The China White Paper 1949(VIII)

In the China White Paper, the American claimed that beginning early 1941, it had begun informal dialogue with Japan for the purpose of settling problems in Asia peacefully. One of the proposal put forward by the US was that all Japanese forces in China be withdrawn. Japan, on the other hand wanted recognition from the US of Japanese hegemony in the Far East.1 According to the White Paper, "the US refusal to stop its support of China and the unwillingness of the US to compromise . . . were among the immediate motivations of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941".2 After Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, the US and China were on the same side against Japan, American assistance to China increased dramatically. One kind of American aid to China was given under the Lend-Lease Program (1941-43). One of its objective was to improve transportation over the Burma Road, one way of helping was to provide trucks, spare parts, and motor fuel etc. However, with the fall of Burma and the occupation of southern part of the Burma Road by Japan in early 1942, air transport became the alternative way to deliver war supplies to China. Another transportation project by the US was the construction of the Ledo Road from Assam in India across upper Burma to China (later called the Stilwell Road and was completed by early 1945).3

On October 9, 1942, for the purpose of showing the intention to treat China as an equal among the Major Powers fighting against Japan, and to strengthen the image of the Chinese Government under Chiang Kai-shek, the US started talks with China to relinquish American extraterritorial rights in China.4 (to be continued)

Notes:

1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 25.
2. Ibid., page 26.
3. Ibid., page 28.
4. Ibid., page 34.

The China White Paper 1949(VII)

Following the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops on July 7, 1937, the US issued a statement to express its concern. On August 10 it informally approached Japan to offer to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute. But Japan showed no interest to this offer.1 On October 5, 1937, US President Roosevelt indirectly condemned Japan for waging a war against China in his "Quarantine" speech. His likened Japan's military invasion in China to spreading "epidemic of world lawlessness". The US Department of State also issued a statement to reiterate its opinion that "the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 8, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928."2 Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the US continued to challenge Japan's action in China, for example, Japan's interference with China Maritime Customs Administration, and also with the Chinese Salt Administration, both were revenue source for China to repay foreign loans, including the American loans.3 In March 1940 when Japan set up a Chinese central regime at Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, the US announced that it would only recognize the National Government of the Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. Indeed, for the purpose of supporting China against Japan, the US began building up its economic pressure over Japan. On July 26, 1939, the US notified Japan the intention of terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in January 1911 between US and Japan. 4 The effect of this decision was to restrict the shipment of oil, scarp iron, machinery, machine tools, and other war related material to Japan. In July 1941, the US even froze Japanese assets in America. The US also began to allow Americans to participate in Chinese armed forces, a military mission was to China, and China was eligible for lend-lease assistance from the American as from May, 1941.5 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 19.
2. Ibid., page 19.
3. Ibid., page 23.
4. Ibid., page 24.
5. Ibid., page 25.

聖誕節晚飯2009

每年我都在家攪個聖誕節自助餐飯局, 和親戚等一起分享. 今年在二十五日舉行, 有二十人到來. 共分開二檯坐, 壹檯年長的, 壹檯後生仔, 各有各天地, 各有各話題. 和往年一樣, 我和老婆幾日前已開始籌備, 要買食物, 又要搬動客廳檯凳, 以方便飯後的遊戲活動, 十分忙碌. 今年的食物有火雞, 燒牛肉, 煙三文魚, 廈門炒米粉, 青豆牛利意粉等總計二十多種食物, 小女兒亦做了一些鬆餅作甜品. 雖然做到一頭煙, 但見到各人都享受到假日氣氛, 亦感滿足.

