War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book title: Seraphim, Franziska. 2006. War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-                          2005. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.

Main points:

Introduction:

- two events had framed Japan’s history of war memory. First, that question of war memory and postwar responsibility had been a part of public life in Japan from the end of war into the 21^st century. War memory developed together with the particular and divergent approaches to postwar democracy. Democracy had shifted, so did memory in public life. War memory remained fragmented yet it was closely woven into the political structure. (4). Second, even if war memory implicitly shaped the way internal political battles were contested, it rarely guided postwar politics explicitly on the state level.(5) Even while the two events depicted here addressed Japanese domestic audience, they were informed by global circumstances in crucial ways.(5)

- this book traces the social politics of war memory in Japan from the defeat in 1945 to the beginning of the new millennium. It draws upon history of five prominent civic organizations from the political spectrum that were at the forefront of this struggle: the Association of Shinto Shrines, the Association of War-Bereaved Families, the Japan Teachers’ Union, the Japan-China Friendship Association, and the Memorial Society for the Student-Soldiers Killed in the War (Wadatsumikai).(7)

- the Association of Shinto Shrines was an umbrella organization that worked with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Imperial Household Agency. It was crucial in keeping in public view the problem of the ‘Emperor system’. (9)

-another conservative interest group was the Japan Association of War-Bereaved Families which lobbied LDP representatives and the Health and Welfare Ministry for state recognition. (9) On the political left, the Japan Teacher’s Union (JTU) sought to diminish the power of the bureaucracy. It saw the bureaucracy as a continuation of wartime militarism and opposed over the system of textbook approval and school curricula decision etc. (9)

- a progressive interest group, the Japan-China Friendship Association, sought to improve the Japanese relations with the PRC. (9-10). A small but influential peace group was the Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War known as Wadatsumikai. This group organized high school and university students and teachers around a pacifist critique of contemporary politics. It complied and edited many editions of the book entitled “Listen to the Voices from the Deep”. (10)

- by the mid-1950s, these five organizations had established themselves as special interest groups dominating the political contest over the memory of war and its aftermath.(10) Each association represented a distinct stance on war memory. The Association of Shinto Shrine and the Association for War Bereaved Families centered their tactics on resuming aspects of wartime system. The Japan Teacher’s Union, the Japan-China Friendship Association and the Wadatsumikai opposed the continuation of the political structure that supported militarism. Wadatsumikai activists insisted on a universal humanist pacifism. (11)

- the structure of this book reflects the main phases in Japan’s history on war memory. Part I describes how these five most prominent political interest groups were formed. They represented different stance over the war memory. They ranged from far right to radical left. (13) Part II analyzes different aspects of public memory as they merged in the changing context that was connected to specific political controversies. The social politics of war memory remained tied to issues of bureaucratic control over school curricula, textbook, and the official celebration of the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine. These controversies revealed the shifting parameters of the memory debated in public life which was influenced by generational changes in the second post war decade, by the international context of the 1960s, and also by the struggle over the official custodianship of memory since the 1970s.(13) Part III documents the most significant shift in Japan’s history of memory. From the 1980s on the interest-based, domestic politics began to engage a global, right-based approach to memory and restitution. International dimension could no longer be ignored. (14)

All five groups surveyed here had continued actively to participate in public life up to the present; each group was nationally organized, with regional and local chapters. (15)

- in organization, each group employed strategies to which war memory was central.  Some points were noted: first, being a Shinto priest or an elementary school teacher did not necessarily mean that one shared the same war experience. The establishment of a Shinto organization or teacher’s labor union could involve ideological consideration, and required an articulation of the past and present realities with which potential members could identify. (16).

- second, organizations competed for a share of public attention by positioning themselves as leaders of democratic changes. Initially they targeted the common people. (16) Third, organizations located themselves on the emerging political map of postwar Japan vis-à-vis the occupation authorities. They had to adjust their activities in response to political changes. (17)

-fourth, each civic group formed networks with political parties and other organizations to establish its interest in the political arena and each benefited from the political power of larger organization. As the political system coalesced into two dominant parties in the first half of the 1950s, organizations became identified with a particular stance on contemporary issues, including views of the war. (17)

- as organizations such as the ultraconservative Association of Shinto Shrines and the Association of War-Bereaved Families successfully lobbied state institution on behalf of their cause, left-liberal groups positioned themselves in opposition to the state. War memory organized along a left-right divide. (20)

- the dominant pattern of contention over both the war-time and the postwar was remained locked in a dynamic that pitted (liberal) citizens against the (conservative) state. One landmark was the beginning of the textbook trials in 1965 over the legality of textbook censorship. (24)

- the five organizations competed with one another for public space to present what they considered to be the essential legacies of war. (24) With the loosening of institutionalized political alliances at the end of the long conservative hegemony by the LDP, there was a growing interaction of local and national politics. There was an emerging public that focused attention on war memory, as both a political issue and a framework for historical analysis. (25)

- as the Chinese and South Korean government discovered political capital in the war memory issues, they began to monitor Japanese official gestures in endorsing an unapologetically nationalist view of the war. (26)

- emperor Hirohito’s death in 1989 ended the Showa period; the fall of the Berlin Wall in the same year, the collapse of the long hegemony of the conservative LDP in 1993 together marked a pivotal point in the history of memory in Japan. The issue of war, and postwar responsibility for Japan’s war conduct in Asia became tied to the politics of redefining Japan’s position in the world. This new beginning catapulted Japan’s unresolved war responsibility into the political limelight. (26)

- the Persian Gulf War in 1991 led the US to demand for Japan’s’ active participation. At the center stood the Japan’s constitutional and the legal position of the Self-defense Force (SDF). The “PKO Bill” allowed overseas deployment of the SDF. (27)

- in 2005 a wave of anti-Japanese mass protest across China was unprecedented in scale. Japan’s active campaign to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security council formed one specific issue of conflict. In Japan the constitutional revision of Article 9 appeared to be a real possibility. (30)

(to be continued)