

トランプ政権 米中衝突 中国・台湾 北米

2020/7/14 7:29 (2020/7/14 12:58更新)

 【ワシントン=永沢毅】ポンペオ米国務長官は13日、南シナ海での中国の海洋進出に関して声明を出し「南シナ海の大半の地域にまたがる中国の海洋権益に関する主張は完全に違法だ」と批判した。米国が南シナ海での中国の権益などに関する主張を公式に否定するのは初めてとみられる。

ポンペオ氏は南シナ海を巡る中国の主張を否定した2016年7月のオランダ・ハーグの仲裁裁判所の判決を支持する考えを示した。

声明はこの判決から12日で4年を迎えたのにあわせたもの。各国が新型コロナウイルスの対応に追われる中で中国は南シナ海での勢力圏の拡大をめざす動きを加速しており、米国は強い警告を発した。米中対立が一段と先鋭化するのは確実だ。

ポンペオ氏は声明で「世界は中国が南シナ海を自らの海洋帝国として扱うのを認めない」とし、個別の係争案件に言及。ハーグの判決に基づき、フィリピンと中国が主権を争うミスチーフ礁について「中国には正当な領有権や海洋権益はない」と否定した。

中国が主張するマレーシア沖のジェームズ礁の領有権やベトナム沖のバンガード堆、マレーシア沖のルコニア礁での権益などもすべて否定。「これらの海域での他国の漁業や炭化水素開発を中国が妨害するのは違法だ」と批判した。

16年7月のハーグ仲裁裁判所の判決は南シナ海問題に関する初の国際的な司法判断で、中国独自の「九段線」に国際法上の根拠がないと認定する内容。九段線はベトナム沖からマレーシア沖、フィリピン沖を囲む線で、中国が南シナ海で実効支配を広げる根拠としてきた。

ポンペオ氏は声明で「中国は東南アジアの沿岸国の主権を侵して海洋資源から締め出し、国際法を『武力の正当性』で置き換えている」と非難。九段線について「中国は筋の通った法的な根拠を示していない」と断じ「略奪的な中国の世界観は21世紀にはあり得ない」との見解を示した。

これまでも米国は南シナ海問題では国際法を尊重した平和的な解決を求めてきたが、中国の主張を明確には違法と指摘せず、九段線は不当と批判するにとどめていた。今回の声明ではフィリピンやベトナム、マレーシアといった中国と権益を争っている国々を支持し、中国の主張を否定する立場を明確にした。

南シナ海では7月、米中がともに軍事演習を実施するなど緊張が高まっている。

Translation

[Washington = Takeshi Nagasawa] US Secretary of State Pompeo issued a statement on March 13 regarding China's advance into the South China Sea, saying that "The claim regarding China's maritime interests across most of the South China Sea is completely illegal." It would be the first time that the United States officially denied claims about China's interests in the South China Sea.

Pompeo expressed his support for the July 2016 Arbitration Court decision in the Hague, the Netherlands, which denied China's claims over the South China Sea.

The statement on the 12^th tied in with the 4th anniversary of the Court decision being passed. The US issued a strong warning as China was accelerating its efforts to expand its sphere of influence in the South China Sea when other countries were busily responding to the new coronaviruses. It was certain that this would further sharpen the US-China conflict.

Pompeo said in a statement that "The world does not allow China to treat the South China Sea as its own maritime empire," citing separate disputes. Based on the Hague's ruling regarding the sovereign dispute between Philippines and China over Mischief Reef, he denied China in saying that "China has no legitimate sovereignty and maritime interests."

He also denied all the claim that China made to the James Reef off Malaysia, the Vanguard Bank off Vietnam, and the Luconia Reef off Malaysia. He said that "It is illegal for China to disrupt other countries' fisheries and hydrocarbon exploitation in these areas,"

The Hague Arbitration Court's decision in July 2016 was the first international judicial decision on the South China Sea issue, and it was found that China's self-claimed "9-dash line" had no basis in international law. The 9-dash line was a line that encircled the coast of Vietnam, the coast of Malaysia, and the coast of the Philippines, it had been the basis for China to expand its effective control in the South China Sea.

Pompeo said in a statement criticized that, "China is invading the sovereignty of coastal states in Southeast Asia to shut out marine resources and replace international law with ‘a force of right’". Regarding the nine-dash line, he concluded that, "China does not show us a legitimate legal basis," and showed a viewpoint of it was "A predatory Chinese world view that cannot exist in the 21st century."

Until now, the United States had sought a peaceful solution to the South China Sea issue by respecting international law, but did not explicitly point out that China's claims were illegal, and only criticized the "9-dash line” as unjust. In this statement this time, it supported countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia who were in conflict with China, and clarified its position to deny China's claims.

In the South China Sea in July, tensions were rising with the US and China conducting military exercises at the same time.

              So, it is the first time for the US to officially show its stance over the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea between China and its neighboring countries. It is an indication that the US is raising the US-China tension.

Toyota adopts special steel plates made in China for making EVs, nearing Japanese in quality

Recently Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition reported the following:

トヨタ、EVで中国製特殊鋼板採用　品質で日本勢に迫る

自動車・機械 環境エネ・素材 中国・台湾

2020/7/13 18:00 (2020/7/13 18:34更新) 日本経済新聞　電子版

電気自動車（EV）に使う電磁鋼板と呼ばれる高機能な鋼材について、トヨタ自動車が中国最大手の宝武鋼鉄集団の製品を一部で採用することが13日、分かった。同鋼板は高い生産技術が必要で、これまでは主に日系の製鉄大手から調達してきた。中国の鉄鋼業界は汎用品の大量供給を強みとしてきたが、質でも日本勢を追い上げ始めた。

トヨタが国内で生産するハイブリッド車（HV）とEV向けに、このほど品質面での承認を出した。宝武はすでに中国からの輸出を始めたもようだ。日本車大手が国内で生産する乗用車に中国メーカー製の電磁鋼板を採用するのは今回が初めてとみられる。

電磁鋼板は電動車の基幹部品であるモーターなどに使う。特殊な処理で鋼材に磁気を持たせており、不純物を取り除くなど高度な生産技術が必要になる。モーターの効率的な駆動には欠かせず、航続距離など省エネ性能に直結する。高い品質が求められるため、トヨタ向けなどの製品を供給できるのはこれまで日本製鉄など一部の鉄鋼大手に限られていた。

採用数量はまだ限られているもようだが、トヨタ幹部は「品質は日本製と遜色ない。電動車の普及が見込まれる中で調達先を多様化する」と語る。日本鉄鋼連盟の調査によると、宝武はEV大手の米テスラにも供給を始めたもようだ。