劉曉波

On December 15, 2009, the US States Department spokesman Ian Kelly made the following announcement:
"The United States was deeply concerned by the formal indictment on charges of “inciting subversion” of the well-known Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波) on December 10, International Human Rights Day. According to all publicly available evidence, the basis for his prosecution is that he has signed and supported Charter ’08, which calls for respect for universal human rights and democratic reform. Mr. Liu has already spent a year in detention while authorities carried out the investigation of his case. We call on the Government of China to release him immediately and to respect the rights of all Chinese citizens to peacefully express their political views and desires for universally recognized fundamental freedoms."
A few days ago I noted in newspaper and in TV that Gregory May, a political officer with the US embassy in Beijing read out a statement outside the court where Liu was being tried. He called on China to respect the rights of all its citizens and release Liu.
Recently, I read about some Chinese history that happened about 80 years ago. In Asia in early 1930s it was obvious that Japan was implementing an expansion policy in Manchuria. The United States, with the purpose of checking Japanese advancement and helping China, began to adopt a policy of non-recognition of territorial changes achieved by military invasion. In those days, China was a feeble republic while Japan was fully modernized. This policy of non-recognition was made known to Japan on January 7, 1932, four months after Japan occupied Manchuria by force.1 The American reaffirmed its sympathy with Chinese nationalism, and used the Nine-Power Treaty signed in February 1922 as the basis in making their diplomatic decisions. US Secretary of State Stimson stated that "this Treaty represents . . . international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interest in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this Treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government, that would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow."2
In view of the above, I begin to wonder that while the present day China, through economic reforms, had already secured its "sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth", yet an autocratic form of government still exist in China. Some of the predictions made by the US 80 years ago still hold: it would require many years of political effort for China to develop free institutions, and the progress would necessarily be slow. I hope that more Chinese people could have the wisdom and courage to contribute to that political effort.
Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 13.
2. Ibid., page 14

中日聯手研究南京大屠殺

Recently Asahi News reported the following:

日中両政府が進めてきた有識者による初の日中歴史共同研究の報告書の内容が明らかになった。１９３７年の南京大虐殺は「大規模な虐殺行為」との認識では一致したが、犠牲者数は今後の研究課題とした。一方、日本の途上国援助（ＯＤＡ）が中国の発展に貢献したと評価。共同研究の日中両座長は「相互理解を促進する第一歩」と位置づけている。 報告書は「古代・中近世史」「近現代史」の２部構成で、同じテーマに関する日中双方の論文を収録している。 近現代史の「総論」によると、日中全面戦争の発端となった３７年の盧溝橋事件について、日本側は事件の「偶然性」を、中国側は事件発生の「必然性と計画性」を重視。毒ガス兵器の使用や市民への無差別爆撃など、日本軍の中国での侵略の傷跡が今も残っているとの考えで一致した。 南京大虐殺については「大規模な虐殺行為であることを認めこれを討論した」と明記。ただ、規模、原因、背景などについては「深く追究する必要がある」とした。 虐殺の規模をめぐっては、中国の大虐殺記念館が「３０万人」と表示。日本の研究者の間では「数万～２０万人」などの諸説があり、虐殺そのものを否定する研究者もいる。日本政府は「多くの非戦闘員の殺害や略奪行為などがあったことは否定できない」としつつも、犠牲者数について「諸説あり、政府として正しい数を認定することは困難」との見解を示している。 戦後の歴史については、日中双方が、日本が新憲法のもとで平和国家として歩んだことを肯定的に評価。靖国神社参拝問題や日本の歴史教科書問題などについては、今後研究する必要があるとした。

Details of the joint history research report done by specialists with the support of both the Chinese and Japanese governments was made known. Although the Rape of Nanking in 1937 was admitted as a "Large-scale slaughter act", the research on casualty toll would be a subject for further research in future. Separately, Official Development Aid (ODA) of Japan was judged to have a positive contribution towards the development of China. The co-chairmen of this China-Japan research party regarded their position as "The first step that promotes mutual understanding". The report would compose of two components: "Ancient times and early modern age history" and "Present age history", and would collect related theses written in China and Japan with the same theme. According to the 'introduction' of the Present age history, while Japan stressed the "Contingency" of the Marco Polo Bridge event happened in 1937 which led to the outbreak of the full-scale war between China and Japan, China stressed the "Necessity and plan" with regard to the occurrence of the event. Both side agreed that the scar of the invasion done in China by Japanese army such as the use of the poison gas munition and the carpet bombing to the citizens still remained. Regarding the Rape of Nanking, it was noted clearly that "discussion is needed in order to judge whether it was a large-scale slaughter act". It was also noted that the scale, the cause, and the background of the event was accepted as "a point that needs further inquiry". Regarding the scale of the massacre, in the memorial in China it was showed as "300,000 people". In Japan, among researchers the opinion on the number varied from 20 to 30 thousand up to 200,000 people, there were researchers who even denied any slaughtering. Japanese Government held the view that "As there are different opinions, therefore as a government, it is difficult to recognize a correct number" on the casualty toll, although the government already admitted that "It is indisputable that there were lots of murders and ravages targeted at noncombatants". Both China and Japan affirmatively evaluated the history of postwar Japan as a peaceful nation progressing under a new constitution. It was understood that the Yasukuni Shrine visit problem and the history textbook issue etc. in Japan would be necessarily a research focus in the future.

