War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points in chapters 3 to 5 are:

Book title: Seraphim, Franziska. 2006. War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.

Main points:

Ch. 3-  while the Shintoists and the war-bereaved families tried to regain the economic lost because of the war defeat, the Japan teachers’ union tried to undo the war itself, picking up the union movement of the 1920s and vowing to complete Japan’s democratic revolution. (86)

- the rapid rise of the teachers’ union movement in the early postwar years was an integral part of the so called ‘the politics of democratic revolution’. The revolution began at a time when the term ‘war responsibility’ appeared widely in public debates. It suggested a broad consensus among the liberal left that the catastrophe of war had structural roots in the wartime ‘system’, usually labeled as either feudal or fascist. And that a radical transformation of society was necessary in order to achieve a complete break with wartime thought and practice. (88) One of their goals was to promote core democratic values such as individual autonomy and political consciousness and participation. (88)

- of crucial important to the emergence of the teachers’ union was in 1945, it got the mutual tolerance and even support of the Japan Communist Party and the occupation authorizes.(89) The need to be able to bargain for higher wages and benefits most clearly defined the teacher’s union as a special interest group.(94)

- in tandem with social scientists and literary critics debating ‘war responsibility’, teachers active in the union said the war time social structure as a typical pre-modern system that was fascism . Whether be it feudal or fascist, it lacked the notion of individual responsibility. (96)

- the struggle against the state bureaucracy had become not only a matter of political fact but one of principle.(99) The principle of resistance often took precedence over issues of substance. For example the local boards of education and textbooks became the ground for the struggle. (99)

- even if the Teachers Union and the Assn. of Shinto Shrines appeared diametrically opposed to each other on issues such as the Emperor system, they shared a similar view of wartime bureaucracy as excessively controlling and harmful to their interest. The Assn. of War-bereaved families, in contrast, campaigned for the revival of wartime bureaucratic support.  Shrine Shintoists lobbied for government support, whereas the Teacher’s Union opposed the government. (106)

- Ch. 4 -an eclectic group of people with ties to China formed a movement to ‘set the grand stage of Japanese-Chinese friendship’ by promoting cultural and economic exchanges.(108) The sentiment of remorse and atonement for specific Japanese war crimes was central to the establishment of the Japan-China Friendship Association. (110)

- the Japanese government had no independent foreign policy. It made clear that it regarded the reparation program as a way to build up East Asian trade rather than as compensation for the war damages. This Friendship Association saw it as evasion of responsibility. (114) US quoted the lesson of WWI in Europe, suggesting that the crippling indemnities imposed on Germany had led to Hitler’s rise. (114)

- the Friendship Association emphasized the common victimization at the hand of Japanese militarist in the past and conservative Japanese government in the present.(122) They accused the government in using anti-communist ideology to avoid wartime aggression responsibility. (123)

- as Akira Iriye had shown, cultural internationalism became an urgent matter in the aftermath of WWII. He believed in the importance of cultural contact for the preservation of peace (e.g. through UNESCO). (129)

- unlike the Assn. of Shinto Shrines, the Japan Assn. of War-bereaved Families, and even the Teacher union, the Friendship Association made memory of Japanese war time aggression a prominent part of its mission.(132)

- the Friendship Assn. aspired to positive government involvement. Their goal after all was to change the government foreign policy and to restore Japanese official diplomatic relation with China. (133)

-Ch. 5. The Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War (Wadatsumikai) was established by intellectuals, students and relatives of the war dead who came from Japan’s elite universities, especially the university of Tokyo and Kyoto. (136)

- the memory of the war dead, Dower wrote, was greatly complicated by the experience of defeat. Defeat left the meaning of war death raw and open. Individual and collective attempts to explain theses contributed significantly to the definition of the emerging political platform. The feeling of guilt and responsibility could be appropriated. (138)

-  while Shintoist etc. justified war death in the name of the Emperor and national struggle again foreign imperialism, many more reinterpreted their losses as giving birth to a new and different Japan. (138)

- in sum, the first phase of Wadatsumikai’s history was a failed attempt to create a mass movement through special interest politics. Reflecting back, the leader criticized the Cold War logic of being forced to pledge allegiance to one of two opposing side. (151)

- Wadatsumikai delivered the most comprehensive critique of the Emperor system in the 1970s, when the Assn. of Shinto Shrines campaigned for the revival of prewar aspects of the imperial institution. Japan’s’ problematic relation with other Asian countries slowly emerged as an important issue in Wadatsumkai activism. Germany offered an important parallel in solving the problem of war responsibility which was a common issue in the 1980s (155).

(to be continued)