The China White Paper 1949(VIII)

In the China White Paper, the American claimed that beginning early 1941, it had begun informal dialogue with Japan for the purpose of settling problems in Asia peacefully. One of the proposal put forward by the US was that all Japanese forces in China be withdrawn. Japan, on the other hand wanted recognition from the US of Japanese hegemony in the Far East.1 According to the White Paper, "the US refusal to stop its support of China and the unwillingness of the US to compromise . . . were among the immediate motivations of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941".2 After Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, the US and China were on the same side against Japan, American assistance to China increased dramatically. One kind of American aid to China was given under the Lend-Lease Program (1941-43). One of its objective was to improve transportation over the Burma Road, one way of helping was to provide trucks, spare parts, and motor fuel etc. However, with the fall of Burma and the occupation of southern part of the Burma Road by Japan in early 1942, air transport became the alternative way to deliver war supplies to China. Another transportation project by the US was the construction of the Ledo Road from Assam in India across upper Burma to China (later called the Stilwell Road and was completed by early 1945).3

On October 9, 1942, for the purpose of showing the intention to treat China as an equal among the Major Powers fighting against Japan, and to strengthen the image of the Chinese Government under Chiang Kai-shek, the US started talks with China to relinquish American extraterritorial rights in China.4 (to be continued)

Notes:

1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 25.
2. Ibid., page 26.
3. Ibid., page 28.
4. Ibid., page 34.

The China White Paper 1949(VII)

Following the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops on July 7, 1937, the US issued a statement to express its concern. On August 10 it informally approached Japan to offer to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute. But Japan showed no interest to this offer.1 On October 5, 1937, US President Roosevelt indirectly condemned Japan for waging a war against China in his "Quarantine" speech. His likened Japan's military invasion in China to spreading "epidemic of world lawlessness". The US Department of State also issued a statement to reiterate its opinion that "the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 8, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928."2 Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the US continued to challenge Japan's action in China, for example, Japan's interference with China Maritime Customs Administration, and also with the Chinese Salt Administration, both were revenue source for China to repay foreign loans, including the American loans.3 In March 1940 when Japan set up a Chinese central regime at Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, the US announced that it would only recognize the National Government of the Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. Indeed, for the purpose of supporting China against Japan, the US began building up its economic pressure over Japan. On July 26, 1939, the US notified Japan the intention of terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in January 1911 between US and Japan. 4 The effect of this decision was to restrict the shipment of oil, scarp iron, machinery, machine tools, and other war related material to Japan. In July 1941, the US even froze Japanese assets in America. The US also began to allow Americans to participate in Chinese armed forces, a military mission was to China, and China was eligible for lend-lease assistance from the American as from May, 1941.5 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 19.
2. Ibid., page 19.
3. Ibid., page 23.
4. Ibid., page 24.
5. Ibid., page 25.

聖誕節晚飯2009

每年我都在家攪個聖誕節自助餐飯局, 和親戚等一起分享. 今年在二十五日舉行, 有二十人到來. 共分開二檯坐, 壹檯年長的, 壹檯後生仔, 各有各天地, 各有各話題. 和往年一樣, 我和老婆幾日前已開始籌備, 要買食物, 又要搬動客廳檯凳, 以方便飯後的遊戲活動, 十分忙碌. 今年的食物有火雞, 燒牛肉, 煙三文魚, 廈門炒米粉, 青豆牛利意粉等總計二十多種食物, 小女兒亦做了一些鬆餅作甜品. 雖然做到一頭煙, 但見到各人都享受到假日氣氛, 亦感滿足.