From the above, it seems that scholars from both China and Japan will achieve some common ground as far as the Nanking Massacre is concerned.

The China White Paper 1949 (VI)

In the early 1930s, it was obvious that Japan was implementing an expansion policy in Manchuria. In response, the US began to adopt a policy of non-recognition of territorial changes achieved by the use of military force by a nation. Such a decision was made known to Japan on January 7, 1932, four months after Japan occupied Manchuria by force.1 The American reaffirmed its sympathy with Chinese nationalism, and used the Nine-Power Treaty to support their diplomatic decisions. US Secretary of State Stimson stated that "this Treaty represents . . . international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interest in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth."2 According to the White Paper, this non-recognition principle remained the policy of the US on many occasions up the the moment when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.3 In the 1930s, conflict in viewpoints between Japan and the US were often seen. For example, on April 17, 1934 when Japanese Foreign Office announced its special status in China and made a statement to proclaim its special responsibilities in East Asia, and also its political guardianship over China, the American rebuked it right away, although in carefully worded notes.4 In late 1935 when Japan tried to convert China's five northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shangtung into an autonomous area, the American issued a statement on December 5, 1935 to express concern over the matter.5 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 13.
2. Ibid., page 14
3. Ibid., page 15
4. Ibid., page 15
5. Ibid., page 17

The China White Paper 1949(V)

After the US joined WWI in 1917, America and Japan were on the same side fighting against Germany, and they signed the Lansing-Ishii Agreement to protect their mutual interest. When WWI was over, China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 demanded Japan to cease its control over Shantung peninsula. That request was somehow achieved on 4th February 1922 with the help of the American and other powers. Also with the co-ordination of the US, countries participated in the Washington Conference signed the Nine-Power Treaty for the purpose of respecting "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and to uphold the principle of the Open Door".1 Furthermore they would avoid "taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subject of citizens of friendly states."2 One implication of this treaty on Japan and the American was that this treaty became a point of reference after Japan seized Manchuria in 1931-1933. And it also became the subject of the Brussels Conference called in 1937 after the outbreak of the war between Japan and China in 1937.

Another diplomatic maneuver made by the US towards China in the 1920s took place in 1928 when China had achieved a degree of unity under Kuomintang. On July 25, 1928, the US recognized the Nationalist Government and became the first country to sign a treaty to restore tariff autonomy to China.3 In mid-1929, the Sino-Soviet relationship drew the attention of the American when a dispute developed between China and the Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. Although the US Secretary of State Stimson tried to intervene, there was not much success. Eventually the USSR and China settled their disputes by signing a Protocol on December 22, 1929.4 (to be continued)

Notes:
1. United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 10.
2. Ibid., page 10
3. Ibid., page 12
4. Ibid., page 13

勵志文集(下)

“勵志文集”一書原作者是美國學者馬爾騰, 後被林語堂翻譯成中文. 這文集書共有八十四篇短文, 內容十分容讀, 意義清晰亦實用. 在其中包含了不少在職場有用的技能和一些可以提升你人生觀的方法. 值得一看. 現節錄其中四篇文章裏面的一些金句:

1. 失敗了以後 (十四頁)
“測驗某一個人的品格, 最好是在他失敗的時候 . . . 傾跌了以後, 立刻站立起來 . . . 是自古以來偉大人物的成功秘訣”.
“什麼是失敗? . . . 它是走上較高地位的第一階段”
2. ‘不小心的’悲劇 (十八頁)
“大地之上, 到處可以看到工作不小心所造成的悲慘的結果 . . . 做事絕對精密 , 絕對正確的名譽對於一個從事事業的青年, 其益處等於大量的金錢資本. 人人都能信用他, 都給他以便利"
3. 工作系統化 (二十二頁)
"工作沒有系統的商人, 每因辦事方法之失當, 而蒙大量之損失. . . 有一位商人, 曾將 ‘缺乏系統’ 一事列為許多公司失敗的大原因"
4. 等不得一等 (二十六頁)
"一個人能夠懂得光陰之可貴, 而不肯輕易放過一分一秒的時間, 則最後他的生命, 總會印上 ‘能力' 之標誌".
" 有些青年人, 就因為不能敏捷, 不能準時, 遂至失掉了上陞及得到高等位置的機會 "


如果讀者有興趣知道更多文章的內容, 可以找這本書看看.

Isaac Newton

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is known for his contributions in the fields of mathematics and physics. However, I also admire Newton for his viewpoint on knowledge. Newton had once said that "I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me."

His another viewpoint on knowledge is reflected in the quotation by him as follows: "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants". Here Newton was borrowing the idea from Bernard of Charters (died in about 1130AD) who used to say that we were like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, so that we could see more than they, and things at a greater distance, not by virtue of any sharpness of sight on our part, or any physical distinction, but because we were carried high and raised up by their giant size.

On the basis of their idea, I create my own analogy. I compare books and knowledge to the giant. Also I always compare those people who love reading books to equip themselves with those who seldom or never read books. To my mind, books and knowledge is the giant in the form of tools. In general it is always the case that, with the help of tools, people can do things better and faster than those who do it with bare hands. In the ancient time, with the help of tools, human could excel animals in survival, and eventually stood at the top of the food chain. By the same token, in modern time in the concrete jungle, similar law of survival may exit, I think.

Reference:
1. Bill Swainson ed. Encarta Book of Quotations. NY: St. Martin' Press, 2000.
2. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations- Third Edition. Oxford University Press,1980.

初雪(2009)

昨日終於下了冬天第一場雪, 不算很大. 在過往幾天, 氣溫徘徊於零下二度到六度之間, 由於乾燥, 所以一直沒有落雪. 在這世紀第一個十年將盡之際, 回望一下, 發覺時間過得飛快. 正如某電視劇所說, 人生有幾個十年. 明白四季更替, 乃大自然正常現象, 故應該好好欣賞它. 從書中順手拈來一首詩, 以應景一下.

詩云:

雪霜自茲始

草木當更新

嚴冬不蕭殺

何以見陽春

(唐詩紀事卷四十三 : 呂溫詩)

香港中文大學

“新亞書院概況” 這本書是我最近在卑詩大學亞洲圖書館買來的舊書. 不知為什麼, 近年我對中文大學或新亞書院等學府有一種無名的享往, 可能是它代表中國文化, 代表追求知識的地方. 相同理由, 自幼就對九龍塘一些滿佈名校的街道亦有一種無名的好感, 例如, 牛津道, 籣開夏道等. 本人出身草根, 更因一向讀書成績平平, 故很早就明白能進入這些學府的機會很渺茫. 在學生年代, 只是路經這些街道, 或是走過這些學校的大門時, 就已有一些滿足感. 多年後, 在不同途徑中漸漸對中大的成立背景有更深的認識, 例如看到錢穆寫於一九八九年的 “新亞遺鐸”一書的內容簡介中提到 “作者四十年前避共產黨赤禍赴香港, 創辦香港第一所流亡人士之大專院校 – 新亞書院.” 即時感覺第一代中大創校者的心血與期望, 和當時文化人面對的艱難歲月. 相片中 “新亞書院概況”一書是在六十年代末出版, 它的第七十頁列出了當時的學規, 揀錄如下:

“凡屬新亞書院.學生, 必先深切了解新亞書院.之精神. 下面列舉綱宗, 以備本院諸生隨時誦覽, 就事研究.
一. 求學與做人, 貴能齊頭並進, 更貴能溶通合一
二. 做人的最崇高基礎在求學, 求學之最高旨趣在做人
三. ……”

估不到的是, 排第二的學規是清楚地說明求學之最高旨趣在做人, 並非求什麼高薪厚職或者榮華富貴. 真感動.

