The China White Paper 1949(XX)

To the American, the problem in China consisted of three areas: political, military and economic. When General Marshall arrived in Chungking (重慶), he became the intermediary between Chiang Kai-shek and representatives of the CCP. In his initial contacts with the National government leaders and CCP representatives in Chungking, Marshall already felt distrust between these two parties. 1 On the one hand the National government thought that the USSR was obstructing the KMT to occupy Manchuria, on the other hand the CCP was suspicious of KMT trying to destroy the Communist Party. Because previously the US, UK and USSR had agreed that Manchuria should be returned to China after the War, Marshall informed Chou En-lai (周恩來) on January 4th 1946 that the US was committed to move the National government troops to Manchuria. This was agreed by Chou. On January 10th 1946, an agreement was reached for Chiang and Mao to issue orders to their respective armed forces to cease hostilities and halt all troop movements. To facilitate the cease of hostilities, an Executive Headquarters was set up in Peiping (北平) on the January 14th which consisted of representatives from the US, the National government and the CCP. The role of the US representative was merely to assist the other two parties.2 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 136.
2. Ibid., page 138.