中国政府は2025年にEVなど環境対応車の割合を18年の4%から25%に高める計画を掲げる。中国はすでに世界で最もEVの販売台数が多い。35年のEV市場は中国が18年比13.7倍の1056万台と成長が続く見通し。欧州も同32.1倍の674万台と拡大が予想されている。

電磁鋼板の引き合いも増える中、製鉄首位の宝武が需要の取り込みを狙う。宝武は16年、国有企業の宝鋼集団（当時中国5位）と武漢鋼鉄集団（同11位）が合併して誕生した。世界鉄鋼協会によると、19年の粗鋼生産量では欧州アルセロール・ミタルに次いで世界2位だ。

電磁鋼板では中国でのシェアが6割に上っており、2023年までに上海市の製鉄所に24億元（約400億円）を投じてさらなる増産体制を整える。中国3位の江蘇沙鋼集団なども19年から生産能力の増強に乗り出している。

自動車向けを中心とする高付加価値品での中国勢の台頭に、国内大手は警戒を強めている。中国は世界の6割の粗鋼を生産するが、これまでは建材向けなどの汎用品が中心だった。中国が先端分野の技術力でも追いついてくれば、収益源にしている高機能品も価格の下落などが進みかねない。

Translation

Regarding high-performance steel called electromagnetic steel sheet used in electric vehicles (EV), it was understood that Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. would adopt some of the products of Bao Wu Steel Group which was the biggest in China. The steel sheet required high production technology and had been procured mainly from major Japanese steelmakers. While the Chinese steel industry had long been strong in the mass supply of general-purpose products, yet it had started to catch up with the Japanese in terms of quality.

For hybrid vehicles (HVs) and EVs that were produces domestically, Toyota had recently approved the quality of the product. It seemed that China Bao Wu had already started to export its products. This was the first time a major Japanese car manufacturer had adopted electromagnetic steel sheets manufactured by a Chinese manufacturer for use in passenger cars production in Japan.

Electromagnetic steel sheets were used for motors which were the core parts of electric vehicles. The steel was made to have magnetism by a special treatment, and an advanced production technology such as removing impurities was required. It was indispensable for efficient driving of the motor and was directly linked to energy-saving performance such as cruising range. Since high quality was required, until now it had been limited to some major steel companies such as Nippon Steel to supply products to Toyota and others.

Although it seemed that the number to be adopted was still limited, Toyota executives said that "the quality is comparable to that made in Japan. We will diversify our suppliers while expecting the electric vehicles would become popular". According to a survey conducted by the Japan Iron and Steel Federation, it seemed that Bao Wu had started supplying to Tesla, a major EV giant.

The Chinese government planned to increase the proportion of EVs and other environmentally friendly vehicles from 4% in 2018 to 25% in 2025. China had already sold the most EVs in the world. China was expected to continue to grow, and  the EV market in 2035 would reach 10.56 million units, which would be 13.7 times higher than in 2018. Europe was also expected to expand 32.1 times to 6.74 million units.

While the number of inquiries about electrical steel sheets was increasing, Bao Wu as the top steelmaker aimed to capture the demand. Bao Wu was born in 2016 when the state-owned enterprises Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd (5th place in China at that time) and Wuhan Steel Group (11th place) merged. According to the World Iron and Steel Institute, it ranked second in the world in crude steel production in 2019, after Europe's ArcelorMittal.

China had a 60% share of electromagnetic steel sheets, and by 2023 it would invest 2.4 billion yuan (about 40 billion yen) at a steel plant in Shanghai to establish a system to further increase production. The third-largest group in China, Jiangsu Shagang Group Co., Ltd. and others had also started to increase its production capacity since 2019.

With the rise of Chinese companies in high-value-added products mainly for automobiles, major Japanese companies were increasingly cautious. China produced 60% of the world's crude steel, but until now, it has mainly focused on general-purpose products such as building materials. If China could catch up with the technological strengths in advanced fields, prices of highly functional products, which were the source of profits, could decline.

              So, the high-quality steel production ability of China is approaching the world’s top standard. China will continue to compete with Japan and other leading countries in high quality steel production.

 

“Seaweed salad” is the cause of group food poisoning at school lunch - Yashio Saitama

Recently NHK News On-line reported the following:

給食の集団食中毒 原因は「海藻サラダ」 埼玉 八潮

2020年7月13日 21時51分

埼玉県八潮市で先月、給食を食べた市内の小中学生など3400人余りが下痢や腹痛などの症状を訴えた集団食中毒で、埼玉県は給食の「海藻サラダ」が原因だったことを明らかにしました。

先月、八潮市では給食を食べた市内すべての小中学校の児童生徒のほか教員の半数にあたる、3453人が下痢や腹痛などの症状を訴えたことから、県の保健所は給食が原因の集団食中毒と断定し調べを進めていました。

その結果、子どもたちの検体と先月26日の給食で提供された「海藻サラダ」から、いずれも病原大腸菌「Ｏ7」が、検出されたということです。

県によりますと、各校で給食が提供される前日の25日に、市内の「四季亭」八潮工場で、海藻サラダの材料の海藻ミックスと乾燥わかめを水戻しした際に加熱処理を行っていなかったということです。

八潮市教育委員会によりますと、市内の小中学校の給食の再開のめどは立っておらず来月7日までの1学期の間は給食を再開せず、弁当を持参してもらうことを決めました。

Translation

Last month in Saitama Prefecture Yashio City, over 3,400 students of elementary school and junior high school who ate a school lunch had a group food poisoning with complains of symptoms such as diarrhea and abdominal pain; Saitama Prefecture revealed that the "seaweed salad" of the school lunch was the cause.

Last month in Yashio City, 3,453 people, all elementary and junior high school students in the city together with half of the teaching staff who ate school lunch, complained about symptoms such as diarrhea and abdominal pain. The prefecture's public health center had confirmed that it was a group food poisoning caused by school lunch and was proceeding with the investigation.

As a result, the pathogenic Escherichia coli "O7" was detected in both the specimens of children and the "seaweed salad" provided at the school lunch last month.

According to the prefecture, on the 25th the day before lunch was provided at each school, in the “Shikitei” Yashio factory in the city, heating treatment had not been performed when the seaweed mix, together with the dried wakame which was a material for seaweed salad, were being soaked.

According to the Yashio City Board of Education, the no prospect of resuming the city's elementary and junior high schools in school lunch might exist until the 7th next month, because the school would not restart school lunch for one semester. It was decided to ask people to bring along their lunch boxes.