劉曉波

On December 15, 2009, the US States Department spokesman Ian Kelly made the following announcement:
"The United States was deeply concerned by the formal indictment on charges of “inciting subversion” of the well-known Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) on December 10, International Human Rights Day. According to all publicly available evidence, the basis for his prosecution is that he has signed and supported Charter ’08, which calls for respect for universal human rights and democratic reform. Mr. Liu has already spent a year in detention while authorities carried out the investigation of his case. We call on the Government of China to release him immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views and desires for universally recognized fundamental freedoms."
A few days ago I noted in newspaper and in TV that Gregory May, a political officer with the US embassy in Beijing read out a statement outside the court where Liu was being tried. He called on China to respect the rights of all its citizens and release Liu.
Recently, I read about some Chinese history that happened about 80 years ago. In Asia in early 1930s it was obvious that Japan was implementing an expansion policy in Manchuria. The United States, with the purpose of checking Japanese advancement and helping China, began to adopt a policy of non-recognition of territorial changes achieved by military invasion. In those days, China was a feeble republic while Japan was fully modernized. This policy of non-recognition was made known to Japan on January 7, 1932, four months after Japan occupied Manchuria by force.1 The American reaffirmed its sympathy with Chinese nationalism, and used the Nine-Power Treaty signed in February 1922 as the basis in making their diplomatic decisions. US Secretary of State Stimson stated that "this Treaty represents . . . international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interest in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this Treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government, that would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow."2
In view of the above, I begin to wonder that while the present day China, through economic reforms, had already secured its "sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth", yet an autocratic form of government still exist in China. Some of the predictions made by the US 80 years ago still hold: it would require many years of political effort for China to develop free institutions, and the progress would necessarily be slow. I hope that more Chinese people could have the wisdom and courage to contribute to that political effort.
Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 13.
2. Ibid., page 14

中日聯手研究南京大屠殺

Recently Asahi News reported the following:

日中両政府が進めてきた有識者による初の日中歴史共同研究の報告書の内容が明らかになった。１９３７年の南京大虐殺は「大規模な虐殺行為」との認識では一致したが、犠牲者数は今後の研究課題とした。一方、日本の途上国援助（ＯＤＡ）が中国の発展に貢献したと評価。共同研究の日中両座長は「相互理解を促進する第一歩」と位置づけている。 報告書は「古代・中近世史」「近現代史」の２部構成で、同じテーマに関する日中双方の論文を収録している。 近現代史の「総論」によると、日中全面戦争の発端となった３７年の盧溝橋事件について、日本側は事件の「偶然性」を、中国側は事件発生の「必然性と計画性」を重視。毒ガス兵器の使用や市民への無差別爆撃など、日本軍の中国での侵略の傷跡が今も残っているとの考えで一致した。 南京大虐殺については「大規模な虐殺行為であることを認めこれを討論した」と明記。ただ、規模、原因、背景などについては「深く追究する必要がある」とした。 虐殺の規模をめぐっては、中国の大虐殺記念館が「３０万人」と表示。日本の研究者の間では「数万～２０万人」などの諸説があり、虐殺そのものを否定する研究者もいる。日本政府は「多くの非戦闘員の殺害や略奪行為などがあったことは否定できない」としつつも、犠牲者数について「諸説あり、政府として正しい数を認定することは困難」との見解を示している。 戦後の歴史については、日中双方が、日本が新憲法のもとで平和国家として歩んだことを肯定的に評価。靖国神社参拝問題や日本の歴史教科書問題などについては、今後研究する必要があるとした。