參考:
1. 錢穆. “新亞遺鐸”. 臺北:東土圖公司印行. 一九八九
2. 香港中文大學. “新亞書院概況”. 鄧鏡波學校承印. 一九六八?
(Note: Should any reader like to have the book in the photo for more meaningful use, e.g. for school library collection or for research purpose, I am willing to give it away. Please contact me at winghojoki@yahoo.ca)

勵志文集(上)

"勵志文集" 這本書原著是美國學者馬爾騰, 它被林語堂翻譯成中文. 內容即使是有些老生常談, 但對年青人來說, 仍然不失其教育意義. 現節錄寫於一九九九年的代序如下:

美國學者馬爾騰博士所著的 “勵志文集”, 針對年青一代成長過程中所遭遇的各種問題, 分析入微, 說理透徹. 對頹唐者能振奮鬥志, 對消極者能激勵人心, 對迷途者予以引導, 對荒唐者予以警醒, 大有助於年青人培養品格, 建立自信, 健康正確地邁向社會. 當年林語堂先生曾受其鼓舞, 自謂 "讀馬氏的原書後, 精神為之大振, 人生觀念為之一變, 煩悶, 消極, 悲觀, 頹唐的妖霧陰霾, 已經驅除盡淨, 現在所面對的, 是光天化日下的世界和人世了.” 因此林先生遂將馬書譯成中文, 希望有助於激勵同時代的中國青年.

這書總共有八十四篇短文, 十分容易閱讀, 其意義清晰亦實用, 在其中包含了不少職場有用的技能, 值得一看. 其中部分短文的題目是:
1. 失敗了以後
2. 工作系統化
3. 生命的儲能
4. 交友的影響
5. 成功的機器
6. 不要恐懼
7. 怎樣補救缺陷的性格
8. 自求進步
9. 讀書的習慣
10. 學校以外之教育
11. 擇業不可不慎
12. 悲觀無益
13. 凡事須作積極肯定
14. 理想如何實踐
15. 怎樣鍛練思想 . . .

當我看完這本書之後, 有被 ‘塞錢入你袋’ 的感覺. (待續)

The China White Paper 1949(IV)

In the few yeas leading to the end of the first decade of the 20th century, Russia and Japan continued to advance their interests in Manchuria in the form of building railways. In an effort to ensure the trade interest in China was not adversely affected, the US suggested that these railways should be open to international investment funds. Great Britain and Germany supported the proposals, but was objected strongly by both Russia and Japan. This American suggestion even had a negative effect of drawing Russia and Japan together to defend their interests in Manchuria.1 When WWI broke out in 1914, China on August 3, 1914 tried to seek US assistance to prevent the world war from spreading to China and turned it into a battle zone because Germany and Japan had entered the War, while China at that time was a neutral country. During this troubling time, Japan in early 1915 secretly presented to China the Twenty-One Demands to seek exclusive rights in the Yangtze valley, and also to control China's social and political institutions. Upon hearing that, the US on March 13, 1915, among other things, told Japan that the US "could not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military or economic domination over China by a foreign Power" on grounds that it could exclude Americans from equal participation in the development of China.2 However, this pressure from the US on Japan had not much effect. Japan continued to pressurize China to enter in an agreement by sending out an an ultimatum to China with the implication of using military force. Japan was successful in getting what it wanted, although some extreme demands had been dropped.3 (to be continued)


Notes:
1. United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 6.
2. page 7.
3. page 8.