              So, the lunch provider has made a mistake in preparing the seaweed salad.

Japan to develop next-generation stealth fighter - US approves sale of F35

Recently CNN.co.jp reported the following:

日本、次世代ステルス戦闘機開発へ　米はＦ３５の売却承認

2020.07.10 Fri posted at 18:30 JST

 （ＣＮＮ） 日本政府は１０日までに、世界最高水準の性能を持つ次世代のステルス戦闘機を開発する計画を明らかにした。航空自衛隊Ｆ２戦闘機の後継機として、２０３０年代の防空任務を担う見通しだ。

ＮＨＫによると、防衛省が自民党の国防議員連盟で発表した。エンジン２基を搭載した第６世代の戦闘機で、２０３１年度に量産初号機を製造するという。

空自には現在、米国のＦ１６を原型にしたエンジン１基のＦ２が約１００機所属している。

日本の２０年度の防衛予算のうち、２８０億円以上がこの次世代戦闘機のプログラムに割り当てられている。この中には戦闘機とともに運用可能なドローンの開発費用も含まれる。

防衛装備庁は次世代戦闘機が備え得る特徴として、データリンクにより複数の戦闘機が目標情報を共有できる統合火器管制システムや、米ステルス戦闘機Ｆ２２にみられるような内装型のウェポンベイ（兵器倉）、機体の旋回性能を向上させる推力偏向ノズルを挙げた。

河野太郎防衛相は先月、記者団に中国軍機の領空接近に空自の戦闘機が日々緊急発進（スクランブル）で対応していると述べ、日本の保有する戦闘機群に掛かる圧力に言及した。

一方、米国務省は９日、１００機を超える最新鋭ステルス戦闘機Ｆ３５の日本への売却を承認した。内訳は離陸に滑走路を使用するＦ３５Ａが６３機、短距離離陸・垂直着陸が可能なＦ３５Ｂが４２機となっている。売却額は推計で２３０億ドル。

米国防安全保障協力局は、この売却はアジア太平洋地域での政治的安定性と経済発展の力となる主要同盟国の安全保障を増強するものだと言及。米国の外交政策と国家安全保障の目標達成を支援するもので、「日本に対し強力で効果的な自衛能力の開発と維持で支援することは、米国の国益に極めて重要だ」とも述べた。

Translation

(CNN) By the 10th the Japanese government had announced plans to develop a next-generation stealth fighter with world-class performance. As a successor to the Air Self-Defense Force F2 fighter, it was expected to carry out air defense missions in the 2030s.

According to NHK, the Ministry of Defense announced it at the Liberal Democratic Party's National Defense League. As the 6th generation fighter equipped with two engines, the first mass-production of aircrafts would be in the year 2031.

The ASDF currently had about 100 one engine-F2 which was based on US F16 engines.

Of Japan's FY2020 defense budget, over 28 billion yen had been allocated to this next-generation fighter program. This included the cost of developing a drone that could operate with a fighter.

The Defense Equipment Agency had listed out the features that next-generation fighters could have, such as an integrated fire control system that allowed multiple fighters to share target information via a data link, an internal weapon bay (weapon storage) as seen in the Stealth fighter F22, and a thrust deflection nozzle that improved the turning performance of the aircraft.

 Last month, Defense Minister Taro Kono told reporters that JASDF fighters were responding to the airspace approach of Chinese military aircraft by emergency launches (scramble) every day, and mentioned about the pressure they put on Japanese fighter groups.

Meanwhile, the US Department of State approved the sale of more than 100 state-of-the-art stealth fighter F35s to Japan on the 9th. The breakdown was 63 nos. of F35A aircraft that used the runway for takeoff; and 42 nos. of F35B aircraft that could make short distances and vertical landings. The sale price was estimated at 23 billion dollars.

The US Department of Defense and Security Cooperation said the sale would strengthen the security of its key allies, which were the energy source of political stability and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region, and said that " to assist Japan in developing and maintaining strong and effective self-defence capabilities is crucial to US national interests”.

              So, in a way I would say that the US has many friends globally. In Asia, countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are more than willing to spend a lot of money to buy weapon from the US for defense purpose. Globally in other areas, the US also has friends, it can “coerce” some English speaking countries to take action together, for example, to restrict using Huawei 5G products in their respective countries.

Ming Dynasty encyclopedia "Yongle dadian" won a bid for 970 million yen

Recently CNN.co.jp reported the following:

明代の百科事典「永楽大典」、９．７億円で落札

2020.07.09 Thu posted at 11:20 JST

Jack Guy, CNN

中国の明代に作られた百科事典「永楽大典」が競売に出品され、予想を１０００倍以上上回る８００万ユーロ（約９億７０００万円）で落札された。

永楽大典は、明の３代皇帝の永楽帝の指示によって編纂（へんさん）された。永楽帝の在位は１４０２～１４２４年。

競売を行ったフランス企業によれば、１４０４年から１４０８年にかけて行われた編纂には２０００人以上の学者が携わった。

永楽大典は世界でも最大級の百科事典でもともとは２万２８７７巻からなる。

１５６２年には副本が作られたが、原本は戦争や盗難などのために散逸した。

今回出品されたのは副本のうちの２巻で非常にまれなもの。当時は印刷技術も発展していたが、分量の多さから手で記されている。ひとつは中国の湖について書かれており、もうひとつは葬儀について記されていた。匿名の買い手が手数料を含む８１億２８００万ユーロで落札した。事前の落札予想額は５０００～８０００ユーロだった。

大英図書館には２４巻が所蔵されている。

Translation

An encyclopedia "Yongle Dadian" that was made in China's Ming Dynasty was put up for auction, and it was sold for 8 million euros (about 970 million yen), which was 1000 times more than expected.

The Yongle Daidian was compiled based on the instructions of the third emperor of Ming, Yongle. The reign of the Emperor Yongle was 1402-1424.

According to a French auctioning company, more than 2000 scholars were involved in its compilation from 1404 to 1408.

Yongle Dadian was one of the largest encyclopedias in the world and originally consisted of 22,877 volumes.

A duplicate was made in 1562, as the original was lost due to war and theft.

Two of the duplicates that were exhibited this time were very rare. While printing technology had been developed at the time, but due to the large volume, it was written by hand. One volume was about lakes in China and the other was about funerals. An anonymous buyer won the bid for €8,128 million including fees. The estimated price before bidding was between 5,000 and 8,000 euros.

 The British Library held 24 volumes.

              I am interested in knowing who is the buyer of these two volumes.