Details of the joint history research report done by specialists with the support of both the Chinese and Japanese governments was made known. Although the Rape of Nanking in 1937 was admitted as a "Large-scale slaughter act", the research on casualty toll would be a subject for further research in future. Separately, Official Development Aid (ODA) of Japan was judged to have a positive contribution towards the development of China. The co-chairmen of this China-Japan research party regarded their position as "The first step that promotes mutual understanding". The report would compose of two components: "Ancient times and early modern age history" and "Present age history", and would collect related theses written in China and Japan with the same theme. According to the 'introduction' of the Present age history, while Japan stressed the "Contingency" of the Marco Polo Bridge event happened in 1937 which led to the outbreak of the full-scale war between China and Japan, China stressed the "Necessity and plan" with regard to the occurrence of the event. Both side agreed that the scar of the invasion done in China by Japanese army such as the use of the poison gas munition and the carpet bombing to the citizens still remained. Regarding the Rape of Nanking, it was noted clearly that "discussion is needed in order to judge whether it was a large-scale slaughter act". It was also noted that the scale, the cause, and the background of the event was accepted as "a point that needs further inquiry". Regarding the scale of the massacre, in the memorial in China it was showed as "300,000 people". In Japan, among researchers the opinion on the number varied from 20 to 30 thousand up to 200,000 people, there were researchers who even denied any slaughtering. Japanese Government held the view that "As there are different opinions, therefore as a government, it is difficult to recognize a correct number" on the casualty toll, although the government already admitted that "It is indisputable that there were lots of murders and ravages targeted at noncombatants". Both China and Japan affirmatively evaluated the history of postwar Japan as a peaceful nation progressing under a new constitution. It was understood that the Yasukuni Shrine visit problem and the history textbook issue etc. in Japan would be necessarily a research focus in the future.

From the above, it seems that scholars from both China and Japan will achieve some common ground as far as the Nanking Massacre is concerned.

The China White Paper 1949 (VI)

In the early 1930s, it was obvious that Japan was implementing an expansion policy in Manchuria. In response, the US began to adopt a policy of non-recognition of territorial changes achieved by the use of military force by a nation. Such a decision was made known to Japan on January 7, 1932, four months after Japan occupied Manchuria by force.1 The American reaffirmed its sympathy with Chinese nationalism, and used the Nine-Power Treaty to support their diplomatic decisions. US Secretary of State Stimson stated that "this Treaty represents . . . international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interest in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth."2 According to the White Paper, this non-recognition principle remained the policy of the US on many occasions up the the moment when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.3 In the 1930s, conflict in viewpoints between Japan and the US were often seen. For example, on April 17, 1934 when Japanese Foreign Office announced its special status in China and made a statement to proclaim its special responsibilities in East Asia, and also its political guardianship over China, the American rebuked it right away, although in carefully worded notes.4 In late 1935 when Japan tried to convert China's five northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shangtung into an autonomous area, the American issued a statement on December 5, 1935 to express concern over the matter.5 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 13.
2. Ibid., page 14
3. Ibid., page 15
4. Ibid., page 15
5. Ibid., page 17

The China White Paper 1949(V)

After the US joined WWI in 1917, America and Japan were on the same side fighting against Germany, and they signed the Lansing-Ishii Agreement to protect their mutual interest. When WWI was over, China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 demanded Japan to cease its control over Shantung peninsula. That request was somehow achieved on 4th February 1922 with the help of the American and other powers. Also with the co-ordination of the US, countries participated in the Washington Conference signed the Nine-Power Treaty for the purpose of respecting "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and to uphold the principle of the Open Door".1 Furthermore they would avoid "taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subject of citizens of friendly states."2 One implication of this treaty on Japan and the American was that this treaty became a point of reference after Japan seized Manchuria in 1931-1933. And it also became the subject of the Brussels Conference called in 1937 after the outbreak of the war between Japan and China in 1937.

Another diplomatic maneuver made by the US towards China in the 1920s took place in 1928 when China had achieved a degree of unity under Kuomintang. On July 25, 1928, the US recognized the Nationalist Government and became the first country to sign a treaty to restore tariff autonomy to China.3 In mid-1929, the Sino-Soviet relationship drew the attention of the American when a dispute developed between China and the Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. Although the US Secretary of State Stimson tried to intervene, there was not much success. Eventually the USSR and China settled their disputes by signing a Protocol on December 22, 1929.4 (to be continued)

Notes:
1. United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 10.
2. Ibid., page 10
3. Ibid., page 12
4. Ibid., page 13