The China White Paper 1949(III)

After the US announced its Open Door policy towards China, there were several occasions that the powers did not care to heed. For example in 1902 Russia tried to press China for a privileged position in Manchuria.1 In 1903 Russia asked China for a bilateral convention which would have the effect of excluding all foreigners from Manchuria in setting up treaty ports and consuls except for the Russian.2 During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Amercian restated that its policy to the two warring parties, and in an open statement, reiterated that "For its part, the US had repeatedly made its position well known, and has been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded to its efforts to strength and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the 'open door' in the Orient, whereby equality of commercial opportunity and access shall be enjoyed by all nations. Holding these views the US disclaims any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire."3 After the Russo-Japanese War was ended, the Amercian helped the two warring parties to negotiate a treaty, and the Treaty of Portsmouth was singed in September 1905 in the US. According the China White Paper, one effect of this treaty was "the two signatories [pledged] to restore Manchuria to China and to observe measures 'which apply equally to all nations' in commerce and industry of Manchuria."4 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 3.
2. Ibid., page 4
3. Ibid., page 5
4. Ibid., page 5

我的工具書(VII)

"現代日本語副詞用法辭典"是中國大陸出版的日文字典. 對我來說, 學習日本語副詞是很重要, 而恰好這書幫我學習日語副詞的意義和使用方法. 它用五十音順序排列出所收集的副詞. 解釋寫得很詳盡. 每個副詞都有分析和比較, 並列出它的近義副詞. 在解釋副詞時, 引用了不少例句說明. 這辭典是於是2001年版, 有488頁, 共收集了1041 個副詞.

我的工具書(VI)

"日本漢字讀音詞典"是中國大陸出版的日文字典. 對我來說, 這書的唯一用處是幫我找出日文漢字的讀音, 並由它找到變化出來的複合詞語的讀音. 它主要用國語拼音列出收集到的日本漢字. 如果你懂得國語拼音, 這是很方便. 另外一個檢字法是去數要尋找的字的筆畫. 它有一個檢字表, 收集了由一筆畫到二十五筆畫以上的字. 我常用個表去檢字. 這字典於1992年出第一版. 相片見到的是2006年版, 有575頁, 共收集了超過5000 個日語漢字.

用手術改變指紋入境

Recently Yoriumi News reported the following:

国人の女が指紋を手術で変えて入国審査のバイオ（生体）認証を通過して不正入国していた事件で、入管難民法違反容疑で今月５日に再逮捕された中国籍の住所不定、無職林蓉被告（２７）が警視庁の調べに「中国で、１０万元（約１３０万円）を払って指紋を変える手術を受けた」と供述していることがわかった。 同庁は、中国国内に指紋変造を専門に行うブローカーが存在するとみている。 同庁幹部によると、林被告が手術を受けたのは、両手の親指と人さし指の計４本。いずれも別の皮膚の一部を移植したり、直接、傷を付けたりしたような不自然な跡が残っていた。２００７年３月に日本から強制送還された後に手術を受け、手術場所については「自宅のある福建省から車で１時間ほどの民家」と供述しているが、どんな手術なのかは「麻酔を受けてよく覚えていない」と話しているという。

A homeless woman with Chinese nationality who had changed the fingerprints by operation, trying to pass the attestation of biotechnology of the passport control (living body) and illegally enter the country was arrested again on the 5th of this month on the suspicion of violating the Immigration Control and Refugee Law. It was understood that this unemployed defendant (27) had testified to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department that "In China (I) paid 100,000 yuan (about 1.3 million yen) for the operation to change the fingerprints". This Department expected the broker who was specialized in fingerprint alteration still staying in China. According to the agency officials, in total four fingers, including the thumb and index finger of both hands had undergone operation, some skin from somewhere was transplanted to both parts, and with unnatural direct wound marks remaining. As to the kind of operation that had been received, she said, "because anesthetizing was received, therefore it could not be remembered well". The operation was undergone after she was deported from Japan in March, 2007, and it was testified that the operation location was "in Fujian in a private house about one hour's drive by car from home".

It seems that if you have the connection, you could have all kinds of private medical services, be it legal or illegal, in China.