Chinese semiconductor companies raise 2.2 trillion yen, accelerating domestic production against the US

Recently Nihon Keizai Shimbun Electronic Edition reported the following:

中国半導体企業、2.2兆円調達　米国対抗へ国産化加速

半年で2019年の2.2倍　政府系が支援

2020/7/6 23:00 (2020/7/7 5:27更新)

 【上海=張勇祥】半導体の国産化をめざす中国企業が資本調達を急拡大している。2020年の調達額は5日時点で約2兆2千億円と、半年で19年通年の約2.2倍となった。支援の主役は政府系ファンドと19年に開設した新しい株式市場だ。中国のハイテク覇権の阻止を狙う米国に対抗し、生き残りを懸けて半導体の自給率向上を急ぐ。

中国は半導体自給率が10%台半ばにとどまる一方、高いシェアを誇るスマートフォンや次世代通信規格「5G」向け機器は国際的な影響力の源泉になっている。ハイテクでの中国台頭を抑えるために米国が半導体市場から中国を締め出せば、これら機器の生産が難しくなるうえ、米国との覇権争いで脱落しかねない。

日本経済新聞社が中国の民間データベースや企業の開示、メディア報道などをもとに半導体関連企業の株式による調達を集計した。20年の調達額は5日までで約1440億元（約2兆2千億円、払い込みが済んでいない案件も含む）と約半年で19年通年（約640億元=1兆円弱）を大きく上回った。公表案件を積み上げると、過去数年の調達額はおおよそ6千億～1兆円弱だった。

背景には、米国が仕掛ける「半導体戦争（チップウォー）」への中国政府の危機感がある。中国排除を進めるトランプ米政権から18年に禁輸措置を受けた通信機器の中興通訊（ZTE）は破綻の間際に追い込まれた。

華為技術（ファーウェイ）は最先端の半導体の調達に支障を来している。半導体製造装置の一部も輸入が難しい。中央・地方政府は相次ぎ半導体の国産化を目的とした半導体ファンドを設立し、中国企業への投資を本格化している。

14年には政府系の半導体ファンド「国家集成電路産業投資基金」を設立し、19年までに1400億元の投資を終えたとされる。19年秋には第2号ファンドを新設し、20年から投資を本格化。上海市や北京市などもファンドを立ち上げ、中央・地方一体で半導体国産化へ支援を加速させる。

代表例が中国の半導体受託生産最大手、中芯国際集成電路製造（SMIC）だ。20年の調達額はグループ全体で1兆円規模にのぼる。

SMICは月内にも中国版ナスダックとされる新市場「科創板」に上場、最大で500億元あまりを調達する。グループ会社は地方政府系ファンドなどから22億5千万ドル（約2400億円）の出資を受ける。世界最大手の台湾積体電路製造（TSMC）に代わる存在に育成する狙いだ。

中国はハイテク産業の育成策「中国製造2025」で、半導体自給率を70%まで高める目標を掲げる。米調査会社ICインサイツによると、自給率は24年時点でも2割強の見通し。米中対立が深まるなか、国産化のペース加速が急務だ。

量産や製造装置の分野では、中国の半導体企業の世界との技術力の開きがなお大きい。SMICの技術水準はTSMCと比べ「2世代以上遅れている」との評価も多い。国産化戦略が狙い通りに成果を上げるには、資金面に加えて技術面でも乗り越えなければならない課題が多い。

Translation

[Shanghai=Zhang Yuxiang] Chinese companies that were aiming for domestic production of semiconductors were rapidly expanding their capital procurement. Procurement amount in 2020 as of the 5^th, being half of a year, was about 2.2 trillion yen which was 2.2 times as much as the full year in 2019. The main supporters were government funds and the new stock market opened in 2019. Against the United States that aimed at preventing China's high-tech hegemony, China rushed to improve its semiconductor self-sufficiency ratio for survival.

In China, while the semiconductor self-sufficiency rate remained in the mid 10% range, smartphones, which boasted a high market share, and devices for the next-generation communication standard “5G” were sources of international influence. If the United States shut out China from the semiconductor market in order to check the rise of China in high-tech, China would have difficulties to produce these devices, and it might drop out in a battle for hegemony with the United States.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun Inc. aggregated the procurement of shares of semiconductor-related companies based on Chinese private databases, corporate disclosures, and media reports, etc. Procurement amount for 2020 by 5^th day, about half of the year, was about 144 billion yuan (about 2.2 trillion yen, including unpaid projects). It greatly exceeded the full year of 2019 (about 64 billion yuan = less than 1 trillion yen). After adding publicly announced projects, the amount of funds raised in the past few years was from about 600 billion to less than 1 trillion yen.

Behind this was the Chinese government's sense of crisis regarding the "Semiconductor war (Chip War)" set by the United States. Trump, who was pursuing China's exclusion, since 2018 embargoed Zhōngxìng Tōngxùn (ZTE), a telecommunications device company and pushed it to the brink of bankruptcy.

Huawei was causing an hinderance in the procurement of cutting-edge semiconductors. It was difficult to import some semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The central and local governments had set up semiconductor funds aimed at the domestic production of semiconductors one after another, and were making a full-scale investment in Chinese companies.

The government-owned semiconductor fund the "National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund" was established in 2014, and it was said that the investment of 140 billion yuan was completed by 2019. A second fund was newly established in the autumn of 2019, and investment began in earnest from 2020. Shanghai and Beijing cities would also launch funds to accelerate support for domestic production of semiconductors by the central and regions as a whole.

A representing example was China's largest semiconductor consignment production company, the Central Core International Integrated Circuit Manufacturing (SMIC). The total procurement amount for 2020 would reach 1 trillion yen for the entire group.

Within a month, SMIC would be listed on the so-called Chinese version of Nasdaq new market “Science and Technology Board,” and could raise up to 50 billion yuan. The group companies might receive investment of 2,250 million dollars (about 240 billion yen) from local government funds. The aim was to develop it into an alternative to the world's largest Taiwan Electric Cable Manufacturing (TSMC).

In the “Made in China 2025” on measure to foster high-tech industries, China aimed to raise the semiconductor self-sufficiency rate to 70%. According to a US research firm IC Insights, the self-sufficiency rate was expected to be over 20% as of 2024. With the deepening US-China conflict, it was urgent to accelerate the pace of domestic production.

In the fields of mass production and manufacturing equipment, China's semiconductor companies still had a large gap with the world in the capabilities in opening up technology. Many people said that the technical level of SMIC was "lagging behind two or more generations" compared to TSMC. In order for the domestic production strategy to achieve the desired results, there were many issues that must be overcome, not only in terms of funding but also in terms of technology.

