Japan: Who Governs? The rise of the developmental state

Recently I have read the following book. Its main points are:

Book Title: Chalmers Johnson.1995. Japan: Who Governs? The rise of the developmental state. NY; London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Main Points:

Ch. 2. It stresses that one of the critical requirement in the study of the late 20^th century political economic was to understand the sociopolitical forces that had fostered Japan’s high speed economic growth, and by extension that of its copiers in east Asia: the four dragons. (38)

-the chapter suggests that there were problems with Weber’s theory of the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism in Asia. (39) The author believes that Weber’s contribution had been seriously misunderstood. His theory was a reaction to Marx’s mutualism, they were arguing about whether values (ideas) were independent or depending variable in explaining social phenomenon.(40) Weber showed that values and similar force of belief (idea/thinking) influenced development as powerful as material forces (Marx’s idea). Capitalism was not possible without appropriate values. (41)

- the chapter suggests that an explanation of the high speed economic growth in east Asia could not be reduced to merely religious value. (44)

-late developers differed from the original developers in that social-economic factors such as the rise of bourgeoisie, private investments, entrepreneurship, and even protestants were not as important as the conscious politic decision to industrialize.(45)

Ch. 3 – suggests that the reforms were the work of the new dealers. This was true as far as it went, but it failed to take into account of the Japanese government’s prewar and postwar industrial policy and how it was built on and thus shaped the heritage of the occupation. (64)

-contrary to American political science theory, the power of the Japanese state had not been delegated to it by the elected representatives of the people, the state had instead imposed its economic achievement on the people and owed their allegiance in doing so.(67)

Ch.4 - it shows four aspects of growing tendency of Japan and American that saw each other as adversaries. Japan’s peculiar pattern of trade, American policy, revisionism, and doctrinaire economist, together they constituting a complex whole that would be analyzed in the chapter. The author uses nine aspects to show that Japanese economic behavior had shown that Japan was mercantile power, not a free trader. By mercantile power it meant a nation that used state action to export the utmost possible quantity, and to import as little as possible. By free trader it meant a nation that used state action to promote trading system in which the lowest cost product always got the order. (71) When confronted with these evidence, Japanese spokesman usually retreated to the argument that foreign salesmen did not try hard enough in Japan. The American’s response to Japan was inconsistent and torn by series of contradictions. (89) This reflected both the changing nature and distribution of power globally and the collapse of bipolarity. (89)

- international trading system was supposed to be self-correcting: current account surplus would lead to capital flows and currency realignment that either alerted consumer’s purchasing decision or lower their levels of living. When this mechanism was not working, this was the realm of the so called macroeconomic imbalances that some analysis thought that it was the true cause of the American trade deficits. After the Regan administration cut American taxes, there should either a sky high interest rate or a drastic cut in government spending. But neither had happened because of the influx of Japanese capital into the US. (90)

Ch. 5. The endless MacNeil Lehrerism that afflicted American public policy discussion was one of the most frustrating aspects of the current Japanese American relation. There were three particular reasons: First, the ideological blinders that prevented American from looking squarely at Japan. These were caused by the ideological dimension of the cold war: the ideology to fit Japan into the west. The second was the unusual situation in which Japanese nationalism was expressed: almost entirely theory of economic claim and achievement. Third, it was the fact that Japanese economy was guided by the state strategy. (96)

- the goal of this chapter is to put some flesh on each of these three arguments. At the end it shall return to the famous question: What was to be done? (98)

- the economists were unable to analyse the Japanese problem because at root it was not an economic problem, but a matter of differing in political system. The key variable and asymmetry was the state structure. (99) The first thing to be done was to strengthen and reorient US national analytical capacity to understand and react to Japanese achievements. Second, the US had to adopt its own industrial policy. State could be important contributor to the success of market economies. (111)Third, the US had to adopt results-oriented trade. (112)

Ch. 6. Practicing political scientists were not yet prepared to answer ‘Who governs in Japan?’, although we had mountains of evidence, much of it contradictory, to sift on the subject. (117)

- the key difference was that the postwar bureaucracy in Japan, at least for the greater part of the postwar period, had fewer rivals of power than did the prewar bureaucracy. John Maki generalized that modern Japan, until the surrender in 1945, was ruled by a combination of three power groups, the militarist, the monopoly capitalist (zaibatsu) and the bureaucrats. From about 1948, and until the conservative’s merger in 1955, the answer to ‘who governs in Japan’ was clearly the bureaucracy. After 1955, political party influence grew. The creation of the Tanaka cabinet in 1972 owed less to the actions of the politician factions than to the weakening of the ex-bureaucrats faction. (127)

(to be continued)