日內陸機手提行李新規定

Recently Asahi News reported the following:

縦、横、高さの合計が１１５センチ以内――。国内線の旅客機の客室に持ち込める荷物のサイズが１２月から各社で統一される。バイオリンなど楽器が持ち込めなくなる音楽関係者は、楽器ケースを作り直したり、航空会社側に「例外扱い」を水面下で求めたり。一方の航空会社は「特別扱いできない」と厳格な運用をする構えだ。 これまでは持ち込み荷物の規制は各社バラバラで、規定があっても厳格に守られず、空席状況などに応じて柔軟に対応するケースもあった。 ところが最近、車輪のついた小型スーツケースを持ち込む客が急増。インターネットや携帯電話で搭乗手続きを終え、空港カウンターに寄らなくて済むようになったこともあり、規定外のタイプが持ち込まれることが多くなった。荷物が機内の棚に収まらず、出発が遅れるトラブルも多発。ある社では０８年度、荷物のトラブルをめぐる運航の遅れが１年間で約５千件、計約３１６時間もあった。航空各社は「定時運航を保つためには、規制の徹底しかない」とルール変更に踏み切った。

Starting from December, flight companies in Japan would be united to restrict the size of luggage that could be brought to the guest room of passenger planes in domestic flights: a total of within 115 centimeters in length, width, and height. Music related parties who could not bring musical instruments such as violins, while trying to make the musical instrument case, requested "exception treatment" from the airline behind the scene. On the other hand, airlines maintained a posture of carrying out the decision seriously, saying that "it is not possible to give special treatment". Up to now, although there were regulations, they were not enforced strictly, there were cases that luggage were handled flexibly in response to the vacant seat situation at the time. However, recently, guests who brought small suitcases with wheels attached had increased rapidly. There were those who completed boarding procedures by Internet and by the cellular phone, did not report to the airport counter before boarding the plane, and often they brought along a type of luggage that was not allowed by regulations. These luggage could not be stored properly onto the shelf of the plane, often causing trouble that delayed plane's departure. In certain company in the year 2008, there were as many as 316 hours of service delay in about 5,000 cases of luggage trouble. Airlines that carried out the rule changes said that "(we) can do nothing but to insist on carrying out the restriction so as to keep (our) service to the time schedule".

It seems that domestics flights in Japan are under tighter control as far as boarding regulations are concerned.

我的工具書(V)

"易懂日語辭典"是由台灣大新書局出版. 對我來說, 它收集的單字數目比較少. 不過它的好處是能把一些常用, 但係十分混淆的日本字詳細地解釋. 例如"氣"這個字,日本人常用它來造出很相似的複合詞. 這詞典收集了由 "氣" 延伸出來的複合詞, 加以對照和比較. 它的另一特色是對單字提供了日語, 英語和中文解釋. 它的例句亦很多, 例句中的 漢字亦附上有日語法音. 這本詞典用日文五十音順排列單字. 這詞典於1996年出版, 有1103頁.

The China White Paper 1949(II)

According to this book, the US policy towards China was for the purpose of getting equality of trading rights in China. The United States saw their first treaty with China, the Treaty of Wanghia (望廈條約) signed on July 3, 1844 had embraced the principle of equality of commercial opportunity, as expressed in the most-favoured-nation clause inside the treaty. Wanghia was named after a small village located slightly north of Macao. The American thought that such a clause had served their interest well up to the late 1890s when they felt the Great Powers was beginning to divide China into spheres of interest that could break China apart.1 In response to the situation, US tried to adopt a new policy towards China: The Open Door Policy. In 1899 the American suggested to the Powers that, within their respective sphere of interest, they would treat the national of all countries equally in matters such as general tariffs, railroad tariff and harbour dues. In 1900, after the Boxer Uprising, the United States formalized its Open Door Policy, with the aim of preserving "Chinese territorial and administrative entity". Starting from the early 20th century, US policy towards China was guided by two principles: to seek equal commercial opportunity in China, and to maintain Chinese territorial and administrative integrity.2 (to be continued)

Notes:
1.United States, Department of State. The China White Paper-August 1949. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, page 2.

2. Ibid., page 3.