              So, let’s see how and when China will reach its goal of 70% semiconductor self-sufficiency rate.

Hong Kong Democratic Preliminary Internal Election - 580,000 Votes: Greatly Exceed Target

Recently NHK News On-line reported the following:

香港民主派予備選、58万人が投票　目標大きく上回る

香港デモ 習政権 中国・台湾

2020/7/12 23:12 (2020/7/12 23:49更新)

【香港=木原雄士】香港の民主派が実施した立法会（議会）選挙の予備選が12日、2日間の日程を終えた。電子投票の参加者は約58万人と、民主派が目標に掲げた17万人を大きく上回った。政府高官が予備選が香港国家安全維持法に違反する可能性があると発言するなど締め付けが強まり、市民の関心が高まった。

予備選は9月の立法会選に向けて、民主派内の候補者を調整するために実施した。香港内の商店などに設けた約250の投票所には行列ができた。主催者は13日以降に結果を発表する。50人程度の候補者を30人ほどに絞り込む予定だ。

民主派は2019年の区議会議員選挙で獲得した票数の1割にあたる17万人の参加を目標に掲げていた。目標を大きく上回り、立法会選に向けた有権者の関心の高さを示した。

投票直前には民主派の締め付けとも取れる動きが相次いだ。選挙担当の政府高官が予備選が香港国家安全法で禁じた国家分裂や政権転覆にあたる可能性に言及。10日には警察が投票システムを運営する民間団体を捜索し、11日の投票開始が3時間遅れた。

こうした動きに市民が反発を強めた可能性がある。民主派の候補をめぐっては、当局が立候補を認めない可能性が取り沙汰されている。親中派からは香港国家安全法に反対する者の立候補を認めるべきではないとの声が出ている。

Translation

[Hong Kong = Yuji Kihara] The 2-day  preliminary election for the Legislative Council (parliament) held by Hong Kong democrats was ended  on the 12th. The number of participants in this electronic voting was about 580,000, by far exceeding the democratic target of 170,000. While the government officials said that this preliminary election might violate the Hong Kong National Security Act and was putting pressure on this activity, yet the citizens' interest was heightened.

A preliminary round was held to coordinate candidates within the democratic people that aimed at the Legislative Council election in September. There were queues at about 250 polling stations set up in shops etc. in Hong Kong. The organizer would announce the results after the 13th. It was planned to narrow down some 50 candidates to about 30.

While the democrats were aiming for the participation of 170,000 people, which was 10% of the votes received in the 2019 District Council election, the result far exceeded the target and reflected the high interest of voters toward the Legislative Council election.

Immediately before the voting, a series of action were being taken to tighten this democratic activity. A senior government official in charge of elections mentioned that this preliminary election could lead to a division of the country or the subversion of government, which was prohibited by the National Security Law of Hong Kong. On the 10th the police searched a private organization that would operate this voting system, and as such the starting of the voting activity on the 11th was delayed by 3 hours.

Government actions might have caused the citizen to backfire strongly. Regarding the democratic candidates, it was said that the authorities might not endorse them to become the Legislative Council election candidates. Pro-Chinese factions had said that those were against the Hong Kong National Security Law should not be admitted as election candidates.

              I would suggest that the high turn-out rate of this internal voting activity has a deeper meaning: it is an indication of the mood among those who support the democratic movement in Hong Kong. It is a challenge to the new National Security Law newly imposed on Hong Kong people. More than half a million of Hong Kong people have cast their votes this time despite the fact that top government officials said that this activity may have violated the new law. Whether these democratic candidates will be endorsed by the government is another battle the that democrats have to fight.

香港失去“特殊地位”是意味著什麼

Yahoo Finance on 3.7.2020 reported the following:

What Hong Kong Losing Its ‘Special Status’ Would Mean

Bloomberg Iain Marlow and Daniel Flatley,Bloomberg 10 hours ago

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(Bloomberg) -- Under the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, the U.S. treats Hong Kong, a semi-autonomous part of China with its own legal and economic system, differently than the Chinese mainland in trade, commerce and other areas. President Donald Trump has begun stripping away that “special status” to punish China for moves to tighten its grip on the city after a year of pro-democracy street protests. At its most extreme, that could mean the global financial hub being treated the same as any other Chinese city -- a seismic shift that could harm both economies at an already difficult time. China has already begun retaliating.

1. Is the special status gone?

It’s going. On May 27, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo notified Congress that the Trump administration no longer regarded Hong Kong as autonomous from mainland China. On June 29, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said the special status had therefore been revoked.

2. What’s been the impact?

In an opening salvo, Pompeo announced visa restrictions against unspecified Chinese officials; China did the same against Americans. Pompeo said the U.S. would also cease selling defense equipment to Hong Kong, a largely symbolic act that will mostly affect the city’s police and corrections forces. The Commerce Department made it harder to export sensitive American technology to Hong Kong by suspending special treatment in areas including export license exceptions; Hong Kong’s leader said the impact would be “minimal.” More far-reaching measures could follow. The city is still treated differently from the the mainland when it comes to tariffs, for instance.

3. Why so slow?

It’s up to Trump to decide how quickly he wants to move while he’s also threatening consequences for China over its handling of the coronavirus and its repression of minorities in Xinjiang province. Hurting China also carries additional risks for the U.S. economy, including the U.S.-China trade deal that Trump had considered one of his biggest achievements, which could affect his odds of winning re-election. Trump has made harsh comments but hasn’t threatened specific punishments for the Beijing government.

4. What’s at stake for Hong Kong and China?

While Hong Kong remains a key gateway from China to the rest of the world, it matters far less to the country’s fortunes than it once did. In 2019, 12% of China’s exports went to or through Hong Kong, down from 45% in 1992. China is also far less reliant on inflows of foreign capital and expertise, and has made a much lower priority of making the yuan an international currency. Nonetheless, the city still matters. Hong Kong’s open capital account and adherence to international standards of governance are unmatched by any mainland Chinese city and make it an important base for international banks and trading firms. Revoking the special status would be “the nuclear option” and “the beginning of the death of Hong Kong as we know it,” said Steve Tsang, director of the University of London’s SOAS China Institute.

5. And their financial markets?

One worst-case scenario: if the U.S. treats Hong Kong no differently than any other Chinese city, why wouldn’t ratings firms and investors do the same? It’s a question posed by Deutsche Bank, which noted that S&P Global Ratings has Hong Kong three notches above China while Moody’s and Fitch have Hong Kong one notch higher. The risk is that China’s own rating gets lowered in coming years and drags Hong Kong’s with it. At the same time, equity index providers may take a fresh look at Hong Kong, which is currently in the MSCI World Index with other developed markets. China is in the emerging market index, raising the question, should Hong Kong be treated the same as Shanghai and Shenzhen?

6. What about for the U.S.?

It has its own reasons for not rocking the boat too much. Hong Kong, the only semi-democratic jurisdiction under Chinese rule, offers U.S. companies a relatively safe way to access the Chinese market and employs a U.S. dollar peg, linking it with the American financial system. According to the Congressional Research Service, the largest U.S. trade surplus in 2019 was with Hong Kong — $36 billion. Hong Kong counted 278 U.S. companies with regional headquarters in the city that year and another 457 with offices. Hong Kong’s first justice minister after the handover to China in 1997, Elsie Leung, told the South China Morning Post in May that any damage would be mutual: “We are not just getting the benefits – it’s a free-trade arrangement which is good for both sides.”

7. How has China responded?

Despite the U.S. action, Chinese lawmakers approved new national security legislation for Hong Kong anyway. The Foreign Ministry has promised unspecified retaliation against what it terms foreign interference, insisting Hong Kong is purely an internal affair. China said last year it would sanction some U.S.-based activist groups including the National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House, and suspend port visits by U.S. Navy ships to Hong Kong. The official Xinhua News Agency has dismissed as “groundless” accusations about the loss of freedom or human rights issues in Hong Kong. It also noted that the 2018 Human Freedom Index compiled by the Fraser Institute, a Vancouver-based think tank, ranked Hong Kong at No. 3, well ahead of the U.S. at No. 17.

8. And Hong Kong?

The city’s leader, Chief Executive Carrie Lam, has defended the national security law (as has Li Ka-shing, Hong Kong’s richest tycoon). Lam also has said it would be “totally unacceptable” for foreign legislatures to interfere in Hong Kong’s internal affairs, and that sanctions would only complicate the problems in the city. (Lam was selected in 2017 by a committee of 1,200 political insiders overwhelmingly loyal to the Chinese government.) She has sought to reassure investors that the city still adheres to the rule of law and has an independent judiciary. She also has defended police actions.

9. Is this what the protesters have been seeking?

As a largely leaderless movement, the Hong Kong protests have made no official request for international assistance. But some prominent activists including Jimmy Lai and Joshua Wong called on Trump to hit China hard with sanctions, even to the point of revoking the city’s special trading status. Wong had testified last year in Washington in favor of the bill, seeking to put pressure on China. On the streets of Hong Kong, some protesters have made clear their interest in U.S. support by waving American flags, singing “The Star-Spangled Banner” and calling on Trump to “liberate” Hong Kong. Such rallying cries are now illegal in Hong Kong under the new national security law.

Translation

（彭博）- 根據1992年的《美國香港政策法》，美國以自己的法律和經濟制度對待中國半自治區香港，在貿易，商業等領域與中國大陸有所不同。唐納德·特朗普總統已開始剝奪這一“特殊身份”，以懲罰中國。因為在香港經過一年的民主抗爭之後，中國採取了加強對這座城市控制的行動。在最極端的情況下，這可能意味著全球金融中心與任何其他中國城市都將受到同等對待 - 如此巨大的變化可能會在本已艱難的時刻傷害這兩個經濟體。中國已經開始報復。

1.特殊身份消失了嗎？

是消失中。在5月27日，國務卿邁克爾·蓬佩奧（Michael Pompeo）通知國會，特朗普政府不再視香港從中國大陸有自治。 6月29日，商務部長威爾伯·羅斯（Wilbur Ross）表示，特殊身份因此已被撤銷。

2.產生了什麼影響？

在開場白中，蓬佩奧宣布了針對尚未指定的中國官員的簽證限制；中國對美國人也是如此。龐培說，美國也將停止向香港出售國防裝備，這在很大程度上是像徵性的行為，將在很大程度上影響香港的警察和懲教部隊。美國商務部通過在包括出口許可例外的領域中暫停特殊待遇，使向美國出口敏感的美國技術變得更加困難。香港領導人說，影響將是“微不足道”。更深遠的措施可能繼續有来。例如，在關稅方面，這座城市仍與大陸區別對待。

3.為什麼這麼慢？

要進展多快是由特朗普決定，同時還要威脅中國在處理冠狀病毒, 和對新疆少數民族的壓制中給中國帶來的後果。傷害中國還給美國經濟帶來其他風險，包括特朗普認為他最大成就之一的美中貿易協議，這可能會影響他贏得連任的機率。特朗普發表了嚴厲的評論，但沒有威脅要對北京政府進行具體處罰。

4.對香港和中國而言有什麼風險？

儘管香港仍然是中國通往世界其他地區的重要門戶，但它對中國財富的影響遠不如從前。 2019年，中國出口到香港, 或通過香港的產品佔總出口的12％，低於1992年的45％。中國對外國資本和專業知識的依賴也大大減少，將人民幣成為國際貨幣的優先級降低了。儘管如此，這座城市仍然很重要。香港的開放資本賬戶和對國際治理標準的遵守是中國大陸城市所無法比擬的，使其成為國際銀行和貿易公司的重要基地。倫敦大學SOAS中國研究所所長曾志偉說，取消特殊地位將是 “核選擇” 和 “我們所知的香港的死亡開始” 。

5.他們的金融市場？

一種最壞的情況是：如果美國對香港的待遇與中國其他城市相同，為什麼評級公司和投資者也不會這樣做呢？這是德意志銀行提出的一個問題。德意志銀行指出，標普全球評級中, 香港比中國高出三級，而穆迪和惠譽排名香港高中國一級。就風險而言，中國自身的評級在未來幾年會降低，從而拖累香港。同時，股票指數提供者可能會對香港重新審視，而香港目前正與其他發達市場一起納入MSCI世界指數。中國是在新興市場指數中, 這引出了一個問題，香港應否與上海和深圳被一視同仁嗎？

6.對於美國呢？

它有自己的原因，不會打擾現有狀況太多。香港是中國統治下唯一的半民主司法管轄區，為美國公司提供進入中國市場的相對安全的方法，並採用美元聯繫匯率制，將其與美國金融體系聯繫起來。根據國會研究服務局（Congressional Research Service）的數據，2019年美國最大的貿易順差是與香港的貿易 — 達360億美元。當年，香港共有278家美國公司，設其總部在香港，另有457家設有辦事處。在 1997年移交中國後，香港首位律政司梁愛詩（Elsie Leung）在5月對《南華早報》表示，任何損害都是相互的： “我們不僅能獲得好處 - 這是一項自由貿易安排，對雙方有好處。”

7.中國對此有何反應？

儘管美國採取了行動，但中國立法者還是批准了香港的新國家安全立法。 外交部已承諾對其所謂的外國干涉進行一些報復，堅稱香港純粹是內部事務。 中國去年表示，它將制裁包括美國國家民主基金會，人權觀察和自由之家在內的一些以美國為基地組織，併中止美國海軍船隻對香港的港口訪問。 官方的新華社對指控香港喪失自由或人權問題視為“毫無根據的”。 它還指出，總部位於溫哥華的智囊機構弗雷澤研究所（Fraser Institute）編制的《 2018年人類自由指數》將香港排在第3位，遠遠領先於美國的第17位。

8.香港呢？

該市的領導人，行政長官林鄭月娥為《國家安全法》辯護（香港首富李嘉誠也是如此）。林還表示，外國立法機關干涉香港內政是“完全不能接受的”，制裁只會使香港的問題複雜化。 （林氏於2017年由1200個一面倒忠於中國政府的政治內部人士組成的委員會選出。）她試圖向投資者保證，該市仍然遵守法治並擁有獨立的司法機構。她還為警察行動辯護。

9.這是示威者一直追求的目標嗎？

作為一種基本上沒有領導者的運動，香港抗議活動沒有正式要求國際援助。但是，包括黎智英（Jimmy Lai）和黃之鋒（Joshua Wong）在內的一些著名激進主義者呼籲特朗普對中國實施制裁，甚至撤銷該市的特殊貿易地位。黃去年曾在華盛頓作證，希望對該法案施加壓力。在香港的大街上，一些抗議者通過揮舞著美國國旗，唱著“星條旗”並呼籲特朗普“解放”香港，明確表示了對美國支持的興趣。根據新的國家安全法，這種集會呼聲現在在香港是非法的。

              So, President Donald Trump has begun stripping away that “special status” to punish China for tightening its grip on Hong Kong after a year of pro-democracy street protests in the city. How far he will go over this matter is still unknown.

香港的新國家安全法對商業有什麼味意 (下)

Yahoo Finance on 1.7.2020 reported the following

What Hong Kong’s New Security Law Means for Business (part II)

Bloomberg Bloomberg News,Bloomberg 12 hours ago

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(Continue from part I)

William Nee, a business and human rights analyst at Amnesty International’s Hong Kong office

In the short run, businesses in Hong Kong may feel some respite if violent protests subside. In the long run, the law will most likely embolden Beijing and local allies to put greater political pressure on companies and their employees to closely adhere to the Beijing’s agenda.

In the mainland, Beijing applies national security laws fairly arbitrarily and selectively. It’s quite possible that CEOs, or any business leaders in Hong Kong who supported the protests, could become targets if Chinese authorities want to prioritize such prosecutions. However, for the moment, no one knows how the authorities will use the law -- whether they will merely target people who engaged in violent actions against police or whether they their targets will be much broader against Hong Kong’s cultural and business leaders. The lack of clarity on Beijing’s true intentions is, quite frankly, one factor of uncertainty.

Alex Wong, asset management director of Ample Capital Ltd. in Hong Kong

The market has fully changed hands to reflect the impact of the law back when it was first announced -- the people who panicked and sold then have been replaced by those well aware of the risks and still prepared to participate, and they will not easily flee now. Even if it does affect sentiment within a day or two, the appetite from southbound funds for Hong Kong-listed new economy firms is still immense and mainland funds will likely buy up dips. The impact of the details of the law are limited as nothing comes completely unexpected.

Yiu Si-wing, a Hong Kong lawmaker who represents the tourism industry and chairman of China Travel Service (H.K.) Ltd.

Since last June, the protests and violent incidents have severely hurt the Hong Kong tourism industry. The passage of this new law will help to deter violent events in the future. It will have positive effect in restoring tourists’ confidence.

In the past year, tourists come to Hong Kong not knowing whether the roads would be blocked, the subway would be stopped, or the shops would be set on fire. The security law will significantly reduce the violence we once saw in the city. And it will help solve the trust crisis between mainlanders and Hongkongers.

Yu Yingbo, investment director at Shenzhen Qianhai United Fortune Fund Management Co.

In the stock market, I don’t think we should reasonably expect anything extreme. What panic or precautionary selling there was locally, southbound funds were more than eager to pick up, and the law has no material impact on the Chinese tech stocks, the most active part of the Hong Kong market now, and even the funds that exit might only be sitting it out for the short term.

The social reaction from the law, the push back on the ground -- has been far softer than expected, and the so-called retaliation from the U.S. Has been a mere pleasantry. It would seem that after this point the U.S. has little drive to impose sanctions on something that is already enacted. It just wouldn’t make sense to fixate on this in the coming months when they have so much on their hands.

Sam Lau, the owner of five hostels and two travel agencies in the normally bustling shopping district of Tsim Sha Tsui

After the introduction of the National Security Law, some foreign visitors may come to Hong Kong less frequently. U.S. residents may feel reluctant to visit Hong Kong, especially if the U.S. retaliates against Hong Kong or the U.S.-China confrontation escalates.

We will likely see fewer protesters on the street driven by impulse. The law will be very serious, and the consequence will be very tough. Except those who really don’t fear going into jail, most of the protesters will not go out as much.

But we are much more afraid of the pandemic than the security law. The pandemic kills our businesses, while the security law only affects a small group of people who breach the law. For Hong Kong tourism to return to the heydays of the past, we will need at least one or two years. Before that, we just have to tighten our belt and try to survive.

Richard Harris, a former director at Citi Private Bank who now runs Port Shelter Investment Management in Hong Kong

I think unfortunately there’s a bit of a perfect storm at the moment because we’ve got not only the national security law but we’ve also got Trump and Congress threatening to remove the special status. It really puts a big ceiling on Hong Kong’s growth.

Instead of the tremendous growth we’ve seen, there are going to be people going the other way as well -- major companies saying we’ll have more people in Singapore instead of Hong Kong, people deciding now is the time to move out.

I’m not completely negative on Hong Kong. I think it’ll still be a great place to do business. China needs Hong Kong still, just as Hong Kong needs China. That’s never going to change.

Ben Emons, head of global macro strategy at Medley Global Advisors

The next phase will be how far the U.S. is willing to go in terms sanctioning Chinese officials involved in drafting the security law, and their dealings with Chinese and U.S. and foreign financial institutions.

Chinese banks have less than 50 percent of their dollar liabilities—outstanding $ debt and other obligations—covered by dollar deposits. Foreign banks however, especially those with large dollar lending exposure in Hong Kong—e.g. Citigroup and HSBC—also have a lower coverage by Hong Kong domiciled dollar deposits.

The so-called ‘mismatch’ between dollar assets and liabilities is one of the key risks to Hong Kong and global markets. If sanctions on Chinese banks listed in Hong Kong causes a local dollar funding squeeze, then markets will reprice risk of all banks with high Hong Kong exposure.

Raymond Chen, portfolio manager at Keywise Capital Management (HK) Ltd.

There might be some volatility as Hong Kong stocks resume trading. But for both stock markets the bigger driver would be the pace of China’s economic recovery and liquidity conditions, rather than Sino-U.S. relations that people have grown weary of. I’m not going to change my Hong Kong positions just because of the security law.

It will serve more as a deterrent to separatists who dare to challenge China’s sovereignty, it doesn’t mean that the PLA will take over Hong Kong. I think China will be quite flexible in actual implementation.

Translation

國際特赦組織香港辦事處的業務和人權分析師William Nee

在短期內，如果暴力抗議活動平息，香港企業可能會有所喘息。從長遠來看，該法律很可能會鼓舞北京和香港同路人向香港公司及其員工施加更大的政治壓力，要求他們嚴格遵守北京的議程。

在大陸，北京相當隨意和有選擇性地使用國家安全法。香港支持抗議活動的公司首席執行官或任何商業領袖很有可能成為目標如果中國當局要優先考慮檢控這些活動。但是，目前還沒有人知道當局將如何使用法律 - 是否只針對那些針對警察採而取暴力行動的人，還是針對香港的文化和商業領袖？坦率地說，北京的真實意圖缺乏明確性是不確定因素之一。

香港安富資本有限公司資產管理總監黃宏偉

香港市場已經完全易手。反映法律最初宣佈時的影響 - 驚慌失措然後賣貨離場的人, 已經被意識到風險, 但卻仍然準備參與入市的人所取代，現在他們不容易離場。即使在這一兩天內確實影響了投資者的情緒，但向南流基金對在香港上市的新經濟公司的胃口仍然很大，內地基金很可能會逢低吸納。法律細節的影響是有限的，因為沒有什麼是完全出乎意料的。

代表旅遊業的香港立法會議員姚思榮，中國旅行社（香港）有限公司董事長

自去年六月以來，抗議活動和暴力事件嚴重傷害了香港旅遊業。這項新法律的通過將有助於遏制未來的暴力事件。這將對恢復遊客的信心產生積極影響。

在過去的一年中，來香港旅遊的遊客，不知道道路會被堵死，地鐵會停下來, 或者商店會著火。國安法將大大減少我們曾經在這座城市中看到的暴力。這將有助於解決內地人與香港人之間的信任危機。

深圳市前海聯合財富基金管理有限公司投資總監于英波

在股票市場上，我認為常理地我們不預期任何極端情況。恐慌性或預防性賣出只在當地發生，南向基金急於踴躍入市，而且該法律對目前香港市場最活躍的中國科技股部分，沒有實質性影響。 甚至已離場的基金，可能只是暫時退避等待。

香港社會對法律的反應，實質的反抗比預期的要軟得多，而美國的所謂報復只是一種玩笑的事情。在這一時段之後，美國幾乎沒有動力對一些已經頒布的制裁加以實施。在接下來的幾個月裡，因他們還有很多手段，故專注於這一點是沒有意義的。

尖沙咀繁華的購物區有五家旅館和兩家旅行社的老闆山姆劉

《國家安全法》實施後，一些外國遊客來港的頻率可能會降低。美國居民可能會不願訪問香港，特別是如果美國對香港進行報復或中美對抗升級。

我們可能會看到因衝動的驅使而上街抗議者的人減少。法律將非常嚴苛，後果將非常沉重。除了那些真的不害怕入獄的人以外，大多數抗議者不會出来太多。

但是，與國家安全法相比，我們更擔心新冠病毒大流行。大流行殺死了我們的業務，而安全法僅影響一小部分違反法律的人。為了使香港旅遊業重回過去的鼎盛時期，我們至少需要一兩年的時間。在此之前，我們需要束緊腰帶並努力工作去生存。

花旗私人銀行前董事Richard Harris現在在香港經營Port Shelter Investment Management

不幸的是，我認為目前會有一場完美的風暴，因為我們不僅制定了國家安全法，而且特朗普和國會威脅要取消特殊地位。這確實給香港的經濟增長設定了上限。

取代我們過往看到的巨大增長，現有人會他往 - 大型公司表示，它們將在新加坡而不是香港擁有更多的人，現在是人們決定搬出去的時候。

我對香港並不完全是負面。我認為這仍然是一個開展業務的好地方。中國仍然需要香港，就像香港需要中國一樣。這永遠不會改變。

Medley Global Advisors全球宏觀策略主管Ben Emons

下一階段將是美國用什麼程度去制裁參與起草安全法的中國官員, 以及他們與中美和外國金融機構的往來。

在中國銀行的美元債務中 - 未償還的美元債務和其他義務 - 只有不到50％有美元存款的覆蓋。另外是外國銀行，尤其是在香港接觸大量美元貸款的銀行，例如花旗銀行和匯豐銀行, 也有較低的香港註冊美元存款覆蓋率。

美元資產與負債之間的所謂“不匹配”是香港和全球市場的主要風險之一。如果制裁在香港上市的中資銀行而導致當地美元資金緊縮，那麼市場將重新定價所有較多接觸香港的銀行的風險。

Keywise Capital Management（HK）Ltd.投資組合經理Raymond Chen

隨著香港股市恢復交易，可能會出現波動。但是對於這兩個股票市場來說，更大的推動力將是中國經濟復甦的步伐和流動性狀況，而不是人們逐漸厭倦的中美關係。我不會僅僅因為安全法而改變香港在我的地位。

這將對敢於挑戰中國主權的分離主義者起到威懾作用，但這並不意味著解放軍將接管香港。我認為中國在實際執行中會非常靈活。

              So, according to many businessmen in Hong Kong, the impact of the new security law on the ground is that it will not affect the stock market too much as it is a supported by the investors from China. The new laws will only affect a small group of Hong Kong politically active people. It will affect the desire of overseas tourists who want to come, and Hong Kong’s connection on science or culture with the outside world may be affected.